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The failure of corporate entities has continued to draw the attention of various 
stakeholders across the globe. As a result of this problem, different countries have 
issued Corporate Governance (CG) guidelines. Part of the objective of these 
guidelines is to improve firm values. In Nigeria, similar guidelines (known as the 
Codes of Corporate Governance) were issued for corporate organizations to align the 
country with the global best practice. However, researchers, investment analysts, and 
other stakeholders continue to argue whether those governance mechanisms increase 
the value of stockholders. Others recommend that firm governance practices should 
be considered before making investment decisions while others argue that 
governance practices are not important in Nigeria. In order to address the problem, 
this research empirically examined the effects of eight corporate governance 
variables on the equity value multiple (EVM) of Nigerian firms. The study used data 
of 100 firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) for the period of 2009-
2013. The study used the Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) to estimate the 
regression due to the endogeneity problem among the variables. The study applied 
the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) method to generate equity value multiple 
from the four equity valuation multiples. The results reveal a significant positive 
relationship between board size, board independence, board gender diversity, audit 
committee independence, managerial shareholding, and disclosure of corporate 
governance information at 1% level of significance. This study contributes to the 
understanding of the governance-equity value relationship by examining some 
corporate governance variables. The results further provide an insight for 
practitioners and policy makers on the importance of corporate governance codes 
consideration towards investment decision in Nigeria. Therefore, the study 
recommends consideration of the above CG variables in making investment 
decision. 
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Kegagalan entiti korporat terus menarik perhatian pelbagai pihak berkepentingan di 
seluruh dunia. Akibat daripada masalah ini, banyak negara telah mengeluarkan garis 
panduan Tadbir Urus Korporat (CG). Sebahagian daripada objektif garis panduan ini 
adalah untuk meningkatkan nilai firma. Di Nigeria, garis panduan yang sama, yang 
dikenali sebagai kod CG, telah diisukan untuk organisasi korporat bagi memastikan 
amalan negara selari dengan amalan terbaik global. Namun, para penyelidik, 
penganalisa pelaburan, dan pihak berkepentingan yang lain terus mempertikai sama 
ada mekanisme tadbir urus meningkatkan nilai pemegang saham. Di satu pihak, 
terdapat syor bahawa amalan tadbir urus firma perlu dipertimbangkan sebelum 
membuat keputusan pelaburan, sementara pihak lain mengatakan bahawa amalan 
tadbir urus tidak penting di Nigeria. Bagi menangani masalah ini, kajian ini secara 
empirikal mengkaji kesan lapan pemboleh ubah tadbir urus korporat ke atas nilai 
ekuiti pelbagai (EVM) firma Nigeria. Kajian ini menggunakan data daripada 100 
syarikat yang disenaraikan di Bursa Saham Nigeria (NSE) bagi tempoh 2009-2013. 
Kajian ini menggunakan Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) untuk 
menganggarkan regresi kerana masalah endogeniti antara pemboleh ubah. Kajian ini 
juga menggunakan kaedah Analisis Komponen Utama (PCA) untuk menjana EVM 
firma daripada empat pengganda penilaian ekuiti. Keputusan kajian mendedahkan 
hubungan positif yang signifikan antara saiz lembaga, kebebasan lembaga, 
kepelbagaian jantina lembaga, kebebasan jawatankuasa audit, pegangan saham 
pengurusan, dan pendedahan maklumat tadbir urus korporat pada aras keertian 1%. 
Kajian ini menyumbang kepada pemahaman tentang hubungan tadbir-ekuiti dengan 
memeriksa  beberapa pembolehubah tadbir urus korporat. Seterusnya, keputusan 
kajian ini memberi maklum balas untuk pengamal dan pembuat dasar tentang 
kepentingan tadbir urus korporat terhadap keputusan pelaburan di Nigeria. Oleh itu, 
kajian ini mencadangkan bahawa pembolehubah CG dipertimbangkan dalam 
membuat keputusan pelaburan 
 
Kata kunci: tadbir urus korporat, nilai ekuiti pelbagai, analisis komponen utama, 
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1.1 Background of Study 
Equity and debt are the two sources of business financing across the globe. Equity 
refers to the excess residual interest of an enterprise asset after liabilities are 
deducted (Pope & Puxty, 1991). Equity financing through the issuance of shares to 
investors appears to be the most preferred source when either starting or expanding a 
business. This is explained by the fact that companies can easily raise the required 
amount of capital and avoid costs such as high interest rates of business financing 
through debt. Srinivasan and Phansalkar (2003) documented that financing company 
through equity is more attractive and preferred compared to financing through debts, 
because the claim of providers of equity is only on the residual value.  
The most common methods of valuing equity are the valuation multiples (Milicevic, 
2009). Valuation multiples simply refer to the expression of firm equity market 
values in relationship to important indicators such as the price-to-book value that are 
assumed to have a relationship with those values (Suozzo, Copper, Sutherland, & 
Deng, 2001). Valuation multiples are widely used in research reports and stock 
recommendations for both the buying and selling of equity shares by investment 
analysts. Valuation multiples are also used by investors to assesses firms seeking an 




comprehensive valuations of equity to obtain their terminal values and are designed 
to summarize the value for the stream of an estimated pay off (Souzzo et al., 2001). 
Valuation multiples or value multiples are usually determined by the use of 
accounting numbers. In fact, the relationship between accounting numbers and 
market values forms the basis of the multiples valuation method (Schreiner, 2007).  
According to Wilcox and Philips (2005), four different interest groups use value 
multiples: 1) corporate managers who want to comprehend how best to improve their 
firm‘s value; 2) fundamental analysts who want to appraise corporate managements 
and forecast the results of their efforts; 3) buyers and sellers who want to set values 
for risky assets not already well-valued by liquid markets; and 4), finally, active 
investors who try to forecast abnormal returns on the basis of mismatches between 
the current price and indicated equilibrium prices supported by a firm's fundamentals 
and current macroeconomic conditions. Thus, value multiples serve as an important 
metric for making business investment decisions by different interest groups 
(corporate executives, fund managers, institutional investors and private equity 
investors amongst others).  
According to Damodaran (2006), one objective of the valuation multiples method is 
to determine the equity value of firms based on the market prices of comparable 
transactions or sometimes comparable firms. That is, stock analysts try to examine 




multiples are used for complete valuations of equities because they efficiently 
communicate those valuations that are used to obtain the terminal values of an 
investment (Liu, Nissim, & Thomas, 2002). According to Penman (2006), current 
firm performance as summarized in its financial reports represents an important 
input to the market‘s assessment of a firm‘s future value.  
Two models exist in relationship to equity value: 1) fundamental and 2) 
relative/market-based valuation models. Fundamental equity valuation is the method 
of analyzing information in present and past financial statements, in combination 
with other firm-specific features, industry, and macroeconomic information to 
forecast future payoffs and finally arrive at an intrinsic value of a firm (Liu et al., 
2002). Fundamental equity valuation models include: 1) the Dividend Discount 
Model (DDM), 2) The Discounted Cash Flow Model (DCF), 3) the Residual Income 
Valuation Model (RIV), and 4) the Abnormal Earnings Growth Model (AEG).  
The second valuation model is the relative or market valuation model, which has also 
been classified into enterprise and equity value multiples (Suozzo et al., 2001). 
Enterprise value multiples are used in expressing the entire value of the enterprise in 
relationship to values that include sales and earnings before interest and tax. 
Enterprise value multiples includes Enterprise Value to Invested Capital (EV/IC); 
Enterprise Value to Total Assets (EV/TA); Enterprise Value to Research and 




Depreciation and Amortization (EV/EBITDA) and Enterprise Value to Sales (EV/S) 
(Suozzo et al., 2001).  
Equity value multiple, as the name implies, refers to the expression of the market 
value of common stockholders‘ interest in a firm, relative to an important indicator 
relating to that value (Suozzo et al., 2001). Owners (shareholders) are subordinate to 
all other claimants of the assets and cash flow of a business; any value used in an 
equity multiple valuation must be one that represents cash flow, residual profit, 
assets or another residual measures (Souzzo et al., 2001). Equity value multiples can 
also be referred to as expression of an owner‘s residual value on the assets of a firm. 
In addition, equity value multiples indicate the future growth in earnings and book 
value that is positively related to expected future returns on equity (Penman, 1996). 
Equity value multiples include price-to-earnings (P/E); price-to-book value (P/B); 
price-to-cash flow (P/C) and price-to-sales (P/S) (Schreiner, 2007). According to 
Schreiner (2007), equity value multiples serve as important tools in predicting the 
value of equity reasonably. In relationship to performance, equity value multiples 
perform better in terms of valuation accuracy compared to enterprise value multiples.  
Equity value multiples seem to have more advantages than other measures of 
performance especially in valuing equity (Schreiner, 2007). For example, Tobin‘s Q 
is used to measure a firm‘s value; however, it includes the value of both debts and 
equity to the replacement costs of the assets. But, many investors are more 




the entire value of the firm. Similarly, other performance measures like return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) measure net revenue to total assets and 
equity respectively. In contrast, equity value multiples consider book value, sales, 
and earnings relative to their market values. Therefore, this study focuses on equity 
value multiples because of the desire by investors to know the worth of their 
investment at any point in time. The question here is whether company corporate 
governance practices impact the value of equity. 
Corporate Governance (CG) is regarded as a global issue that has attracted debates 
among researchers, investment analysts and other players in corporate organizations. 
Financial scandals, in recent years, mostly attributed to failure of those corporations 
in their CG practices, have shaken the confidence of the investing public (Strier, 
2005). Good CG has been acknowledged by global financial institutions as an 
important component in the promotion of a more stable financial system and the 
reduction of systemic risks related to financial crises (Copp, 2006). CG is an 
essential component of equity risk; therefore, investors must consider its 
measurements (Grandmont, Grant, & Silva, 2004). The issue of CG is of huge 
practical significance, even in developed markets (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Corporate governance can be viewed from the perspective of internal and external 
mechanisms. Internal corporate mechanisms are those actions that affect how an 
organization is governed internally. They include boards and their various 




mechanisms involve external factors influencing CG such as regulatory bodies, 
standard setting organizations, and labour rules (Weir, Laing, & Mcknight, 2002). 
Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission‘s (SEC) Code of Corporate 
Governance stresses the importance of internal governance mechanisms in Nigeria 
listed firms. According to the code, it is the internal mechanisms that are responsible 
for the implementation of the external governance mechanisms. CG can also be 
viewed from the perspective of CG structures and process (Kula, 2005). Structured 
corporate governance mechanisms include board attributes. Board attributes, on the 
other hand, include board characteristics, board composition, board processes, and 
board structure (Ishak & Abdul Manaf, 2013).  
The internally structured corporate governance mechanisms are the focus of this 
study. Internal CG mechanisms are required for the external mechanisms to function 
effectively, and this, therefore, leads to the harmonization of the relationship among 
these CG mechanisms (Nair & Cremers, 2005). Monitoring and control dimensions 
have received considerable importance in CG. Lack of monitoring and control may 
hamper business activities, raise doubts about business prosperity and add to a 
narrow perspective on CG (Filatotchev, Toms, & Wright, 2006). Moreover, 
information about internal CG mechanisms comprises the information available for 
Nigeria listed firms, which is the focus of the study.  
 
Several arguments have been developed on whether company corporate governance 




been conducted on CG and a firm‘s value in developed and developing countries. 
Studies conducted have used various mechanisms of CG. Some studies conducted in 
developed economies include Bhagat and Bolton (2008), Black and Love (2005), 
Black, de Carvalho, and Gorga, (2012), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003), Gherghina, 2015, Goncharov, Werner, and Zimmermann 
(2006), Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Kenneth, 
Parrino, and Trapani (1996), Kuo and Tswei (2011), Lehn, Patro, and Zhao (2005), 
and Walters, Kroll, and Wright (2007). The studies mentioned above used different 
CG mechanisms and CG index in relationship to performance measures. Some of the 
CG mechanisms used in the above studies included board structure, ownership, and 
committees amongst others. 
However, the studies have produced mixed results. Some found a significant positive 
relationship between different CG mechanisms and firm performance (Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985; Gompers et al., 2003; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; Walters, Kroll, & 
Wright, 2007), while others could not establish that good CG enhances corporate 
values (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Jensen & Murphy, 1990). Similar studies on CG and 
firm performance have also been conducted in emerging markets. They include 
Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2014, Black, Jang, and Kim (2006), Black and Khanna 
(2007), Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells 
(1998), Klapper and Love (2004), Sanda, Mikailu, and Garba (2005), Ujunwa 
(2012). Yet, these studies too produced mixed results. In addition, previous studies 




performance measures such as return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and 
Tobin‘s Q (TQ) of firms. At this time, little theoretical knowledge exists with respect 
to the complex nature of CG and the equity value multiples of firms, particularly in 
an emerging economy like Nigeria. This, therefore, serves as one basis for carrying 
out the study.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
Understandings of the structure of corporate governance have been developed 
through the analysis of firms from an agency perspective (Pope & Puxty, 1991). The 
firms that are publicly traded on a stock exchange are characterized by the separation 
of shareholding and management. Managers are saddled with the responsibility for 
operational and strategic decision making of the firm, while shareholders only 
provide the money and act as risk takers for their individual investments (Kohl, 
2009). In this relationship, managers are expected to run the company on behalf of 
shareholders with the objective of maximizing the value of owners on both a short- 
and long-term basis. However, in certain circumstances managers pursue their own 
interests by extracting private benefits at the cost of common stockholders.  
The collapse of companies such as Enron, Cadbury and WorldCom amongst others 
reveals how managers can pursue personal interests to the detriment of shareholders 
and other interest groups. As a result, shareholders across the globe and Nigeria in 




investments. In Nigeria, equity investors show more concern on corporate 
governance after the 2007/08 global financial crises. 
Global financial crises have greatly affected Nigerian investors in terms of a loss of a 
huge sum of money by both local and foreign investors (Sanusi, 2010). The 
capitalization of the Nigerian Stock Market has increase to 318.3% from 9.05 billion 
United State dollars in December 2005 to 38 billion United State dollars in March 
2008. However, due to the terrible effects of the global financial crises on Nigeria, 
the market capitalization was worth only 13 billion United State dollars in March 
2009 (Sanusi, 2011). The collapse of the capital market that resulted in the loss of 
investments was largely attributed to poor CG practices such as insider-related loan 
abuses, poor management of risk, weak internal control systems (ICS) and 
insufficient information disclosures by public companies (NTWG, 2009). The 
outcome of the National Technical Working Group NTWG posed a serious 
challenge to the regulators; as such they devise means to address the problem 
holistically.  
To address the drastic effects of the global financial crises on Nigerian equity 
investments, regulatory authorities responded through a review of governance 
regulations. For example, the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission 
constituted a committee in September 2008 to review the 2003 Code of Corporate 
Governance for listed firms. According to the commission, the objective was to 




precipitous decline in the future firm and equity values. Thus, the code was amended 
in 2011 to meet increasing challenges. For its part, the National Insurance 
Commission (NAICOM) in 2009 issued a CG code for the country‘s insurance 
companies. This, according to the commission, was necessary considering the 
complex nature of insurance companies with respect to the national economy. 
Similarly, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in 2006 issued a code of corporate 
governance for banks after banking consolidation.  
The measure areas affected by the reforms are board size, board independence, board 
gender diversity, audit committee independence, managerial shareholding, chief 
executive officer (CEO) tenure, director‘s compensation and CG disclosure in the 
annual reports. The SEC Code of 2003 recommends a minimum board size of 5 and 
maximum of 15, while the revised SEC code of 2011 allowed firms to have a board 
size relative to the scale and complexity of their operations. On it part, the CBN 
recommends a maximum board size of 20.  
On the issue of board independence, the 2003 code of CG termed the non-executive 
director as an independent director. However, the SEC later realized that non-
executive directors might not be necessary be independent particularly after the 
2007/08 financial crises. Therefore, SEC 2011 revised code make a clear distinction 
between non-executive directors and independent directors and listed firms are 
required by the revised code to have at least 40% of their members to be 




in the 2003 code, the emphasis was on non-executive directors while the new code 
placed more stress on independent directors serving on the audit committee to make 
that committee truly independent. 
Similarly, the 2003 SEC code did not make any provision for gender in the 
composition of corporate boards. But, the 2011 revised code of SEC recommends 
that listed firms consider gender diversity in the composition of their respective 
boards. The disclosure of managerial shareholding is not compulsory in the 2003 
SEC code while the revised 2011 code required detailed disclosures of managerial 
share ownership. In fact, in the case of CBN code, an approval is required for 10% 
and more for managerial ownership. On the issue of chief executive officer power 
(CEOP), the 2003 code allowed one person to hold the position of CEO and 
chairman at the time. The tenure of the CEO has no limit in the 2003 code. However, 
the 2011 revised code separated the position of chair and that of the CEO and the 
tenure of the CEO was fixed for 4-year periods, which can be renewed based on 
performance after the first 4 years.  
The SEC revised code of 2011 further states that a company‘s compensation policy 
should be designed to provide appropriate compensation to directors and the 
compensation paid to them must be published in the company‘s annual report. 
Adequate guidelines for compensation were not addressed in the 2003 SEC code. 
Finally, listed firms are required by the revised codes particularly, the SEC and the 




provide reasons for instances of non-compliance. This study empirically examined 
the effect of CG governance reforms on the value of firms to stockholders as the 
parties that suffered more in the event of corporate failure. The expectation is that 
the new regulation would enhance firm value and equity value of the firm‘s 
stockholders. 
On the other hand, equity value multiples (EVM) are regarded as the most important 
measures of the value of equity share ownership (Schreiner, 2007). According to 
Wilcox and Philips (2005), four different interest groups use equity value multiples: 
1) corporate managers who want to comprehend how best to improve their firm‘s 
value; 2) fundamental analysts who want to appraise corporate managements and 
forecast the results of their efforts; 3) buyers and sellers who want to set values for 
risky assets not already well-valued by liquid markets; and 4), finally, active 
investors who try to forecast abnormal returns on the basis of mismatches between 
the current price and indicated equilibrium prices supported by a firm's fundamentals 
and current macroeconomic conditions.  
The Nigerian equity investors used equity value multiples to forecast stock returns 
relative to the value of equity shareholders. This is because, EVMs are used for 
comprehensive valuations of equity to obtain their terminal values and are also used 
to summarize the value for the stream of an estimated pay off of the equity 




investment decisions by different interest groups (corporate executives, fund 
managers and private equity investors amongst others).  
As a result of widespread use of the equity value multiples globally and in Nigeria, 
assessment of firm governance of those equity value multiples becomes paramount. 
This is because equity shareholders suffered more from governance failures in 
Nigeria compared to other interest groups of corporate organizations.  
Similarly, researchers have made theoretical efforts to study the relationship between 
CG mechanisms and the value of firms in the global perspective (Alimehmeti & 
Paletta, 2014; Gompers et al., 2003; Goh, 2011; Goncharov et al., 2006; Kuo & 
Tswei, 2011). Unfortunately, the results of the studies have been conflicting. For 
example, Alimehmeti and Paletta, (2014), Gompers et al. (2003), Black and Love 
(2005), Black et al. (2006) found a significant and positive relationship between CG 
mechanisms and the value of equity. Conversely, studies of Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008), Gherghina, (2015), Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Lehn et al. (2005) 
reported a negative relationship between CG and the equity value of the companies. 
In Nigeria, the only known study on price-to-earnings (P/E) multiple is that of Sanda 
et al. (2005), which established that only selected CG mechanisms influence the P/E 
multiple. Therefore, the findings combined are mixed and inconclusive suggesting 




Hence, the problem of the current study is whether the regulatory reforms on board 
size, board and audit committee independence, board gender diversity, managerial 
shareholding, CEO tenure, director‘s compensation, and disclosure of CG 
information in a firm‘s annual report have a corresponding impact on the equity 
value multiple of firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.   
1.3 Research Motivation 
This study is motivated by the arguments of Nigerian investors about whether the 
reviewed code of Corporate Governance by regulatory authorities with respect to 
board size, board and audit committee independence, managerial shareholding, CEO 
power, director‘s compensation and disclosure of CG information have significant 
effects on the equity value multiples of Nigerian listed firms.  
Other reasons that motivate this study include the following:  
First, previous studies that addressed the influence of CG and equity values have 
focused on either one or a few of the CG mechanisms (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Miller 
& Triana, 2009; Rosentein & Wyatt, 1997; Yermack, 1996). In contrast to the above 
studies, this study extends the literature by expanding the knowledge through the 
incorporation of eight CG variables and their effects in predicting the value of 
equity. The eight CG variables are board size, board and audit committee 
independence, board gender diversity, managerial shareholding, CEO power, 




The selection of the above mentioned CG variables is based on the regulatory 
reforms carried out to address lapses in the 2003 SEC code of CG. 
Second, previous research measured compensation of directors by the amount of pay 
(Mehran, 1995; Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 2006; Ryan & Wiggins, 2004). In this 
current study, the compensation of directors is measured as abnormal director‘s 
compensation (ADC). Abnormal director‘s compensation refers to the pay that 
directors receive above their peer group sector average. This is because good pay 
encourages directors to enforce sound CG in the company. Abnormal director‘s 
compensation has been studied in the United States with respect to takeover target 
companies (Agrawal & Walkling, 1992). However, to this researcher‘s knowledge, 
this current study is a pioneering attempt to test abnormal director‘s compensation on 
equity value multiples. 
Third, with respect to the Nigerian business environment, investments analysts have 
used value multiples in the valuation of equity for both growth and value investors. 
Growth investors are those investors who like to buy stock with high prices, while 
value investors invest in firms with low stock prices. CG is seen as a global issue in 
corporate management and the protection of stakeholder‘s interests. Yet, no study so 
far has examined the combined effects of a firm‘s CG in predicting the equity value 
of firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). According to Okike (2007), 
Nigeria, with its emerging economy, is the most populous country in Africa. 




its peculiar socio-political and economic settings. Also, providing sound CG that 
gives correct assurance to prospective and existing shareholders (domestic and 
foreign investors) is critical to the country‘s development. 
Fourth, a general argument exists amongst investment analysts on whether a firm‘s 
governance practices should determine investment decisions. For example, some 
studies have established a strong positive and significant relationship between a 
firm‘s CG practices and a firm‘s value (Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2014; Black et al., 
2006; Black & Love, 2005; Gompers et al., 2003). However, other studies have 
reported a negative and significant relationship between the governance practices of 
firms and their value (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Gherghina, 2015; Yeh et al., 2008).  
Based on the research problem and motivation of the study discussed above, this 
study seeks answers to the following research questions.      
1.4 Research Questions 
In line with the problem and research motivation stated above, the study seeks to 
answer the following research questions: 
1. Does board size have a relationship with the equity value multiple of 
Nigerian listed firms? 
2. Does board independence have a relationship with the equity value multiple 




3. Does board gender diversity have a relationship with the equity value 
multiple of Nigerian listed firms? 
4. Does audit committee independence have a relationship with the equity value 
multiple of Nigerian listed firms? 
5. Does managerial shareholding have a relationship with the equity value 
multiple of Nigerian listed firms? 
6. Does chief executive officer power concentration have a relationship with the 
equity value multiple of Nigerian listed firms? 
7. Does abnormal directors compensation have a relationship with the equity 
value multiple of Nigerian listed firms? 
8. Does corporate governance information disclosure have a relationship with 
the equity value multiple of Nigerian listed firms?  
1.5 Research Objectives 
Based on the research problem, motivation and research questions stated above, the 
major objective of this study is to examine the impact of corporate governance on the 
equity value multiple of Nigerian listed firms. To achieve the above objective, the 




1. To examine the relationship between board size and the equity value multiple 
of Nigerian listed firms. 
2. To examine the relationship between board independence and the equity 
value multiple of Nigerian listed firms. 
3. To examine the relationship between board gender diversity and the equity 
value multiple of Nigerian listed firms. 
4. To examine the relationship between audit committee independence and the 
equity value multiple of Nigerian listed firms. 
5. To examine the relationship between managerial shareholding and the equity 
value multiple of Nigerian listed firms. 
6. To examine the relationship between chief executive officer power 
concentration and the equity value multiple of Nigerian listed firms. 
7. To examine the relationship between abnormal directors compensation and 
the equity value multiple of Nigerian listed firms. 
8. To examine the relationship between corporate governance information 




1.6 Contribution of the Study 
A number of studies have been conducted on CG and a firm‘s value at different 
times and in different parts of the world. However, most studies documented in 
accounting and finance literature have focused on CG and other performance 
measures that include return on assets, return on equity, return on investment, sales 
growth, profitability and Tobin‘s Q amongst others. Thus, by studying CG and 
equity value multiples, the study has great significance and contributes to 
stakeholders including shareholders, firms, regulatory authorities, the empirical body 
of literature and methodology.  
1.6.1 Contribution to Shareholders 
The findings of the research have great significance with respect to the perceptions 
of shareholders about the role CG mechanisms play in improving the reliability of 
corporate financial reporting procedures and the information of accounting-based 
multiples. Measuring CG in relationship to equity value helps shareholders assess the 
capability of managers in managing their investments. This is because managers 
sometimes alter accounting information for their respective interests. Thus, the study 
contributes to shareholders by evaluating information and the reliability of 
accounting -based multiples in relationship to CG. The findings of this study open 




1.6.2 Contribution to Firms 
A firm CG is an issue that is related to the way and manner in which companies are 
structured and administered, for example, management, owners, boards and 
committees. Companies need to satisfy owners and attract more investors by 
adopting appropriate CG practices. The result of this research has highlighted the 
significance of CG practices in predicting the value of equity. Measuring the impact 
of CG mechanisms on EVMs also enables companies to assess the effectiveness and 
efficiency of corporate governance in improving the financial stake of the 
shareholders. Once investors are able to obtain reliable information about 
corporation performance, their response to financial and market performance 
measures can increase.   
1.6.3 Contribution to Regulatory Authorities 
Issues of CG practices rules and regulations in any part of the world require evidence 
that CG systems are effective in protecting stakeholder‘s interests. This study has 
provided empirical evidence about the roles of CG in increasing the value of equity 
holders. New CG regulations and amendments of existing CG best practices should 
be founded on empirical evidence rather than on politically driven debates. The 
outcome of the research has provided an understanding to regulatory authorities of 




1.6.4 Contribution to the Literature 
The findings of the study have contributed to the body of empirical literature in the 
following ways:  
 
1. To the best knowledge of the researcher, no prior study empirically and 
theoretically investigated the relationship between various CG mechanisms and 
all the four equity value multiples. Thus, the study contributes by providing 
theoretical evidence on the relationship between corporate governance variables 
and equity value multiple of Nigerian listed firms. 
2. The results have given an additional understanding on the reasons behind the 
inconclusive findings concerning the CG and performance relationship.   
3. Previous studies have measured directors‘ compensation by aggregating the 
amount of pay to the directors including salaries and other incentives accruing to 
the directors (Mehran, 1995; Ryan & Wiggins, 2004; Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 
2006). However, in this study, abnormal director‘s compensation was determined 
by computing director‘s compensation above the peer group sector average. The 
expectation is that additional incentives to directors will enable them to create 
more value for the company. This is also a unique contribution. 
4. The results of the research have also provided further support for the external 
validity of previous studies through analysis of different economic settings, the 




5. Prior studies measured CEO power in two ways: 1) the situation in which the 
CEO is also the chairman of the company and 2) the number of years spent as the 
company‘s CEO. However, the current study measured CEO power as dummy of 
1 for CEO serving above 4 years while 4 years and below 0. The expectation is 
that, CEO assumes more power as the tenure increases.  
1.6.5 Contribution to Methodology 
Prior studies on CG and equity values have focused on one or two of the equity value 
multiples: price-to-earnings, price-to-book value, price-to-cash flow, or price-to-
sales multiples. However, this research study used all dimensions of the EVMs by 
using principal components analysis (PCA). For example, Lys, Naughton, and Wang 
(2015) applied PCA to condense 10 corporate social responsibilities CSR to 3. But, 
to the best of this researcher‘s knowledge, no prior study used PCA to generate one 
EVM. 
Similarly, one common concern with research on CG and value is the possible 
presence of endogeneity. Specially, where positive causality is established from 
performance to good CG, the estimated coefficient on CG might become biased, 
hence rendering the prior results unreliable. This study used the generalized method 




1.7 Scope of the Study 
The study covers all the EVMs because they capture essential aspects of company 
financial statements. The EVMs also provide a more accurate valuation of equity 
compared to enterprise value multiples (Schreiner, 2007). The selection of firms is 
based on the availability of information in annual reports for the equity value 
multiples. The study also concentrated on mechanisms of CG in the literature 
including board size, board independence, board gender diversity, audit committee 
independence, managerial shareholding, chief executive officer (CEO) power 
concentration; abnormal directors‘ compensation and CG disclosure.  
The selection of above CG mechanisms is based on availability of information in the 
environment of the study. The information on the variables of the study is available 
in the annual reports of firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. In addition, the 
choice of the above-mentioned CG variables is based on issues observed in CBN, 
SEC, and NAICOM codes formulated for implementation by firms. For example, the 
codes have recommended different board sizes, an independent board, and 
ownership by management, independent of an audit committee, power of the CEO in 
relationship to tenure, the compensation structure for directors and the provision of 
CG information in annual reports.  
The choice of audit committee independence is based on regulatory 
recommendations of the SEC, CBN, and the NAICOM that all functions of an audit 




functions. Furthermore, global financial crises have greatly affected Nigerian 
investors. The crises have resulted in the loss of huge sums of money for both local 
and foreign investors (Brambila-Macias & Massa, 2010; Sanusi, 2010). Thus, the 
study covered the post-global financial crises period (2009-2013), as this was the 
period in which investors began paying more attention to CG practices as a result of 
corporate failures. The period of 2009 onward is regarded as the post-global 
financial crises period, therefore, making it very important for this study. The study 
covered all firms listed on the NSE as of 31st December 2013.    
1.8 Organization of the Study  
The study is organized into six chapters. Chapter One contains the introduction to the 
study; the chapter clearly explained the study‘s focus. Chapter Two explains the 
concepts and reviews the relevant literature and underpinning theories. Chapter 
Three presents the hypotheses and model. Chapter Four explains the methodology of 
the research. Chapter Five presents the results and discussions and Chapter Six 








The previous chapter discusses the direction and focused of the research, research 
problem, research questions, research scope, significance and objective the study 
seek to achieve. This chapter extensively conceptualizes Equity Value Multiple 
(EVM) and Corporate Governance (CG mechanisms). Equity value multiples 
explained in the chapter includes; price-to-earnings, price-to-book value, price-to-
cash flow and price-to-sales.  
The CG mechanisms explained in the chapter, includes, board size, board 
independence, board gender diversity, audit committee independence, managerial 
shareholding, chief executive officer power, abnormal directors compensation and 
CG disclosure information and transparency. The purpose is to ensure that, the 
review is more comprehending. The CG literatures that are important to the problem 
under study were thoroughly reviewed. The studies conducted on the relationship 
between CG and performances were critically reviewed. The review focuses more 
attention on problems, methodologies and findings/results of preceding studies to 
justify the need for our study. Finally, the chapter presented established theories of 




2.2 Background Information of Nigerian Business Environment and CG 
The Nigerian business setting is dominated by private. The private sector capital is 
held by institutions, groups, and private individuals. The private sector capital is 
managed by managements and the company board of directors on behalf of 
shareholders (owners) who are usually spread across the country and abroad. Nigeria 
is the most populous country in Africa with an estimated population of about one 
hundred and seventy eight (178) million people based on 2014 world population 
review reports. According to NSE 2010 annual reports on the country capital market, 
Nigerian capital market is rank second in Africa after South Africa and largest in the 
sub-Sahara region. Nigeria is blessed with a lot of natural resources including oil 
which makes the country one of the oil exporting countries OPEC. Therefore, strong 
corporate governance in Nigeria is important considering its vast population and 
resources in order to better the life of its people.  
Corporate governance is an international issue that continues to attract debate 
amongst practitioners, researchers and the public in virtually every country of the 
world. Investors and other stakeholders (management, creditors employees suppliers, 
creditor society, government agencies) increase more concern on the way and 
manner their corporations are administered. The concern of interest groups in recent 
time upsurge as a result several corporate scandals that lead to the collapse of the 




organization especially financial institutions that include banks and insurance 
companies. 
The National Technical Working Committee NTWC of Nigeria in 2009 attributed 
failure of corporate organizations to poor CG practices and insider- related abuses. In 
order to meet up the global challenge in governance best practices and protect the 
interest of investors (local and foreign). Government regulatory institutions issued 
guides for corporate best practices. The guides are known as the corporate 
governance codes. The codes includes CG code for Nigerian listed firms issued by 
the SEC in 2003 and amended 2011, code of CG for banks after consolidation issued 
by the CBN in 2006 and code of CG for insurance companies issued by the 
NAICOM 2009 to carter for the country‘s insurance companies. 
However, it is important to note that the codes are not rule based rather they are 
principle based like those of the United Kingdom. Compliance with various 
provisions of the codes is not a compulsory, but companies are mandated to disclose 
the level of compliances with the codes and state reasons for instances of non-
compliance. In the case of banks, the Central Bank of Nigeria CBN can enforce 
sanctions for erring banks in regards to the CG compliance. The following sub-
section explains various reasons specified by the regulatory authorities in issuing the 




2.2.1 The Securities and Exchange Commission of Nigeria (SEC)  
The SEC of Nigeria is regarded as the apex regulatory authority in the capital market 
operations. The body was established in 1962. Its obligation was to examine requests 
from companies looking for capital in the capital market. The SEC started as an 
advisory body of Central Bank of Nigeria CBN before attaining the full status of 
regulatory authority of the country capital market in 1973. The Commission issued a 
code of CG for all listed firms in Nigeria effective in 2003. However, as a result of 
increased challenges and weaknesses of the 2003 code, the commission establishes a 
committee to review the area of lapses of the 2003 code. The Committee was 
particularly saddled with the responsibility of identifying constraints and weaknesses 
of the 2003 code, recommending ways of ensuring good CG in the country listed 
firms and means of ensuring greater compliance with the code in order to align the 
code with global best practices.  
According to the SEC, the objective of the review is to ensure the highest level of 
transparency among listed companies in Nigeria. The Committee after concluded its 
assignment comes up with the revised code known as SEC Code of CG for Nigerian 
listed firms 2011. According to the commission, the provisions of the code apply to 
the following categories of companies: 
i. All public listed companies in the country capital market, which is the Nigerian 




ii. All companies seeking to raise money in the capital market through securities 
issuance.  
iii. Other public listed companies seeking to be listed on the stock market. 
 It is also important to note that compliance with the SEC code is principle based and 
not rule based. However, companies are required to include the level of their 
compliance with the code in their respective annual reports and state reasons for 
violating any section of the code.  
2.2.2 The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
The CBN is the apex regulatory body in the country‘s banking industry. CBN was 
established the 1958 Act of Parliament. Its function includes, ensuring monetary 
stability, issuing of the currency, maintaining of external reserve and promoting 
sound financial system among others.  The CBN in 2006 issued code of CG for 
banks after consolidation that increases the capital base of the banks from 2 billion to 
25 billion Nigerian Naira. The following reasons were highlighted by the CBN for 
having separate code of CG specifically for banks looking at their importance in the 
economy. 
i. Financial scandals that leads to the collapse of corporate organization 




 ii. Retention of public trust in the banking industry because of its role in funds 
mobilization, credit allocation to the needy economic sectors, settlement of payment 
and monetary policy implementation. 
iii. Survey by the SEC of Nigeria in 2003 that only 40% of listed companies 
including banks have CG structures in place. According to the same SEC survey, 
virtually all the corporate collapses are attributed to poor governance. 
iv. Consolidation of the banks necessitated the need for strong CG because increase 
in their size has a corresponding increase in complexity of their management. 
2.2.3 National Insurance Commission of Nigeria (NAICOM) 
The NAICOM is the regulatory authority in the Nigerian insurance industry. The 
commission derived its regulatory power from the NAICOM Act of 1997 and the 
Insurance Act of 2003. The major objective of NAICOM is to ensure the effective 
management, supervision and regulation of insurance business in Nigeria 
(NAICOM, 2009). The insurance industry plays vigorous roles in the economy of a 
nation because of risk and uncertainty in the corporate world. CG is inevitable in the 
Nigerian insurance industry considering the critical role of the sector to financial 
market stability, security and economic development (NAICOM, 2009). The CG 
code was adopted in 2009 to guide the operation of Nigerian insurance companies in 
line with international best practices in the insurance business. NAICOM (2009) 




the board of directors and individuals duly appointed by the shareholders to manage 
the business of the company. CG must ensure accountability, transparency and 
increase in the value of shareholders. 
The frameworks of CG introduce by the NAICOM aims to promote transparency and 
efficiency of insurance business in Nigeria. The code also provides clear division of 
responsibilities between different stakeholders that includes shareholders, 
management, creditors and other players in the industry. The code specifically 
addresses the following issues: 
i. Compliance to the relevant regulations and guiding principles of 
insurance business in Nigeria.             
ii. Differences that exist between the board of directors and management of 
insurance business in Nigeria.  
iii. Ineffective oversight and functions of board directors of insurance 
companies in Nigeria. 
iv. Fraudulent practices among board members, managements and staffs of 
insurance companies in Nigeria. 
v. Domineering influence of chairmen or chief executive officer/managing 
director CEO/MD, especially in insurance companies dominated by 
family members.  
vi. Weak systems of internal control. 




viii. Influence of block shareholders over minority shareholders. 
ix. Ineffectiveness of company‘s management information and 
communication system. 
x. Increasing public awareness on the importance of the insurance sector in 
Nigeria. 
xi. Conflict of interest among different interest groups. 
2.2.4 The Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) 
The NSE was founded in 1960 and today serves as the second biggest financial 
centre in Africa. The NSE is a company registered limited by guarantee, is approved 
under the Investments and Securities Act (ISA) under the regulatory supervision of 
the Nigerian SEC. The NSE has affiliations with African Securities Exchanges 
Association (ASEA), International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) and the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE). The NSE is empowered by 
the SEC to carry out the following functions- listing of securities of public 
companies; trading services; dissemination of market data/information; provision of 
market indices and other functions approves by the SEC.  
On its part, the NSE continues to develop ways to meet the desires of its esteemed 
customers, and to attain the maximum level of competitiveness. In about 208 listed 
securities as at December 2012, the Exchange operates fair, orderly and transparent 




communities. The NSE is composed to lead the acceleration of Africa's economic 
growth and development and serve as a gateway into the African Markets (N.S.E, 
2012). It is important to note that, listed securities in Nigeria are traded on the NSE 
trading floor through the Central Security Clearing System CSCS.  
2.2.5 Development of CG codes in Nigeria  
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in partnership with the Corporate 
Affairs Commission established a 17-member Committee on June 15, 2000. The 
Committee, headed by Atedo Peterside (OON), was mandated to identify 
weaknesses in corporate governance practices in Nigeria and fashion the necessary 
changes to improve the country‘s corporate governance. Membership of the 
committee was carefully selected to cut across all sectors of the economy and 
included members of professional organizations, organized private sector and 
regulatory agencies. The outcome of the committee work was adopted by the board 
of SEC and named as the Code of Corporate Governance for listed firms in Nigeria 
and became effective in 2003. However, despite the 2003 CG code, Nigerian 
investors, particularly equity investors, suffered severe losses due to the 2007/08 
global financial crises.  
The 2007/2008 global financial crises prompted the Nigerian Securities and 
Exchange Commission to constitute a committee to review the 2003 Code of 




was to identify areas of lapses in the previous code and to adopt measures to avoid 
such a precipitous decline in the future value of equity. Thus, the code was modified 
in 2011 to meet increasing challenges. On its part, the National Insurance 
Commission (NAICOM) issued a CG code for country‘s insurance companies in 
2009. This, according to the commission, was necessary considering the complex 
nature of insurance companies with respect to the national economy. Similarly, the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) issued a code of corporate governance for banks in 
2006 after banking consolidation. 
The key areas affected by the revised code were the following: board size, board 
independence, board gender diversity, audit committee independence, managerial 
shareholding, chief executive officer (CEO) tenure concentration, director‘s 
compensation and CG disclosure in the annual reports. The revised SEC Code of 
2011 allowed firms to have a board size relative to the scale and complexity of their 
operations unlike the previous code that limited board size to maximum of 15. The 
issue of board independence was also revisited to conform to contemporary 
challenges. The SEC 2011 revised code make a clear distinction between non-
executive directors and independent directors and listed firms are required by the 
revised code to have at least 40% of their members to be independent. 
Similarly, revisions were also made to audit committee independence. The new code 
stressed that independent directors should serve on the audit committee rather than 




of a gender diversity board, the 2003 SEC code did not make any provision for 
gender in the composition of corporate boards. But, the 2011 revised code of SEC 
recommends said that listed firms should consider gender diversity in the 
composition of their respective boards. The revised 2011 SEC code required detailed 
disclosures of managerial share ownership. In fact, in the case of CBN code approval 
is required for managerial ownership of 10% or more. In the 2003 code of SEC, no 
separation of the chairman and the CEO was mandated and the CEO did not have a 
specific fixed tenure.  
However, the 2011 revised code separated the position of chair and that of the CEO 
and the tenure of the CEO was fixed for 4-year periods, which could be renewed 
based on performance after the first 4 years. The SEC revised code of 2011 further 
states that a company‘s compensation policy should be designed to provide 
appropriate compensation to directors and the compensation paid to them must be 
published in the company‘s annual report. Finally, listed firms are required by the 
revised codes particularly, the SEC and the CBN codes, to provide information on 
their board size, board and audit committee independence, board gender diversity, 
managerial shareholding, chief executive tenure, directors compensation in their 




 2.3 Equity, Shareholders and Equity Value Multiple 
According to Pope and Puxty (1991), equity is the residual attained by ordinary 
shareholders after liabilities are subtracted from resources and the associated. They 
stated that, income definition shows the role and significance of equity in the 
accounting process in practice. The introduction of company laws in different 
countries has accorded an exceptional position to ordinary shareholders. The 
ordinary shareholders are also known as equity holders, stockholders or owners of 
the company. The statute law is founded in the idea that, the aim of a company is to 
assist the members (shareholders) to develop means of maximizing their investments 
(profits). They added that, UK Companies Act of 1985 provides that when a 
company completes all process of incorporation, the company is thus structured in 
terms of the ordinary shareholders rights. The ordinary shareholders are the company 
owners. The other stakeholders (management, employees and others) constitute only 
avenues through which shareholders run the activities of the company. 
In normal condition, all residual power in a company‘s strategic decisions is retained 
by the shareholders. They are only the ones to vote in the company general meeting, 
appoint directors or terminate their appointment, approve company‘s auditor‘s 
appointment and grant approval for payment of dividends proposed by the 
management. As long as the company remains as a going concern business, apart 
from precise powers conferred by agreements in debt contracts or the company 




are non-existent. However, they have right to withdraw the funds contributed. The 
debenture holders and suppliers also have the right to withdraw their supplies (Pope 
& Puxty, 1991).  
According to Pope and Puxty, those who provide capital other than equity 
shareholders have to depend on constraints agreed at the period the capital is 
provided. While equity shareholders in norm have the opportunity of influencing 
management policy through their ownership right as conferred to them by law. The 
Nigerian company law on the other hand is a replica of British company law in 
regards to ownership rights of shareholders therefore the same applies. According to 
Souzzo et al. (2001), multiple refers to the expression of the market value compare to 
a key measurement that is presumed to relate to that value (example earnings, sales 
and book value). The above authors also mentioned that, for a measurement to be 
valuable, it most has a rational relationship with the observed market value.  
Souzzo et al. (2001) and Schreiner (2007) divided multiples into two basic types- 
enterprise value multiple and equity value multiple. Enterprise multiples are used to 
express the value of the entire enterprise value and all entitlements of the business, 
proportional to a value driver that relays to the whole enterprise, sales for example. 
Equity value multiple on the other hand, is used to express the value of equity 
holders claims on the cash flow and assets of the business. Thus, equity value 




shareholders only, such as earnings (the residual after minority shareholders, 
creditors, and other non-equity claimants are paid). 
2.3.1 Enterprise Value Multiples 
According to Sehgal and Pandey (2010), multiples are popularly used by 
investment/portfolio analysts in buying and selling of shares. They used multiples to 
the appraise value of a firm‘s price per share, that is, the firm‘s equity value per 
share. However, some corporate managers and analysts are more interested in 
evaluating the total value of the company, reflecting both debt and equity. In this 
circumstance the best multiple for the evaluation is enterprise value multiple. The 
enterprise value multiples are used by corporate managers and investment analysts 
especially when valuing mergers and acquisitions. The most popular enterprise value 
multiple known in the literature includes, enterprise value to earnings before interest, 
tax, depreciation and amortization (EV/EBITDA) multiple and enterprise value to 
sales (EV/S) multiple. The EV/EBITDA multiple indicates what the acquirer will 
pay and know whether is over or under-valued. Many investment analysts usually 
consider EV/EBITDA multiple in their investment and portfolio analysis.  
2.3.2 Equity Value Multiples 
Equity values multiples on the other hand are also referred to as price multiples or 
market multiples. They are defined as, the proportion of a market price adjustable to 




company. Thus, EVM represent the summary methods, which inform about the 
market‘s opinion of a firm‘s market valuation compared to its competitors (Penman, 
2006). The use of price or market value as the numerator is what differentiate 
between equity value multiples and financial accounting ratios (growth ratio, 
profitability ratio, liquidity ratio).  
The terms such as P/E ratio, P/BV ratio, P/S ratios, P/CF are very common in some 
literatures, for example in the studies of (Aras & Yilmaz, 2008; Gupta & Modise, 
2012). However, this study used a more precise term that is used in the literature and 
to differentiate the multiples from the normal accounting ratios. The terms used in 
the literature are P/E multiple, P/BV multiple, P/S multiple, and P/CF multiple to 
avoid misinterpretations. They are used by Sehgal and Pandey (2010); Pandey, 
(2013); Liu et al. (2002) and Suozzo et al. (2001).  
Equity value multiples provide information on a firm‘s financial and operating 
performance at any particular point in time. The equity value multiples are usually 
based on either the market value/price variable or the type of value driver used to 
compute the multiples. Also, equity value multiples are different from Tobin‘s Q, as 
the latter is used to determine market value of debts and equity to replacement value 
of the same assets. That is why, during the period of inflation, Q is usually lower 
than the price to book value ratio. Hence, book value would not reflect the cost that 




balance sheet. Therefore, the focus of this study is the EVM because of the desire by 
several investors in knowing the value of their equity instead of the entire firm value. 
2.4 Corporate Governance 
The term corporate governance is an issue that continues to attract debates among 
academicians, researchers; market practitioner‘s institutions and the general public. 
The concept is understood and defined by different researchers; corporate 
organizations and institutions based on the way they perceived it. The concept of CG 
has no one single definition that is accepted to all interest group. However, parties 
involve agreed that governance has to do with the management of corporations as a 
result of separation between the owners and appointed managers who served as 
agents of the owners. Some of CG definitions include the following. 
CG has conventionally been related to the principal-agent known as an agency 
problem. The principal-agent relationship arises in a situation where the person that 
owns a company is not the person who controls or manages its affairs. For example, 
shareholders or capital providers (principals) employ managers (agents) to 
administer the company on their behalf. Shareholders need managers that are 
specialized in human capital in order to generate investment returns, and managers 
require shareholders‘ funds as shareholders require their services (Maher & 




Coşkun and Sayilir (2012) defined CG as the relationship that exists between the 
organization and its various stakeholders. A number of processes are utilized in 
managing their relationship and they include laws, regulations and voluntary 
practices. The increasing acceptance and spread of CG practices mostly stem from 
benefits expected as a result adopting the measures mentioned at both micro and 
macro level. The term CG is all about building operational mechanisms and 
methods, in order to satisfy current social expectations or the satisfaction of 
anticipations of shareholders (Letza, Sun & Kirkbride, 2004). 
Gompers et al. (2003) defined corporations as republics; the last power rests with the 
electorates (shareholders). The electorates elect their representatives (company 
directors) and delegate most of the decisions to administrators (company managers). 
Like in state, the real power-sharing association depends upon the exact guidelines 
of governance. One end which slopes toward democracy system, preserve lesser 
power for the managers and authorities shareholders to quickly and simply replace 
directors where necessary. While the other ends, that slopes toward autocracy, 
reserved broad power for managements and places tough limitations on capability of 
stockholders‘ to change directors. Actually, stockholders accept restrictions of their 
hopes towards wealth maximization, but not many are known about the best balance 
of power. Similarly, CG comprises of the contractual, legal and understood 
frameworks that explain the exercise of control within a corporation, that impact 




corporation, and that guarantee their rights and respect for their privileges (Jean-
Paul, 2005).  
Sanda et al. (2005) sees corporate governance as means through which all interest 
groups concerned in the company management (stakeholders) attempt to make sure 
that, managers and insiders take necessary measures or implement machinery that 
safeguards the interests of all stakeholders of the company. That type of procedure is 
required due to management and ownership separation. 
Daines (2001) observes that ownership separation from control generate possible 
conflicts of interest among the parties. The reason is because both stockholders and 
managers want wealth maximization in their favour. Hence, Daines define CG as set 
of mechanisms through which decision makers make company decisions that protect 
the interest of capital suppliers. The boards of directors of the company who perform 
their duty in accordance with shareholders interest who entrusted them with the 
power to employ, reward, monitor and sack any company staff were required for 
maximization of stockholders value.  
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) defined CG as established 
machinery through which outside investors (stockholders) protect themselves against 
insiders (managements) expropriation. For example, management might steal firm‘s 




market values; divert chances of the businesses; assigning family members to key 
posts though are unqualified to hold those positions.  
Zingales (2000) describes CG as a difficult set of controls which outline the ex-post 
trading over the quasi-rents created by a firm. Note that, capitals allocation; the 
board of directors; managerial compensation packages; pressure from labour market 
competition; institutional investors, product market competition, company structure, 
among others, could all be anticipated as institutions which affect the procedure of 
quasi-rents distribution.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) view CG on the perspective of issues that treat the ways 
in which providers of finance to companies (shareholders) guarantee themselves of 
getting returns on their investments. In addition, Garvey and Swan (1994) explained 
that, CG decides how the company‘s top decision makers (executive and non-
executive directors) actually manage the contract that is entered between them and 
stockholders (owners). They added that CG matters only when such contractual 
associations are incomplete, and the consequence is that executive directors no 
longer look like the Marshallian entrepreneurs.  
The concept of corporate governance can be viewed from the perspective of internal 
and external mechanisms. Internal corporate mechanisms are those actions that affect 
how an organization is governed internally; they include managerial efficiency; CG 




governance mechanisms involve external influence that affects how the company is 
governed. External CG mechanisms include, the legal system of the environment 
where the company operates, regulatory authorities, standard setting organizations, 
labour rules, creditors and media (Weir et al., 2002). 
The internal CG mechanisms are required for the external mechanisms to function, 
leading to complementary association between these CG mechanisms (Nair & 
Cremers, 2005). The concept of CG can also be viewed from the perspective of CG 
structures and CG procedures. The structured CG includes board size, board 
composition, board independence, committee structures, director‘s executive and 
non-executive‘s experiences, compensation and tenure amongst others. On the other 
hand, CG process includes norms and cohesiveness. 
Deducting from the explanation above, CG involves internal and external 
mechanisms, structure and process whether the principle or rule that guide how a 
corporation is governed for maximum shareholders returns. In the context of this 
study, internal structured CG mechanism will be the focus. This is because external 
CG mechanisms depend on the internal mechanisms to function well as documented 
by Nair and Cremers (2005). In addition, information on the internal CG 
mechanisms is the information available on the companies that form the focus of the 
study (Nigerian listed firms). The information on labour rules, standard setting 




relationship with companies cannot easily be found in published annual reports of 
companies. 
Furthermore, information on the issue of board structure is available in the annual 
reports of the listed firms in Nigeria. For example information on the study variables 
board size, board independence, board gender, audit committee independence, 
managerial shareholding, directors compensation, chief executive officer power and 
disclosure of CG information are available in the firm‘s annual reports. The issues 
discussed serve as reasons for the researcher to focus on the structured corporate 
internal mechanisms. 
2.5 Empirical Studies on CG mechanisms and Firm Performance 
The previous studies on the CG mechanisms, board size, board independence, board 
gender, audit committee independence, managerial shareholding, chief executive 
officer power concentration, director‘s compensation and CG disclosure were 
extensively reviewed. The objective of the review is to provide insights on previous 
literature efforts and establish gab in the body of knowledge that justifies the need 
for this study. The issues in respect of aforementioned mechanisms of CG codes of 
CBN, SEC, and BAICOM are additionally highlighted. The objective also, is to 




2.5.1 Board Size 
The board of a public corporation is the most important CG monitoring mechanism 
(SEC, 2009). The board is responsible for the establishment of strategic goals and a 
set of corporate values with clear lines of responsibility for the attainment of banks 
objective (CBN, 2006). The framework of CG shall be safeguarded on an active and 
responsible board of directors that are nominated and appointed to ensure strategic 
direction and effective administration of the company (NAICOM, 2009). A board is 
responsible for the overall performance and affairs of a company. It is the duty of the 
board to ensure that firms, human and financial resources are efficiently and 
effectively managed towards attaining company goals (SEC, 2009). 
The SEC Code of best practices issued in 2003 and amended in 2011 states that, 
board members of listed firms in Nigeria shall not be less than five (5). The code did 
not specify the maximum number of board members of listed firms. In the case of 
banks, the code of CG for banks issued by the CBN in 2006 provides that, banks 
operating in Nigeria must have a maximum board size of 20. The code did not 
provide the minimum number of board members. In addition to the SEC and CBN 
codes, the NAICOM also issued a code of CG for insurance companies operating in 
Nigeria. The code provides that the minimum number of board members of the 





The SEC code covers all listed firms irrespective of sectors while CBN and 
NAICOM codes are industry-specific. As a result of various guidelines issued on 
board size, public companies have different board size. Companies need to abide by 
the SEC code on one hand and their industry specific codes. The issue of board size 
has become an important factor in Nigerian company administration looking at roles 
conferred to the board by all the issued codes. In an attempt to increase the value of 
shareholders and other stakeholders of public corporations, several researchers, 
corporate analysts, investors and interest groups argued on best board size. Studies 
and arguments produce mixed results on the exact number of company board 
members. This study reviewed the following studies on board size and performance: 
As highlighted earlier, numerous studies have been conducted on board size as a 
mechanism for corporate monitoring and firm performance. However, studies 
produce conflicting results on what number represent an effective and efficient 
board. For example, Jensen (1993) suggests larger board size as a better monitoring 
mechanism for corporate value. The researcher argues that larger board has a range 
of expertise to support the company makes better investment decisions, and is hard 
for the chief executive officer of control. To support Jensen, Smith et al. (1994) 
study UK firms board structure and found that higher board size have the potential of 
providing a better group of knowledge and proficiency to the board, the reason is of 
because of their large number; some of them may possibly have wider variety of 




prepared compared to smaller board size to process vast volume of information for 
the firm overall benefit.  
A large board is significantly related to the performance of sampled United State 
(US) commercial banks before the global financial crises of 2008-2009 (Switzer & 
Wang, 2013). Board size is established to be positively related to firm value of 257 
selected US firms for the period from 1994 to 2000. In addition, large boards are 
reported to be positively related to yearly stock returns measured by market to book 
value (Larmou & Vafeas, 2010). Larger board size increases company performance 
and value of shareholders for a sample of 103 firms in four African countries 
namely, South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya for the period from 1997 to 2001 
(Anthony, 2007). Also, Mat Rahim, Mahat, Md Nassir, and Yahya (2015) examine 
board size and the performance of 200 selected Islamic banks across 21 countries 
during the 2014 cross-sectional analysis, the result revealed a significant relationship 
between board size and Islamic banks performance. 
Similarly, Linck, Netter and Yang (2008) reported that average increase in the 
number of board size is positively and significantly related to firm value amongst 
7,000 sample firms in the US during the period of 1990-2004 pre- and the post-SOX. 
Other studies in favour of a larger board size are Black et al (2006) who reported a 
significant positive relationship between Korean CG Index (board size) and a price 
to sales of firms listed on the Korean stock exchange during 2001. Adams and 




management and provide for improved board expertise. They argue that a larger 
board size may increase the level of managerial monitoring. Board size is 
significantly and positively associated with bank‘s financial performance of Turkish 
firms (Isik & Ince, 2016). 
According to Morey, Gottesman, Baker and Godridge (2009) in a study of 200 firms 
from 21 emerging markets, report a significant positive relationship between board 
size and higher market value measured by price to book value of the sampled firms. 
Board size has a positive and significant association with the firm value (Alimehmeti 
& Paletta, 2014).  
In contrast to the above findings, other studies suggest small board size, for example, 
Eisenberg et al. (1998) studied the relationship of board size and declining company 
value. The study discloses that larger boards have the possibility of being slowly 
towards decision making, and thus could lead to changing problem. A small board 
size inclines to be less active because it is simple for the influential CEO of control. 
Hence, optimum board size is required, a board that is not too small and not large. 
Small board size has positive demonstrating effects on the privatized company‘s 
performance in Jordan (Al-Smadi, Mond-Saleh, & Ibrahim, 2013). Also, Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) in a study of some listed firms in the United State, discovers that large 
company‘s boards are less effective and easier to be controlled by a powerful CEO. 
When a company‘s board grow excessively large, it becomes difficult to co-ordinate 




To support Lipton and Lorsch, Yermack (1996) establish that for large United State 
industrial corporations for the period of 1984-1991, the market values of firms with 
small board size are higher compared to firms with large boards. Similarly, Mak and 
Kusnadi (2005) concured with the above findings in their study of firms listed in 
Malaysia and Singapore. They found that firm valuation is higher when board size is 
small. For example, if a firm has five directors, the number is considered fairly small 
in their markets. The study of Eisenberg et al. (1998) also reported a negative 
relationship between firm board size and profitability while using the sample of 
midsized and small Finnish firms in the US. This suggests that effects of board size 
can exist even in a situation where there is a lesser separation of ownership from 
management in the smaller firms. In addition, they argue on whether large firm 
boards, perform better than small boards. They conclude that performance of large 
and small board depends on the situation such as a firm operational setting, size of 
the firm, and development of technology.  
Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) documented that, board size and other boards 
features are determined by some endogenously factors, for example, performance of 
the firm, ownership structure and CEO power. The works of Yermack (1996) states 
that small boards are more efficient in taking good company decisions and easier to 
take emergency decisions where the need arises unlike larger boards where 




Vafeas (2000), suggested a minimum board size of five (5) performs better in terms 
of market valuation of 307 sampled Forbes firms and important corporate decisions 
can be taken since members can easily meet within the shortest possible period due 
to their limited number. Small board size has a significant impact on the market to 
book value of 250 publicly traded listed firms in the UK during the 1993-1994 
(Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998). Goosstein, Gautam and Boeker (1994) used selected 
hospital in the US and reported that large company boards may find it difficult to 
establish individual relationships which may provide promote cohesiveness. Strong 
individual interaction among large board‘s members is challenging. This means, the 
board might develop divisions and coalitions that could increase group rattle and 
therefore constrain cooperation among the directors. 
The studies of Eisenberg et al. (1998) and Hackenbrack et al. (2000) found when the 
structure of board upsurges, the board might be endangered with traditional dynamic 
difficulties associated with large groups. In summary, large company board of 
director‘s become problematic to the management and the board may face 
difficulties in communication amongst its members. The larger boards might be quiet 
to have fruitful discussions. Also, having large member of individuals around a table 
could impede board ability to ascertain, extract and utilize its member‘s potential 
contributions during the meeting. Bearing in mind the inadequate period available in 




Board size has a significant negative impact on the Tobin‘s Q and share return of 
2746 sample firms in the UK for the period of 1981 to 2002 (Guest, 2009). Board 
size is inversely related to earnings before interest tax, depreciation and amortization 
of 459 sample firms after initial public offering (IPO) from 1996-2011 (Madalina, 
2013). Board size as CG monitoring mechanism usually increases in proportion with 
firm growth over the period of time, board size ensures balance between costs and 
benefits of monitoring. Therefore, size of firm board depends on the size of the firm 
(Boone, Casares, Karpoff & Raheja, 2007).  
The optimum number of company board directors is a problem for companies. The 
efficiency is reduced where the number of board of directors of the company is too 
large. This is because there will be increased difficulty in reaching agreement 
concerning important decisions. Furthermore, decision-making accuracy is reduced 
where the number of directors is too small as they may be inadequate discussion of 
important issues (Chiang, 2005).  
Correspondingly, on the relationship between board size and firm value, Amran and 
Che Ahmad (2009) study the relationship between board dynamics, family business 
and firm value in Malaysia. Evidence from the study reveals that, leadership 
structure and board size affect company value. Similarly, board size gives a positive 
contribution towards improved performance of non-family corporations. The size of 





However, the following studies find no relationship between size of the board small 
or large and firm value. Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010), using of 2000-2004 of 
Greek capital market data found that board size has no significant impact on the 
value of shares listed on the Greek Stock Exchange market. Board size has 
insignificant relationship on the performance of 82 sampled Islamic Financial 
Institutions IFSs in Golf Countries (Hashim, Mahadi, & Amran, 2015).  
Board size has little evidence in predicting impact of firm‘s market valuation, except 
for small and medium entities and in some particular industry sectors (Di, Christos, 
Raonic, & Riccaboni, 2008). Board size has no significant association with firm 
value measured by earnings per share (EPS) (Gherghina, 2015). Therefore, the focus 
of this study is monitoring role of the board not the size. Thus, board sizes of 
selected companies would be regressed against the equity value multiple.  
2.5.2 Board Independence 
The firm board independence is another source of monitoring firm governance 
practices. The firm board is the most important monitoring mechanism of CG as 
observed by the SEC. Therefore it independence is critical to the survival and 
success of corporations. It is the decision of the directors that influence the 
performance or otherwise of the company. To ensure the independence of the board 




firms should not exceed 40% while the remaining directors should be non-executive 
to ensure their voting influence overwhelmed that of executive directors.  
While code of CG issued by the SEC 2009 suggests that majority of the director‘s 
should be non-executive directors and among the NED some must be independent. 
According to the code, an independent director is a director that has no stake in the 
company and does not represent any interest group. In addition, CBN code of CG 
2006 directed that number of NED should be more than the executive directors and 
at least two must be independent who have no any interest in the bank and appointed 
by the bank boards.  
As a result of different regulatory recommendation (CBN, SEC, and NAICOM) 
listed firms in Nigeria have different ways to implement the independence of their 
respective boards. Researchers conducted studies on board independence and 
performance. However, most of the studies reported a significant relationship 
between the dependent variable (equity value) and the independent variable (board 
independence) while others found no relationship between the variables, therefore, 
making the issue inconclusive. The studies that report positive relationship include 
the following:  
The study of Kenneth et al. (1996) finds a positive and significant relationship 
between the percentages of outside directors to inside directors and firm performance 




is consistent with the significant role of monitoring the management by outside 
directors. On their part, Rosentein and Wyatt (1997) reported an abnormal increase 
in firm value after outside directors (independent directors) are appointed. Similarly, 
Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) document a positive and significant stock price 
reaction once firm‘s boards are dominated by outside independent directors, and 
negative stock returns where insiders dominated the firm board. Also, Byrd and 
Hickman (1992) report that the firms market stock price reaction of bidding firms 
offers is more positive when firm‘s boards comprise outside independent directors. 
Independent boards lead to more active CEO discipline and monitoring thereby 
increasing firm value (Guo & Masulis, 2015).  
The independence of the board is one of the important CG monitoring. Ratio of 
outside independent directors produces positive abnormal returns of US industrial 
firms of 1989-1995 (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). Consistent with the significance of 
independent directors on board as monitors, Weisbach (1988) documented that, chief 
executive officers (CEO) of poorly performing companies are likely to be changed if 
the company has a majority of independent directors.  
The work of Cotter, Shhdasanib and Zennef (1997) analyzes target firms role on the 
independent of outside directors of the sample firms during takeover challenges. 
They discover that, boards with a majority of independent directors are more likely 
to use resistance approaches that enhance shareholder value. Also, fields and Keys 




independent directors using 70 sample companies in the London Stock Exchange for 
the period of 1997-2003 and found overwhelming backing from the researchers.  
Similarly, Weisbach (1988) and Byrd and Hickman (1992) buttressed the favourable 
advisory roles and monitoring roles to firm stockholders by independent company 
directors. Though, there seems no evidence that insider/outsider percentage is 
associated with company performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2001) and that 
companies with additional independent directors attained improved company 
profitability (Bhagat & Black, 2002).  
On their part, Bhagat and Black (2002) using 934 large US firms from 1985-1995 
found a significant positive relationship between board independence and market to 
book value multiple. Also, Bruno and Claessens (2010) in a study of 2,350 firms 
from 23 countries from Europe and America reports a significant positive association 
between firm board independence and market to book value multiple. The 
independence of firm board is positively related to earnings before interest tax, 
depreciation and amortization of 459 sample firms after initial public offering (IPO) 
from 1996-2011 (Madalina, 2013). Board independence has a significant positive 
association with earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization of 100 
samples Danish firms listed on the Danish Stock Exchange in 2004 for cross 




Moreover, Morey et al (2009), in a study of 200 firms from 21 emerging countries, 
report a significant positive relationship between board independence and higher 
market valuation measured by price to book value multiple of the sampled firms for 
the period of November 2001 to September 2006. The company‘s board 
independence has a substantial positive influence on the share prices value of 30 
sampled firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange for 2009-2010 periods (Malik, 
2012). Board independence, board size, audit independence have a positive and 
significant association with the firm value (Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2014). 
On the contrary to the above studies that established a positive link between board 
independence and performance, other studies report little or no relationship between 
the variables. They include the following: the study of Bhagat and Black (1998) 
established no evidence that the proportion of independent directors on board affects 
future company value.  
Thus, results of the study did not support the predictable wisdom that higher board 
independence increases firm performance. Cadbury (1992) recommends the 
existence of more independent directors in the boards of firms as the report found 
that, increase in outside directors on board of a company is consistent to an increase 
in the company board monitoring activity. However, could not produce evidence on 
whether such an increase in the independent directors has resultant improvement in 
the value of those companies. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) observed that company 




directors on the board, do not help in increasing performance of a company. Also, 
Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis and Wong (2005) in a study of 412 listed public companies 
in Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1995 to 1998 found little impact between board 
independence and firm‘s performance measured by price to book value, particularly 
firms with small market capitalization. Proportion of independent directors on 
company board has a negative outcome on shareholders wealth and the economic 
value addition (Imanzadeh, 2014). 
Board independent has little influence upon firm value because of the strong 
attention of the media and regulators, all corporations moved hurriedly to upsurge 
the independence of their respective boards and other committees mitigating a cross-
sectional effect on firm value (Brick & Chidambaran, 2010). Bathala and Rao (1995) 
used 800 sample firms by Forbes magazine from 1984 to 1986 to study the influence 
of independent directors. The study established an inverse association between the 
percentage of independent directors and several other agency conflicts and equity 
value of the firm. Thus, present study would empirically investigate the impact board 
independence as a monitoring mechanisms and equity value multiples of Nigerian 
listed firms.  
2.5.3 Board Gender Diversity 
In recent times, there has been increasing demand on the corporations in both the 




corporate board memberships. For instance, in the UK, Higgs report (2003) 
suggested that companies should look at other ways to find and employ non-
executive directors (NED) in order to widen the group of talent available, with the 
confidence that board diversity will provide a more effective company board. 
According to the report gender issue is one of the most important board diversity. 
Gender issue continues to attract the interest of researchers, practitioners and the 
investing public. In Nigeria, SEC Code of CG set guideline for directors‘ selection to 
include experience and skills, ranges in age and gender composition.  
In addition, there is increasing argument of gender representation in company‘s 
board as both genders have similar rights in the Nigerian constitution. For example, 
Ejumudo (2013) observed that, gender equality is a critical factor for the 
development of the country. Equality is needed in both government institutions and 
public companies. In addition, Farrell and Hersch (2005) document that, number of 
women serving on corporate boards increased considerably during the 1990s.  
Nevertheless, studies conducted on the relationship between board gender diversity 
and performance of firms produced contradicting results. For example, the study of 
Farrell and Hersch (2005) report that women tend to serve on better performing 
firms and significant abnormal returns is recorded when an announcement is made 
on additional women joining a company board. Similarly, Carter et al. (2003) in a 
study of African American and Asian American percentage of women on board of 




women or minorities on the board and firm value. Additionally, they found that, the 
percentage of women and minorities on board‘s increases with firm size and board 
size, but, decreases as the number of insider‘s increases. 
The study of Miller (2009) for Fortune 500 firms, reports a positive relationship 
between board ethnic diversity on firm repute and innovation. Also, reputation and 
innovation partly mediate the relationship between board ethnic diversity and 
company performance. Lastly, the study establishes a positive relationship between 
board gender diversity, innovation and company value. Firms with a greater number 
of female directors are implementing restrained towards earnings management 
practices in the UK (Arun, Almahrog, & Ali, 2015). 
The percentage of women and minorities on boards of directors for 127 large US 
companies during 1993-1998 are positively associated with two financial 
performance indicators (return on investments and return on assets) (Erhardt, Werbel 
& Shrader, 2003). The companies with more female directors have more 
performance in relation to return on equity and Tobin‘s Q (Masulis, Couto, & 
Francisco, 2015). The proportion of women on company boards and top 
management has positive impact performance of the firm. This is, after adjusting for 
numerous features of the firm and causation effects. However, the positive influence 
of women on directorship and top management intensely depends on their 
credentials (Smith, Smith & Verner, 2006). Ethnicity has very little effect on firm 




significant (Brammer, Millington & Pavelin, 2007). Gul, Srinidhi and Ng (2011) 
documented that, gender diversity of board members increases stock price through 
the device of public information disclosure in larger firms and by boosting 
confidential evidence gathering in smaller firms.  
Dezso (2012), used 15 year pool data on the company board and top management 
teams Standard and Poor (S&P)1,500 firms, found that, female representation in the 
company top management improves performance. In this regard, the informational 
and social benefits of gender diversity and the characters associated with women 
sitting on top management are likely to improve managerial task performance. On 
their part, Adams and Ferreira (2009) found that, female directors have a significant 
impact on board inputs and firm performance in selected US firms. Furthermore, 
female directors on firm boards record more attendance in meetings than their male 
counterparts. Finally, the study establishes that, women directors on the board are 
more willing to join monitoring committees of the firm. Shareholders in Spain 
support firms that increase the number of female directors in their company board‘s 
membership and the greater diversity in gender is more likely to generate for 
economic benefits (Campbell & Minguez Vera, 2010). 
In a similar study, Ku Ismail and Abdul Manaf (2016) examined market reactions to 
127 Malaysian firms towards women appointment in the corporate boards and 
women‘s attributes including their role towards discharging and monitoring 




appointment of women on the corporate board and a positive abnormal return was 
also observed due to such appointment.  
Morey et al. (2009) studied 200 firms from 21 emerging market countries and report 
a significant positive relationship between board gender and higher market valuation 
measured by price to book value of the sampled firms. Julizaerma and Sori (2012) 
examined the benefit of board gender diversity on companies listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia for the period of 2008-2009; the study suggests that female directorship in 
the company board may influence company performance. 
On the contrary, other studies could not establish any relationship between board 
gender diversity and firm‘s value. For example, Fenwick and Neal (2001) could not 
find any significant correlation between group gender structure and market value of 
equities. To support their findings, Fenwick and Neal, Rose (2007) study sample of 
listed Danish firms during the period of 1998–2001, evidence from the study show 
that, Danish boards rooms are to a significant extent dominated by men directors. 
Yet, the study could not establish any significant linkage between firm value and 
representation of female on board. Moreover, Marinova, Plantenga and Remery 
(2010) used 186 listed companies in Dutch and 84 listed companies in Danish to find 
the relationship between number of women and performance. The evidence obtained 
from the study reveals that, number of women serving on firm's board have no any 
significant influence on their performance. Despite, 40% of the companies have at 




finding may be as a result of an insignificant number of women on the board of those 
companies. They are limited in number, therefore, cannot influence any decision 
during board meeting.   
The discussions above highlighted the findings of previous studies on gender 
representation in the company‘s board of directors. Most of the studies report a 
significant positive relationship between performance and women representation, 
though few other ones could not find a significant relationship between the 
independent variable (board gender) and the dependent variable (performance). This 
study tests the relationship between the number of women on board and equity of 
Nigerian listed firms. 
2.5.4 Audit Committee Independence 
Audit committee independence is also one of the internal governance monitoring 
mechanisms that ensure corporations operate in accordance with appropriate laws 
and regulations upon which they are established. An audit committee monitors the 
financial accounting practice through interaction with the company board of 
directors, managements and the external auditors. They also conduct an investigation 
into certain management estimates and accounting matters to prevent tendencies of 
fraud. Audit committee mediates between management and the external auditors to 
ensure all relevant information required by the external auditors are supplied to ease 




To achieve the independence of an audit committee (AC) of listed firms in the NSE, 
the SEC code recommends the following: at least one member of audit committee 
should be well-educated; at least one member of the AC should be able to read 
financial statement and at least one member of the committee should have 
accounting and financial management knowledge. Similarly, NAICOM 2011 codes 
recommend that, audit and compliance committee should be headed by an 
independent director. The code defines independent director as an individual who 
has no personal interest in the company and represent neither shareholder no 
management.  
In the same way, CBN code 2006 recommends all members of the audit committee 
should be non-executive director (NED) and ordinary shareholders nominated and 
appointed at the company general meeting of the bank. According to the CBN code, 
some members of the audit committee must have knowledge of internal control 
procedures one of the shareholders appointed should serve as committee chairman. 
On the other hand, studies on the relationship between audit committee 
independence and firm‘s performance on the other produced mixed results. For 
example, Klein (2002a) in study of firms listed in NYSE during 1990s found board 
or audit committee independence resulted in increases in abnormal accruals of the 
sample firms; however, Klein (2002b) found a negative relationship between audit 
committee independence and abnormal returns. Similarly, Klein (2002b) found no 




accounting information. Chan and Li (2008) used a sample of Fortune 200 
companies find that, the presence of expert independent directors in the audit 
committee of those companies increases company‘s value. 
Analyses by Zhang, Zhou and Zhou (2007) indicated that a relationship exists 
between audit committee independence and value of firms. The board and audit 
committee members with corporate or financial expertise are related with firms that 
have smaller discretionary accruals, furthermore, board and audit committee frequent 
meeting reduces levels of discretionary accruals in the firms (Xie, Davidson & 
DaDalt, 2003).  
Yang and Krishnan (2005), in a study of 896 samples 1996–2000 reports that 
earnings management is lower in firms where audit committee members have greater 
governance knowledge. In addition, the study report that there is positive association 
between the proportion of independent directors on board and its monitoring 
committees, and a greater percentage of independent directors on both audit and 
compensation committees than the full board. Thus, audit committee independence is 
envisaged to have a positive association between board and monitoring committee 
independence and firm performance (Cotter & Silvester, 2003). Firms with more 
effective board and independent audit committee structures, managements are more 
likely to apprise company earnings estimate, and their estimate is less likely to be 
precise, it is more accurate, and it elicits a more encouraging market response 




only in firms where majority of the directors serving in the audit committee are 
independent that are related with the possibility for aggressive earnings management 
(Sharma & Kuang, 2014). 
Moreover, Bruno and Claessens (2010) studied 2,350 firms from 23 countries. The 
study reports a significant positive relationship between audit committee 
independence and market to book value multiple for the period of 2003-2005, 
especially, in countries with good legal requirement for CG practices. Audit 
committee independence has a significant positive impact on the value of share 
prices of 30 sampled companies listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange for the 2009-
2010 periods  (Malik, 2012). Audit committee formation surrounding corporate 
governance reform in Australia is significantly related to improved earnings for both 
large and small companies (Christensen, Kent, Routledge, & Stewart, 2015). 
In addition, Morey et al. (2009) reported a significant positive relationship between 
audit committee independence and higher market valuation measured by price to 
book value multiple of the sampled firms. To support,  Black and Khanna (2007) 
report significant positive relationship between CG measured by audit committee 
and 4% increase in stock prices of listed Indian firms. There is positive relationship 
between independence of audit committee and quality of performance(Al-Haddad, 
Alzurqan, & Al-Sufy, 2011). Audit independence have positive and significant 




On the contrary, Sunday (2008) found no significant relationship between audit 
committee independence and the two performance measures profit margin (PM) and 
ROE of 20 non-financial institutions listed on the NSE during the period of 2000 to 
2006. The findings may be a result of inadequate data used in the regression model. 
Similarly, Chen et al. (2005) in a study of 412 listed public companies in Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong from 1995 to 1998 found little impact between audit 
committee independence and firm performance measured by price to book value 
multiple. The evidence is more glaring particularly in firms with small market 
capitalization. Similarly, Lin, Li, and Yang (2006) study features of an audit 
committee and found them to have no significant impact on the quality of firms 
reported earnings. Evidence from the study reveals a negative association between 
the size of audit committees and the firm‘s value.  
From the discussion above, most of the literatures reported a positive relationship 
between the independence of firm‘s firms audit committee and performance. This is 
in line with agency theory assumption of corporate monitoring as a means of 
enhancing firm performance. Audit Committee in the context of this study is 
measured as the proportion of independent directors on the audit committee.  
2.5.5 Managerial Shareholding 
The ownership of shares owned by management is often suggested as one of CG 




them to ensure success of the company. Management will take appropriate steps to 
avoid unethical issues which may have a potential consequence on the company 
value. The NAICOM 2011 code of CG directed that information on each director 
who owns (5%) five percentages of insurance company shares directly or indirectly 
must be provided, in addition, to information on shareholders who control the 
company. In the same way, 2006 CBN codes of CG states that, shareholding above 
10% is subject to approval from the CBN. However, the SEC code was silent on the 
amount of ownership of management. 
Researchers argue on the role played by managements towards ensuring rigorous 
monitoring of company activities. The findings of studies on the relationship 
between management share ownership and performance produce mixed result. Most 
the findings reveal a positive relationship. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
observe the association concerning pay and performance as a problem issue; they 
contend that, the greatest approach to decrease agency cost is through increasing 
shares of executive director‘s and managers in the corporation. That may align 
management interest with that of shareholders. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) opined that, as management shareholding increases, 
company managers bear a large proportion of the costs of elusion and other deed that 
will rescind the value of the company. In addition, large shareholding by 
management reduces the differences between the interest of shareholders and 




reducing agency costs is that management may not be concerned in increasing their 
ownership stake in the company as a result of certain reasons, for example their 
individual wealth. Peasnell Pope and Young (2005) using UK firms, study the 
relationship between managerial ownership and the percentage of outsiders 
(independent directors) on the board of directors. They found entrenchment level is 
around 40%; however, applicable only to larger firms. Managerial shareholding is 
significantly related to monitoring characteristics which in turn influence financial 
reporting quality for listed manufacturing companies in Nigeria (Hassan, 2013). 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that, managerial owners can be considered potential 
managers of equity agency problems; therefore, an increase in their shareholdings 
gives them a stronger incentive to monitor performance of the firm. Increase in 
market of return of equity of selected US firms is dominated by shareholding of 
managers and directors of the firms (Baker, 1988). Managerial ownership is 
positively related to performance evaluation roles and management oversight roles 
(Kamardi & Haron, 2011). 
Similarly, Short and Keasey (1999) in a study of the relationship between insider 
ownership (directors and management) and company performance (measured by 
shareholders return on equity) in accordance to entrenchment of 225 sample 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange. The study reports a negative 
relationship at lower levels of directors and management shareholding and a positive 




shareholdings. This is in consistent with the alignment of managers and 
shareholder‘s interests being dominant at the highest and lowest levels of insider 
shareholding.  
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) constructed board composition and insider 
ownership relationship model and performance, permitting for the endogenous 
purpose of insider ownership and board composition and found a significant 
relationship with firm value. Their results are in agreement with the study of (Morck, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). On their part, McConnell and Servaes (1990) reported 
significant results after regressing market value against different methods of 
ownership that explain the ownership structure in the company own by insiders 
(management and executive directors); individual shareholders; large shareholders 
and institutional shareholders, using a quadratic measurement for insider ownership. 
Managerial ownership is positively related with crisis-period performance of 
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (C. Liu, Uchida, & Yang, 2012). 
Furthermore, Stulz (1988) presents a model specifying that high share ownership by 
company management and the associated voting power warrant managers to be more 
likely embedded in their individual positions within the company. In line with a 
management entrenchment perception, Morck et al. (1988) regress the association 
between insider share ownership and market to book value and found that market to 
book rises at the start (0-5%) and falls when insider share ownership increases to 




the findings as consistent with the alignment of interests when insider shares 
ownership increases. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) also advanced the model whereby 
management is able to establish them by making investments that improve the value 
of company owners.  
Corporate organizations where insiders (directors and managers) held above 30% of 
the shares have not ever been acquired during the period hostile takeovers (Weston, 
1979). The firms with managerial share ownership are probably had to experience 
distress (Donker, Santen, & Zahir, 2009). Moreover, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
document that, with minor or no shareholdings in the firm, management may use 
company assets to achieve personal gain, such as ducking, unnecessary consumption 
and the search of unprofitable investments. Therefore, increase in stake of executive 
directors and management may reduce agency cost as managers bear a larger portion 
of the costs. They concluded that, as the directors and management ownership 
percentage increases, the management pays larger part of agency costs and thus, 
considered unlikely to waste corporate wealth. 
Morey et al (2009) study the relationship between managerial shareholding and 
performance of 200 firms from 21 emerging countries. The study reports a 
significant positive relationship between managerial shareholding and higher market 
valuation measured by price to book value of the sampled firms. Managerial 
shareholding has a significant positive impact on the collective stock return of 800 




2003). Ownership by directors and outside shareholders has an influence on the 
abnormal returns of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (Fidrmuc, Goergen 
& Renneboog, 2006).  
There is inverse relationship between managerial ownership in several segments and 
total monitoring costs as projected in agency theory (Mustapha & Che Ahmad, 
2011). Firms with insider director‘s shareholding have better operational 
performance and market to book ratios, particularly when an observation is more 
problematic. These companies make better purchasing decisions; have better cash 
holdings, and less overstatement of earnings (Masulis & Mobbs, 2011). 
The directors and management ownership are significantly related to firm value 
measured by price to book value multiple of 60 listed firms during their initial public 
offering in Finland (Keloharju & Kulp, 1996). Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) 
propose a model of ownership of firm and upper management income to be as a 
function, in line with management entrenchment. The researchers found that top 
management turnover is expressively higher in firms that report poor shareholder‘s 
returns with low management and directors ownership than in corporations that are 
performing badly with higher managerial and directors ownership. Furthermore, 
larger equity stake by company managers and directors has a significant impact in 




Despite, results from the studies reviewed reported a positive relation between the 
explained and the explanatory variables; others could not establish any link between 
the proportion of shares own by managements and performance. For instance, Sanda 
et al. (2005) study the CG mechanisms and performance of 93 listed companies in 
the NSE for the period of 1996 to 1999. The study reports no significant relationship 
between director‘s ownership concentration and price to earnings ratio of the sample 
firms. Also, Dadidson, Rosenstein, and Sundaram (2002), reported a significant 
negative relationship between stock of executive (inside directors) and abnormal 
equity returns of 94 sample firms in the US from 1985-1991.  
In addition, Mura (2007) in a study of 1100 non-financial firms in the London Stock 
Exchange for 1991-2001 found that the proportion of directors and non-executive 
director‘s ownership is not positively and significantly related to market value of the 
sampled firms. To conclude, this study would empirically test the relationship 
between percentage of executive directors share ownership and equity value multiple 
of firms listed on the NSE. 
2.5.6 Chief Executive Officer Power Concentration  
Reduction in the power concentration of CEO is suggested as internal governance 
monitoring (Flath & Knoeber, 1985; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This is to ensure that 
the CEO does not use his concentrated power to the detriment of other company 




CBN and NAICOM) recommend the separation of chairman from the CEO and CEO 
shall not serve on the audit committee to make the committee truly independent of 
the management. In addition to the chair/CEO separation, the NAICOM code of CG 
for insurance companies recommends that the appointment of the CEO must be 
approved by the commission. This is to ensure that, the appointed CEO is qualified 
and competent to manage the affairs of the company in terms of requisite knowledge 
and experience. Similarly, the CBN code of CG for banks recommends the tenure of 
the CEO to a maximum of two terms of 4 years each (8 years) and his/her 
reappointment for the second term must be on performance and value addition to the 
bank.  
Researchers argue on whether too much power for CEO enhances the value added to 
the company. The power of the CEO can be considered in two perspectives. First, 
where the CEO serves as chairman of the company board and, secondly, where the 
CEO is not the chairman but stay at the company CEO for a long period of time. 
Studies have been conducted on the relationship between CEO power and the value 
of companies. However, the studies produce mixed results. For example, Daily and 
Dalton (1992) using some selected entrepreneurial firms in the US from 1986-1992 
found no association between the duality of CEOs and the performance of those 
entrepreneurial firms.  
Other studies on the CEO board chairman separation show that for an efficient, 




positions should be separated (Jensen, 1993). In agreement to this results therefore, it 
can be deduced that, if the firm CEO is also the board chairman, the board major 
responsibility for supervising the appointment, sacking, evaluating and rewarding of 
the CEO could be jeopardized. This is because the CEO may not implement this 
function in contradiction of his/her individual interests. Chen et al. (2005), in a study 
of 412 listed public companies in Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1995 to 1998 
found a negative relationship between CEO duality and firms performance measured 
by price to book value multiple of the sampled firms. 
Also, Rechner and Dalton (1990) studied 250 sample firms for 6 years in the US. 
Evidence from the study indicates that companies with independent leadership 
perform better than companies that rely on CEO duality in terms of stronger market 
performance. CEO power measured by separation of chair from CEO has a 
significant positive impact on the value of share prices of 30 sample companies 
listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange for 2009-2010 periods (Malik, 2012). The pay 
for to directors is tied to long-term firm performance thereby adding value to 
shareholders (Cheng, Hong, & Scheinkman, 2015). 
However, other studies suggest combination of Chair and CEO to one person, for 
example, Goyal and Park (2002) established that the CEO sensitivity to turnover and 
firm performance is lesser for corporations without CEO duality, which means CEO 
occupying the position of chairmanship bring more value to the company compare to 




is not associated with inferior performance; evidence from the study show that 
combining CEO and chair is associated with agency cost and is not associated with 
low performance. Furthermore, Chan and Li. (2008) report a significant negative 
relationship between chief executive officer/chairman separation and price to sales 
multiple.  
The other aspect of chief executive power is tenure. Scholars argued that whenever 
CEO stay for a long period of time is likely to have too much power that may 
influence many company decisions. Long-serving CEO may influence the 
appointment of executive directors that may be loyal to him. The CEO can also use 
his position to penetrate some board member‘s to support his opinion during board 
meetings to the detriment of other company stakeholders. To ensure the control of 
tendencies of excessive CEO power, code of CG issued by the SEC, CBN and the 
NAICOM provides a guideline on the maximum number of years an individual can 
occupy as the CEO of his/her company.  
Research was also carried out on the average term of the CEO as a solution for the 
inhibition of organization fraud (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). The tenure of the 
CEO as the member of the board of directors could therefore be an essential 
indicator of the influence of the individual. As a long-serving CEO takes relatively 
more influence compares to a new CEO. Therefore, if CEO tenure increases, his/her 
power concentration in the firm could as well increase, that could reduce the 




fraud. Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) report that leverage resolutions are 
correlated to the extent of entrenchment by executives, and generally entrenched 
executives strive to evade debts. In addition, leverage is likely to be lesser when the 
CEO has longer tenure to serve in the company. 
On their part, Walters, Kroll and Wright (2007) in a study of 100 public traded firms 
in the US from 1997 to 2001 found that, CEO tenure is significantly related to value 
addition for shareholders where board of directors take adequate measures to 
enhance vigilance. Furthermore, tenure of the CEO is positively related to 
shareholders value at low level tenure, and negatively related with shareholders 
value where the tenure of the CEO rises to significant level. They conclude that 
shareholders value can advance through board vigilance even where the tenure of 
CEO is high.  
Moreover, Bhagat and Black (2002), using 934 large US firms from 1985-1995 
found a significant positive relationship between CEO power concentration and 
market to book value multiple. Morey et al (2009), in similar study of 200 firms 
from 21 emerging countries, report a significant positive relationship between chief 
executive officer power concentration and higher market valuation measured by 
price to book value multiple of the sampled firms. 
Bathala and Rao (1995), using 800 sample firms by Forbes magazine from 1984 to 




officer tenure and significant at 1% level. This means chief executive officers who 
control the firms for relatively long periods of time seem to be successful towards 
restricting outside directors representation on boards of their firms'. This agrees with 
the entrenchment proposition found in the literature that longer serving CEO gets 
excess power that makes it easy to control other board members.  
Studies on the influence of the CEO on firms‘ performance produce mixed results. 
However, reducing too much power to CEO will contribute to the achievement of 
monitoring role of the board. It is important to note that, CEO power on the 
perspective of separation of chairman from CEO has been taken care off by the 
issued codes in Nigeria. Presently, no listed company in Nigeria having one person 
that occupies the position of chairmen and CEO at the same time. The other 
perspective is the power of the CEO in terms of number of years of he/she is serving 
as CEO. Therefore, the study will empirically examine whether tenure of CEOs 
influences equity value of firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
2.5.7 Directors Compensation 
Director‘s compensation is often-suggested as internal CG monitoring mechanism to 
ensure the optimum performance of directors. A solution to the problem of 
ineffective or self-serving directors is to improve compensation policies that tie 
compensation of management directly to company performance, for example 




compensation plan, the SEC Code of CG recommends that, only board of directors 
shall approve the compensation of executive directors on the recommendation of the 
company remuneration committee. 
The SEC code further emphasized that, compensation of executive director should be 
on individual bases considering director skills and relevant experience and only non-
executive directors should be associated with the procedure. In addition to cash 
option, where stock option is granted as part of director compensation, an approval is 
required from the SEC. Similarly, compensation for non-executive directors should 
be established by the board of directors and approved by the shareholders at the 
annual general meeting. The objective of SEC guidelines is to ensure that directors 
are properly and adequately compensated, but, without detriment to the shareholders. 
Compensation of directors differs across industries and even within an industry 
across firms. The code of CG for insurance companies issued by the NAICOM code 
and the code of CG for banks issued by the CBN also, makes a similar 
recommendation. They clearly state that, directors cannot sit and decide their 
compensation. Instead, the compensation committee decides their compensation and 
the decision must be approved by the board of directors for executive and in the case 
of non-executive by the shareholders.  
The pay-performance strategy generally helps to decrease the problem of CG in a 
firm (Phan, 2001). Mehran (1995), in examining executive compensation structure 




evidence supporting supporters of incentive compensation for directors. The study 
found that stock-based compensation is extensively used in firms that have more 
outside directors on board. The firms were a higher proportion of stocks are held by 
inside directors or outside block holders use less stock-based compensation plan.  
The results from data of U.S. non-financial companies from 1993-2005 indicate that, 
the impact of CEO equity-based pay on company performance is positive but in 
companies with higher incomes quantile levels, while the impact is negative in 
companies in the lower incomes levels (Li, Yang, & Yu, 2015). 
Perry and Zenner (2001) conducted a study on pay and performance. Evidence from 
the study suggests that, incentive -based compensation for directors influence the 
level of monitoring by the board and through such compensation, firms can align the 
interest of directors and shareholders. Equally, Shivdasani (1993) provides additional 
evidence that ownership by unconnected outside directors remains negatively related 
to the possibility that a company will be subject to aggressive takeover attempt.  
Furthermore, when choosing the form of compensation, firms need to be considerate 
to their individual firm features, because some directors and managers may use the 
advantage to compensate themselves at the expense of other company stakeholders. 
Lambert and Larcker (1988) in a study of 800 sample firms in the US from 1970 to 
1984 reported that bigger stock-based compensation is applied when accounting 




rewards to chief executive officers of Fortune 500 corporations in the US from 1992 
to 1994. Evidence from the study reveals that, method of awards agrees with 
favourable movements in corporation stock prices and quarterly announcement of 
incomes are in agreement with the interpretation that CEOs obtain share option 
rewards just before good company news.  
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), in a related research also suggested that incentive 
pay for directors and management can enhance the monitoring efforts executed by 
the board of directors. Additionally, Morey et al. (2009), report a significant positive 
relationship between directors compensation and higher market valuation measured 
by price to book value multiple of the sampled firms.  
In contrast, Core et al. (1999) investigated 205 US firms from 1982 to 1984 and 
found that firms with weak boards (weak outside directors) and ownership (no block 
holder) structures allow CEOs to obtain excessive compensation, which results in 
worse subsequent firm value. Also, Yeo, et al (1999) in a study of 56 sample listed 
firms in Singapore from 1983 to 1993 established no significant evidence for the 
motivation effect of executive directors share option compensation plans (ESOP) on 
stock price increase and operating performance of Singapore listed firms during the 
period. The study concludes that, lack of significant effects for incentive and stock 
price of the sample firms reveals mainly the distinctive regulatory setting in 
Singapore. Campbell and Wasley (1999), found that executives can sometimes 




Other studies that examined the relationship between management and director‘s 
compensation and firm performance includes, a study by Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
which found a weak relationship between compensation and performance. Similarly, 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) report drops in both level of CEO pay per annum and the 
pay-performance relationship since the 1930s. This position is compounded by the 
evidence that managerial capital is more complex to asset size compared to market 
value. This position contradicts Rosen (1982) postulation that the firm size-pay 
association is due to bigger firms hiring more capable executives.  
Agrawal and Knoeber (1998) report that, threat of takeover has two contrasting 
effects on compensation: they are risk and competition effects. The compensation 
effects between directors result in less ability for directors to extract greater wages. 
However, risk effect that leads to different improved compensation as greater 
takeover threat is possible to result in an improved probability of corporation-
specific human investment loss or implicitly delayed compensation. This difference 
in risk makes management demand higher remuneration to counterbalance the bigger 
risk. Finally, Healy (1985), reports evidence which suggests that, executives choose 
revenue increasing in order to maximize present value of the bonus element of their 
compensation in the firm.  
Studies conducted on directors‘ compensation and performances continue to produce 
mixed findings. The studies reviewed used cash payment and share bonuses. In the 




Abnormal directors compensation will be measured by directors pay above their peer 
sector average.  
2.5.8 Corporate Governance Disclosure and Transparency 
The disclosure of corporate governance information in the annual report is also 
suggested as one of the internal monitoring mechanisms. This is because investors 
that are sensitive on governance issues in their investment decision can use such 
disclosed CG information and make their decisions. According to the code of CG 
issued by the SEC, all listed firms in the NSE must disclose the level of their 
compliance with the code. Information on shares owned by directors and all 
remunerations must be published in the annual reports. The CBN code of CG also, 
concurred with SEC code; it requires banks to include CG compliance status in their 
audited financial statements. But, the NAICOM Code of CG 2009 did not make it 
compulsory for the insurance companies to disclose their level of compliance to the 
code but require them to disclose their accounting system in line with guidelines 
issued by the commission. The disclosure of financial reporting and governance 
information is important potential means by which management communicate 
performance of the company to outside investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
Research was also conducted on whether disclosing CG information has an impact 
on the value of firms yet, the studies produced mixed findings. Some established 




(CG information disclosure), while others find no relationship between disclosure 
and performance. The following studies established a positive relationship between 
disclosure of CG practices and performance of firms. Holm and Schøler (2010) in a 
study 100 Danish companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange, the data 
derive mainly from information in the 2004 annual reports. Evidence from the study 
reveals that, disclosure has a significant positive relationship to earnings before 
interest tax, depreciation and amortization of the samples firms during the 2004 cross 
sectional analysis. CG disclosure indexes of 49 listed firms in Zimbabwe show a 
significant positive effect on compulsory disclosure and reporting practices of the 
sample firms (Owusu-ansah, 1998). 
Ayorinde, Toyin, and Leye (2012) examined the level of corporate governance 
disclosure for the sampled deposit money banks in Nigeria, the result revealed a 
positive and significant relationship between corporate governance disclosure index 
and bank performance. Gompers et al. (2003) report a significant positive association 
between corporate governance indexes (CGI) built from 24 provisions and stock 
returns. The study establishes that potential investors buy stocks in firms with the 
highest levels in CGI and their stock in such firms earned considerable abnormal 
returns of 8.5% per annum. The authors also document that, firms with stronger 
investor rights experience higher firm value; greater profits and lower investment 
expenditures. Whereas corporations with weak corporate governance index 




Firm‘s voluntary CG disclosure has a significant positive relationship with a price to 
earnings multiple of 156 sample firms listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange for 
the period of 1991-1995 (Eng & Mak, 2003). Also, Bauer, Frijns, Otten and Tourani-
Rad (2008) using Governance Index Metrics (GIM) constructed and rating of 225 
companies in 2003 June 2004 January and 356 companies for the month of August 
2004 in Japan, found significant positive relationship between disclosure, internal 
control and market to book value during the period. Similarly, Mitton (2002) in a 
study 398 firms in five Asian countries, report that, firms with higher quality 
disclosure, greater transparency and CG experiences have better share price 
performance during the East Asian financial crisis.  
In addition, Bruno and Claessens (2010) studies 2350 firms from 23 countries. The 
study reports a significant positive relationship between governance transparency 
and market to book value for the period of 2003-2005 in countries with low investor 
protection. Equally, Morey et al (2009) in a study of 200 firms from 21 emerging 
market countries, reports a significant positive relationship between CG disclosure 
and higher market valuation measured by price to book value multiple. 
Correspondingly, Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995) observed that, company directors 
may disclose voluntarily information if that information will be to their own personal 
interest. When directors own company shares and their interest coincide with the 
interest of shareholders, directors will pay more attention to the company share price, 




director‘s shareholdings may have a significant impact on the disclosure of CG 
information. Governance and social responsibility disclosure is significantly related 
to performance of companies (Lys et al., 2015). The disclosure effects are associated 
with the likelihood that the market expects future involvement and responds to the 
pronouncement of funds ownership performance (Croci & Petrella, 2013). 
In contrast, other studies could not establish that GC information disclosure affects 
performance. For example, Che Haat, Abdul Rahman and Mahenthiran (2008) 
examine the effect of good CG practices on company transparency performance of 
listed firms in Malaysia. The results suggest that, timeliness and disclosure are not 
significant contributing factors in the association between CG and market 
performance of the sample firms. Nevertheless, foreign ownership and debts 
monitoring have predicting power on the performance of the company. Also, 
Poshakwalea and Courtisb (2005) using 135 banks across America, Europe, and 
Australia, report significant negative relationship between disclosure and price to 
earnings multiple of the sample banks across the countries.  
Apart from the previous studies that relate information disclosure and corporate 
performance, other researchers look at motivations why firms disclose or failed to 
disclose information. Akhtaruddin, Hossain and Yao (2009) examined empirically 
the level of CG and voluntary disclosure of Malaysian listed firms. The results 
suggest a positive relationship between board size and disclosures and between ratio 




disclosure is adversely associated with family control, while proportion of audit 
committee members to whose members are on the company‘s board is not associated 
with voluntary disclosures. Proportion of independent directors on firm board; an 
audit committee appointment; amount shares held by directors and stock option 
plans, have a definite relationship to voluntary disclosure of CG information (Babı & 
Muin, 2005).  
Ownership structure, shareholders dispersion and market capitalization have 
significant effect on companies‘ CG information disclosure and level of CG 
disclosure is sluggish in Ghana (Tsamenyi, Enninful-adu & Onumah, 2007). Firm 
capability to voluntary discloses CG information is positively associated with the 
need to increase equity share capital, though, not with the need for raising debt 
investment in Australian firm‘s (Collett & Hrasky, 2005). The CEO duality is related 
to lower stages of voluntary CG information disclosures amongst 385 companies in 
Hong Kong (Gul & Leung, 2004). In addition, Chairman who is non-executive 
director and board controlled by family members has a significant association with 
the level of voluntary disclosure of non-compulsory financial accounting information 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Family control firm‘s characteristics affect their corporate 
disclosure practices. They disclose only small information on their CG practices 
(Ali, Chen & Radhakrishnan, 2007). 
Eng and Mak (2003) in a study of 158 firms listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange. 




structure of ownership influence firm‘s information disclosure; significant 
government stake and lower managerial interest are associated with increased 
information disclosure. Also, large ownership is not related to information disclosure 
while increase in the independent directors reduces corporate information disclosure. 
Finally, firms with few debts and big firms have the highest level of information 
disclosure.  
Financial accounting information reporting and disclosure are important avenues for 
management to communicate firm performance and CG practices to outside investor 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001). The existence of an audit committee on firm‘s board is 
positively and significantly correlated to the extent of voluntary information 
disclosure (Ho & Wong, 2001). Similarly, Verrecchia (2001) reports that if company 
directors have motivations, such as valuable shareholdings, they might tend to 
prejudice information disclosure in order to make it less or more or favourable 
compared to actual expectation. Dedman (2004) contends that if directors‘ 
remuneration contains company shares, they might tend to issue update when their 
corporations are wrongly valued by the market for them to increase their individual 
wealth.  
Literatures reviewed for CG information disclosure and performance has shown that 
most of the studies established a relationship between the variables, though some of 
the studies could not establish that CG information disclosure in the company 




monitoring mechanism for reducing agency problem and whether information 
disclosure on CG practices has an effect on the equity value multiple of listed firms 
in the NSE.  
2.6 Control Variables 
According to Becker (2005), control variables in organizational research are 
important like the independent and dependent variables. They assist in ruling out 
other explanations of study findings, reduction in error terms and enhance statistical 
power. The objective of control variables is to ensure the reliability of results and 
avoid the possibility of spurious regression. Following consideration of the objective 
of our study, that is, investigating the relationship between mechanisms of CG and 
equity value multiple of listed firms in Nigeria. Practically, investors in Nigeria 
consider company reputation in terms of size and age, leverage, risk, industry in 
making investment decisions. Thus, the study control for firm size, firm age, industry 
type, leverage, and risk to reduce the error term and increase the statistical power of 
explanatory variables, as in (Pagano & Schivardi, 2003; Loderer & Waelchli, 2009). 
2.6.1 Firm Size 
Firm size is a vital variable that controls the volatility in stock prices fluctuations 
(Lam, 2002). Prior studies established a positive relationship between size and 
performance. For instance, Pagano and Schivardi (2003) found empirical evidence of 




Germany, Italy, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and France). The study discloses 
substantial differences, positive association between output growth, industry level 
and structure of size Also, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005) Using 
more 4000 survey and database consisting 54 countries from 1996 to 1999 to 
examine the influence of financial, corruption problems, legal and on corporations‘ 
value rates whether the mention factors growth constrains depends on size of firm. 
Evidence from the study reveals that, small firms are most constrained.  
In addition, Kiani, Chen and Madjd-Sadjadi (2012) using cross-sectional data 
obtained from 120 good-performing companies issued through Common Wealth 
Magazine during the years 1997-2003 and 25 companies that are performing poorly 
and published in Taiwan Stock Exchange for the same period. Evidence from the 
study reveals that, large firms grew faster compared to smaller ones. One of the 
yardsticks that display the size of the firm is the logarithm of the total assets of the 
firm. Large firms are usually considered to have attained maturity which shows that 
a firm is relatively established and better capability to produce more profits 
compared small firms (Nur‘ainny, Nurcahyo, Kurniasih & Sugiharti, 2013). Firm 
size has a significant positive relationship with the book to market value and 
earnings to price value of listed companies listed in the Hong Kong and United State 
stock exchange for the July 1984 to 1997 cross-sectional studies (Lam, 2002). 
Furthermore, Bassey, et al (2014) study financial reports of twenty eight (28) agro 




the study reveals a significant positive relationship between long term debt 
proportion and firm size, the results conform prior expectation that large size firms 
with large tangible assets are well-known to access loans easier compared to small 
firms with smaller tangible assets.  
2.6.2 Firm Age 
The age of a firm features in several researches of finance and accounting literature. 
For example, it is a control variable in studies on CG and performance of firms 
(Loderer & Waelchli, 2009). Part of the reason is, if a company‘s shares are traded 
for quite period of time, investors can have the opportunity to monitor company 
share prices fluctuations. The ability of investor‘s to assess share prices volatility 
enhances their investment decision in those companies. As stated above, the 
importance of age for company dynamics has attracted attention in accounting and 
finance literatures. Many prior studies believe that company‘s age influence 
performance. At least, firms learn some abilities on how to do their activities better 
as they become older. 
Similarly, the existing empirical evidence shows that life expectation increases with 
age. For example, Bassey, et al (2014) study the financial reports of twenty eight 
(28) agro allied companies listed on the NSE during the period 2005 to 2010. 
Evidence from the study reveals a significant positive relationship between long term 




companies are well-known to access loans easier compared to newly listed 
companies.  
Moreover, Bellone, Musso, Nesta and Quere (2008) in a study of selected French 
manufacturing firms in the 1990s argue that the determining factor for the concrete 
survival of a firm depends on its age. Considering the importance of age in the 
performance of firms, age is used as control variable for more accuracy and 
reliability of results. 
2.6.3 Firm Leverage 
A number of empirical studies have used leverage as control variable (Chiu & Ho, 
2015; Lys, Naughton, & Wang, 2015; Mitton, 2002). Leverage was reported to have 
to have positive relationship with the financial performance of selected insurance 
companies listed at the Nairobi Stock Exchange (Wanyonyi & Tobias, 2013). The 
size of firms and leverage generally explained more than 53% of the variation in 
reported goodwill impairment of selected firms in the 2002 to 2004 reporting periods 
(Godfrey & Koh, 2009). The relationship between leverage and firm value is positive 
especially where leverage is not unreasonably high (Pech, Noguera, & White, 2015).  
The leverage coefficient (total debt/total assets) was indistinguishable from the value 
of zero; this could be as a result of fact that the variable does not have significant 
change over the time series analysis (Linck et al., 2009). The empirical study of this 




sample are financed. The control for leverage prevents the likelihood of spurious 
correlations between the variables of the study. Therefore, this study controls for 
leverage to ensure the reliability of the regression results. 
2.7 Limitation of the Previous Studies 
In summary, previous studies on CG used one or few of CG mechanisms on the 
value of firms excluding other mechanisms. For, example, some studied only board 
size (Guest, 2009; Eisenberg et al., 1998). Some study only used board independence 
in relation to performance (Bhagat & Black, 2002; Klein, 2002). Others study 
compensation and performance (Mehran, 1995; Brick et al., 2006) and some used 
gender (Abdullah et al., 2016). However, this study incorporates eight mechanisms 
of CG (board size, board independence, board gender diversity, audit committee 
independence, managerial shareholding, chief executive officer power, abnormal 
directors compensation and disclosure of corporate governance information in the 
annual reports) to see their individual and collective impact in predicting the value of 
equity.  
On the equity value multiples, previous studies concentrate on one or two of the 
multiples. For instance, price to earnings (Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Salomons, 
2008), some considered only price to book value (Barniv, 2009; DeAngelo, 2014). 
But, this study incorporate all the four equity value multiples (P/E, P/V, P/C, P/S) 




condense the equity value multiple serve as one of the major deviation of this study 
compared to the prior literatures. This is because prior literatures have established a 
strong correlation between the equity values multiples themselves due to their 
relationship with price. In addition, several studies on board size tend to argue on 
size, some argue in favour of small board size (Yermack, 1996) others argue favour 
of large board size (Black et al. 2006). This study is considered the board in relation 
to its responsibility of corporate monitoring (Cotter & Silvester, 2003). Studies on 
CEO power mostly concentrated on the chair/CEO power separation, only rare look 
at the power of the CEO in relation to his tenure as the company CEO.  
Similarly, research on directors compensation focused on total pay to directors 
including, stock rewards and other tangible incentives. This study measures 
compensation as payment of directors above their peer sector average making the 
study the first to relate abnormal compensation on the value of owners. This is 
because good compensation can also influence good corporate governance practice. 
It can be observed from review of previous works on stock value where some of the 
studies only look at stock prices without relating it to any value driver like earnings 
and book value. Moreover, most of the studies are in developed economies, 
therefore, similar study in emerging economies particularly Nigeria would add value 




2.8 Established theories of CG and Equity Values 
Theories related to corporate governance and performance are discussed. The 
objective is to enable the study establish ground for developing hypotheses that are 
tested to answer the research questions   
2.8.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory seems to be most used theory in CG monitoring mechanism because 
the agency problem arises out of separation of ownership from management. As 
observed by Pope and Puxty (1991) that, understandings into the structure of CG 
have been mostly developed through the analysis of firms in an agency viewpoint. 
According to Eisenhardt (1989), agency theory is utilized in numerous subjects with 
different implications. For example, researchers in accounting, finance, management 
sciences, political sciences, economics, marketing, sociology and organizational 
behavior amongst others have used agency theory with different inference. Although 
agency theory may have different meaning in usage, it generally, discusses those 
relationships where one party call (the principal) employs work to another party call 
(the agent). In the context of this research, agency theory refers to those types of 
relationships that exist between directors (managements) and shareholders (owners). 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) added that, the problem of agency arises as a result of two 
reasons; first, because the collaborating players may have different objectives 




activities of the agent (manager). The cost of agency comprises of costs of 
monitoring, structuring, and binding set of contracts relationship between agents and 
conflicting interests groups. On the other hand, Hart (1995) stated that, what 
constitutes a good return is its gross profit and gross profit depends on manager‘s 
determination.  
The effort of the agent towards increasing the value of the firm is likely observed by 
only the agent himself. Thus, Hart (1995) proposes a model that provides balance 
(trade off) between risk sharing and incentive to decrease the principal-agent 
problem. The model suggested agent-performance pay that includes stock options 
compensation and the remuneration. The empirical literature divided agency theory 
into two perspectives the positivist and the principal-agent. The positivist focused on 
all CG mechanism that is used to decrease ―the behavior of self-serving agent‖, 
while the principal-agent examined every agency relationship with mathematical 
evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
As already stated above, literature on CG conventionally identifies agency problem 
on the perspective of conflicts between directors (managements) and shareholders 
(owners), so the positivist perspective is closer to our research objective. This 
perspective produced numerous articles on CG model to evade managerial 
opportunism and reduction in information asymmetry. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
emphasized how a partaking in company ownership affects managers‘ interest. The 




ownership in order to align their objectives with that of shareholders. A study by 
Fama (1980) maintained that efficient capital market and labour represent an 
instrument for controlling the behaviour of self-serving (manager) agent.  
The large part agency theory literatures concentrate in determining the optimum 
balance between risk bearing and efficiency. The efficiency result argues that agent 
opportunism decreases by information systems, permitting the principal (owner) to 
verify what does the agent is actually doing. Every shareholder may encounter 
principal-agent problems, though it is more obvious for bigger firms. Those firms, 
where share ownership is spread amongst several investors, monitoring costs are not 
insignificant. 
The study of Muth and Donaldson (1998) presented some of the assumptions of the 
agency theory, and they include the following. First, separation of chairperson and 
chief executive officer leads to higher company performance. Second, increase in 
board size increases company value. Third, higher percentage of non-executive 
directors on boards leads to higher company value. Fourth, boards with lower 
average tenure including CEO lead to higher company value. Lastly, stake of 
management in the company ownership leads to performance.  
Agency theory further argues that, the company board of directors is responsible for 
taking adequate measures in terms of incentive mechanisms to make management 




representatives of shareholders incentive alignment is important to them as it is 
important for management (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). To conclude, Hjelmstad, 
Marshall and Walmsley (2006) documented that, positive market reaction related to 
open market equity repurchases in the UK is better explained by agency theory.  
Finally, Phan (2001) submitted whether agency theory assumptions can be generic to 
emerging markets, despite their economic, sociological and developmental 
differences remain an essential research problem. In the Nigerian business 
environment, agency theory has been a serious problem most especially in public 
companies where shareholders are dispersed across the country and abroad. The joint 
report of Central Bank of Nigeria CBN and Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation 
NDIC 2009 indicted many CEO of public companies for using their positions to 
defraud their respective organizations. Shareholders in the affected corporations have 
suffered seriously due to the problem self-serving (managers) agents. Therefore, this 
study investigated the influence of corporate governance mechanisms in predicting 
the value equities from an agency theory perspective. 
2.8.2 Stewardship Theory 
The stewardship theory is also recommended as a substitute for agency theory; the 
theory assumes that managements are good company‘s stewards. They are 
dependable and working diligently towards attaining high company profit and 




situations where managements are not motivated by their individual objectives but 
instead stewards whose motivations are aligned with that of their principals (owners) 
(Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). 
 The theory argues that re-allocation of company control by shareholders (owners) to 
professional managers may have positive development in management of modern 
corporation complexity. Having control to maximize company value, using the 
stewardship theory, executive directors are favoured because of their technical 
expertise, depth knowledge of the company operation, access to current information 
and operating environment. Prediction of stewardship theory is that shareholders 
(owners) can expect maximization of equity returns where the company is structured 
and effectively control by the management (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). 
Stewardship theory is assumed to have been originated from the social relations 
management theories, is perceived to be an alteration of the agency theory. 
According to stewardship school of thought, managements are not opportunistic; 
also, play a significant role towards empowering directors instead of controlling and 
monitoring them (Ong & Lee, 1996). The stewardship reveals a continuing sense of 
responsibility or duty of interest groups based on the intent to maintain the 
covenanted link. Therefore, stewardship refers to the level whereby individual freely 
suppresses his/her individual interests and acts in guard of others‘ individuals‘ long-




The stewardship theory reflects involvement of board‘s in both management and 
control decision through a board of directors on strategic roles (Bordean, Lucian & 
Cristiana, 2000). To conclude, Kulkarni and Ramamoorthy (2011) extend the 
relationship between principal and agent to include further hierarchy of staff, where 
subordinates (other hierarchy employees) might be considered as stewards of the top 
managers.  
In Nigeria, many shareholders depend on the integrity and reputations of the 
management team appointed to manage their respective organizations. In some 
instances, managers are found to engage in activities that increase the value of 
owners. However, in most cases managers betrayed this trust and act in their interest 
instead of owners interest. This is more glaring in the banking sector where the CBN 
has to inject money to some banks to save depositors and remove the banks 
managements due to recklessness. Thus, the present study examined the impact of 
firm‘s governance on the value of owners‘ equity amongst Nigerian listed companies 
in relation to the stewardship theory.  
2.9 Summary of the Chapter 
The chapter extensively operationalizes dependent variables (EVM) and independent 
variable (CG mechanisms). The equity value multiple explained in the chapter are: 
price to earnings, price to book value, price to cash flow and price to sales multiples. 




board gender, audit committee independence, director‘s shareholding, chief 
executive officer power, abnormal director‘s compensation and CG disclosure and 
transparency in addition to extensive definition of CG in general and in the context 
of this research. 
The review of related literature was based on the CG variables in order to make it 
more comprehending. Studies conducted on the relationship between CG and 
performances were critically reviewed. The review focuses more attention on 
problems, methodologies and findings/results of previous studies with the aim of 
justifying the need for this study. The chapter presented control variables and 
limitations observed in previous studies that warrant this study. Finally, relevant 
theories of CG are reviewed with the aim of aligning our study with established 
theories. The subsequent chapter presents hypotheses of the study and a theoretical 










THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter continues from the previous review of relevant literature by focusing on 
literature that relates to the problem under investigation. The theories that are 
relevant to the study were also reviewed in the preceding chapter. This current 
chapter presented a theoretical model for the study. The chapter also presents 
hypotheses that are tested in order to achieve the objective of the study. As 
mentioned earlier, the main objective of this study, is to, empirically examine 
whether the combinations of different CG mechanisms have significant influence in 
predicting equity value multiple of firms listed on the NSE. Also, in developing the 
hypotheses emphasis is placed on existing theories that explain CG and performance 
not on the conflicts of results from prior literatures.  
3.2 Theoretical Model of the study  
The figure 3.1 below presents the theoretical model of the study. The objective is to 
provide a picture of the relationship that is proposed to exist between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable. The figure also included control 
















Theoretical Model of the Study  
Equity value multiple can be explained by board size, board independence, board 
gender diversity, audit committee independence, managerial shareholding, CEO 
power concentration, abnormal directors compensation and CG disclosure. However, 
they are not the only variables that explain equity value multiple. There are other 
variables that influence the equity value multiple but they will not be included in the 
model. Nevertheless, control variables are introduced to take care of them. 
































important like the independent and dependent variables. They help in ruling out 
other explanations of study findings, reduction in error terms and enhance statistical 
power of the regression model.   
3.3 Hypotheses Development  
It can be understood from the theoretical exploration in the previous chapter that, 
different scholars have produced different theories on CG in relation to firm 
performance. For example, board size, board independence, board gender and audit 
committee independence can be explained by agency theory on the perspective 
internal governance monitoring. Share ownership by management can also be 
explained by both agency and stewardship theories. The stewardship theory assumes 
that managements are good firm‘s stewards. They are dependable and working 
diligently towards attaining high company profit and returns to the shareholders‘ 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  
The CEO power concentration on the other can be explained by stewardship and 
agency theory. The stewardship theory sees CEO as steward of the firm, therefore, 
exercise his/her responsibility with all sincerity in order to increase the value of 
owners. The director‘s compensation is explained by the same agency and 





Accordingly, in developing the hypotheses of the study, researcher reviews conflicts 
of results from previous studies. However, emphasis is placed on existing theories 
that explained various CG mechanisms and performance of corporate organizations. 
3.3.1 The Relationship between Board Size and Firm Performance 
From an agency perception, there is argument that a larger board size is more 
probable to be watchful for agency problems. This is because; a larger number of 
people on the company board will find it easier to review actions of the management 
(Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). The empirical study of Adams and Mehran (2003) 
reported that an increase in the company board size increases board‘s capacity of 
corporate monitoring thereby increasing firm value. Similarly, Linck et al. (2008) 
provided another support for this argument by establishing that larger board sizes are 
strongly related to lower earnings management. Board size has a significant positive 
relationship with the performance of Islamic banks (Mat Rahim et al., 2015). 
In addition, works of Smith et al. (1994) found that, large board size has the 
perspective to provide a better group of experience and expertise to the board. This is 
because of their number, some of the board members may have a broader mixture of 
credentials and that may represent more specific knowledge, skills and training. 
Thus, are more equipped as compared to smaller board size to process huge volume 




positively associated with bank‘s financial performance of Turkish firms (Isik & 
Ince, 2016). 
Furthermore, large board is significantly related to the performance of sampled 
United State commercial banks before the global financial crises of 2008 (Switzer & 
Wang, 2013). Equally, larger board sizes increase company performance and value 
of shareholder for the sample of 103 firms in four African countries for the period 
from 1997 to 2001 (Anthony, 2007). Additionally, Linck et al. (2008) reported that 
the average increase in the number of board size is positively and significantly 
related to firm value. The empirical evidence on the role played by board size on 
company performance is inconclusive (Dalton et al., 1999; Eisenberg et al., 1998; 
Yermack, 1996)). Apart from size these research also, focused on board‘s role in 
improving performance and increasing the reliability, credibility and the integrity of 
company‘s financial reporting procedure. Given that the main important role of the 
company board is monitoring of management.  
Some researchers are of the view that by the time board sizes comprise of many 
members, taking important company decisions may be difficult. This is because, 
even during meetings there are many members to here from and that could have 
negative effects on urgent vital company decisions. To prove this, Jensen (1993) and 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue on the problem of coordinating a large group of 
directors for urgent company decision. Therefore, large board could negatively affect 




from the work of Eisenberg et al. (1998) reveals that a large board has a likelyhood 
to be slow in decision making, and thus can be problematic to change. 
Small board size tends to be less active because it is easier for the powerful CEO to 
control. Hence, an optimum board size is required, a board that is not too small and 
not large. Mak and Kusnadi (2005) opined the above findings by reporting that firm 
valuation is higher when board size is small, example if a firm has five directors, the 
number considered fairly small. In addition, Yermack (1996) established that the 
market values of firms with small board size are higher compare to firms with large 
board. Small board size has positive demonstrating effects on the privatized 
company‘s performance in Jordan (Al-Smadi et al., 2013). While, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2001) documented that board size and other boards‘ features, is 
determined by some endogenously factors, for example, performance of the firm; 
ownership structure and CEO power. Also, Board size has insignificant relationship 
to the performance of 82 sampled Islamic Financial Institutions IFSs in Golf 
Countries (Hashim et al., 2015). 
Empirical findings on the relationship between board size and performance are 
mixed. Some of the studies established a positive relationship between board size 
and company value others found a negative relationship. The current study is looking 
at board size in relation to its monitoring role (Beasley, 1996). This is because even 
prior studies that argue in favour small or large board size have accepted that, the 




context, board is responsible for the establishment of strategic goals and a setting of 
corporate values with clear lines of responsibility for the attainment of firm‘s 
objective. Size of firm board is expected to influence its performance. Therefore, 
based on the above discussion and in line with agency theory the study makes the 
following proposition. 
H1. Board size has a positive relationship with equity value multiple of firms listed 
on the NSE. 
3.3.2 The Relationship between Board Independence and Firm Performance  
The independence of company board of directors is one of the major lines of defence 
for shareholders‘ against opportunistic behaviour of management (Sundaramurthy, 
2000; Weisbach, 1988). According to Kenton (1995), there are three important 
responsibilities of company board of directors. First, it is the responsibilities of the 
boards to ensure company strategic direction (Kesner & Johnson, 1990). Second, it is 
their responsibility to provide advices and avenue for networking between the 
company and relevant stakeholders (Westphal, 1999). Third, it is the responsibility 
of the board to exercise their monitoring over the management for the benefit of 
shareholders (Bainbridge, 1993; Fama, 1980). For the third responsibility of the 
board to be effective and efficient, an independent board is required. In a situation 




function is likely to be compromised. Corporate organizations that have limited 
monitoring, the interest of the shareholders may be affected.  
The boards monitor management by ensuring that, executive directors and managers 
exercise their obligations in a way that protects the interests of shareholders of a 
corporate entity (Fama & Jensen, 1983). However, according to Sundaramurthy 
(2000), not all corporate boards effectively monitor their management. To support 
the independence of board members, Fama (1980) asserts that boards dominated by 
insiders (executive directors) encounter the problem of self-monitoring, hence, 
resulting in ineffective monitoring of the executives. Majority of prior studies 
provide empirical evidence on the role played by board independence in the 
performance of corporate organization. For example, the study of Rosentein and 
Wyatt (1997), reported an abnormal increase in the value of companies after 
additional outside directors are appointed on board. Board independence has a 
positive effect on the company value and overall operating performance (Knyazeva, 
et al., 2013). 
In addition, Byrd and Hickman (1992) establishes that, the firms market stock price 
reaction offers is more positive when firm‘s boards comprise of independent 
directors. Independent boards lead to more active CEO discipline and monitoring 
thereby increasing firm value (Guo & Masulis, 2015). Also, Brickley et al. (1997) 
found that the average equity market response to pronouncements of poison pills are 




it does not. The independence of board members has significant positive relationship 
with bank performance during the period of financial crises (Aebi, et al. 2011).  
On the contrary, the study of Bhagat and Black (1998) established no evidence that 
the proportion of independent directors on board affects future company value. 
Result of the study did not support the predictable wisdom that higher board 
independence increases firm performance. Board independence has insignificant 
relationship to the performance of 82 sampled Islamic Financial Institutions IFSs in 
Golf Countries (Hashim, et al. 2015). Similarly, Cadbury (1992) report, recommends 
the existence of more independent directors (outsiders) for an increase company 
monitoring activity. Proportion of independent directors on company board has a 
negative outcome on shareholders wealth and the economic value addition 
(Imanzadeh, 2014).  
Bathala and Rao (1995) established an inverse association between the percentage of 
independent director‘s members and several other agency conflicts mechanisms and 
insider ownership of equity of the firm. Greater board independence is significantly 
and inversely associated with the degree of share price returns, regularized share 
trade sizes and the market value of stock traded (Elbadry, et al., 2015). While, 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) observed that, company board that are expanded on 
political motives often result to too many outside directors on the board, does not 




recognized on the basic assumptions that outside independent directors on the board 
are more vigilant compared to inside directors because of the following reasons:  
Firstly, emphasis of outside directors is more on financial performance of their 
respective companies, which is a significant part of firm monitoring (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). Secondly, independent directors are more expected to dismiss CEOs after 
poor performance than inside directors (Weisbach, 1988). Thirdly, independent 
directors have a reason to defend their personal reputes as truly independent directors 
through attentive monitoring of management (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
In Nigeria, all the codes of CG issued by the regulatory agencies emphasized the 
need for board of public companies to be independence. The code recommends that 
40% of the board member should be independent directors. The independence is 
determined by the proportion of directors on independent cadre to total number of 
directors sitting on the board. Against the background in the discussion above, that 
independence of firm‘s board increases its monitoring capacity and in line with 
agency theory prediction. This study therefore, suggests the following hypothesis: 
H2. Board independence has positive relationship with the equity value multiple of 
firms listed on the NSE.  
3.3.3 The Relationship between Board Gender Diversity and Firm Performance 
In recent times, there has been increasing pressures to the world corporations to 




Higgs report (2003) suggested that companies should look at other ways to find and 
employ non-executive directors in order to widen the group of talent available, with 
the confidence that board diversity will provide a more effective company board. 
The gender mixture of company board is among the important measures of diversity 
available in the CG literature. Nevertheless, studies into the influence of gender 
diversity on company performance have produced mixed findings. For instance, 
Carter et al. (2003) established that the proportion of females on the company board 
is positively and significantly related with firm value. In addition, Adams and 
Ferreira (2004) documented that firms that experience higher variability in their 
share returns have less women serving on their boards, this indicates that, when the 
level of uncertainty increase, group homogeneity is desired.  
The percentage of women and minorities on boards of directors is positively 
associated with performance indicators (Erhardt, 2003). Similarly, Gul et al. (2011) 
documented that gender diversity increases stock price through machinery of public 
information disclosure in larger firms and by boosting confidential evidence 
gathering in smaller firms. Also, Dezs (2012) found that, female representation in 
top management and board improves performance. Investors welcomed the 
appointment of women on the corporate board and a positive abnormal return was 





Adams and Ferreira (2009) found that, female directors have a significant impact on 
board inputs and firm performance in selected US firms; similarly, female directors 
on boards record more attendance in meetings than their male counterparts and are 
more willing in joining monitoring committees of the firm. Greater diversity in 
gender of company boards is more likely to generate economic benefits (Campbell & 
Mínguez-Vera, 2007). Female directors generate value for some Malaysian firms 
however decrease the value in others (Abdullah, et al., 2016). The more female 
directors have more performance of Tobin‘s Q and return on equity (Terjesen et al., 
2015).  
However, other studies could not establish a significant relationship between board 
gender and firm performance. For instance, Fenwick and Neal (2001) reported no 
significant correlation between group structure and the market value of equities. The 
firm with higher presence of female in the boards does not result in substantial 
differences both in service quality and financial return (Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle, 
2015). Representation of female on boards negatively affects the performance of 
small firms (Adams, 2015) 
In addition, Rose (2007) could not also establish any significant linkage between 
firm performance measured by firm value and representation of female on boards. 
The number of women serving on boards could be seen as one of the monitoring 
mechanism; however, only in countries that their laws and customs allowed women 




like their male counterpart and public companies are encouraged by the regulatory 
authorities to consider gender diversity in composition of their boards. Therefore, 
from the issues highlighted above and in line with agency theory prediction the study 
hypothesizes: 
H3. Board gender diversity has positive relationship with the equity value multiple 
of firms listed on the NSE.   
3.3.4 The Relationship between Audit Committee Independence and Firm   
Performance 
Firms audit committees are suggested to be part of internal monitoring mechanisms 
of corporate organizations. As a result of additional responsibilities to corporate 
boards, certain responsibilities are allocated to sub-committees for example, audit 
committees, risk management committees and compliance committees (Kesner, 
1988). Kesner (1988) uphold that a majority of essential corporate board decisions 
start at the committee‘s level including audit committee.  
 
The objective of an audit committee is to increase the reliability and the integrity of 
the financial examination process (Klein, 2002). Klein added that audit committees 
in the company boards can add to internal monitoring through an increase in the 
level of financial auditing process integrity. Dechow, et al (1996) report that, 
companies that have no audit committee on their boards are more likely to commit 




Zimmerman (1990), auditing is an essential form of monitoring mechanisms used by 
corporations to minimize agency cost. 
However, the presence of an audit committee alone does not provide assurance for 
the efficiency of the management monitoring process and credibility of the company 
financial reporting process (Cotter & Silvester, 2003). Other issues should be taken 
into consideration when analyzing audit committee measure in monitoring 
management‘s conduct and performance. An audit committee of every company 
should be truly independent from management to enable them to conduct effective 
monitoring for potential prevention of management opportunistic tendencies, 
improvement in the credibility and quality of the financial reporting process. 
Empirical evidence reveals that audit committee independence improves firm 
performance.  
Chan and Li (2008) reported that the presence of expert independent directors on 
company boards and in the audit committee increases their value. Equally, Klein 
(2002) found that the board or audit committee independence led to an increase in 
abnormal accruals of firms. The management of companies with more effective 
boards and independent audit committee structures is more likely to provide more 
accurate estimates (Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). In the same line, Bruno and 
Claessens (2010) reported a significant positive relationship between audit 
committee independence and market to book value multiple, especially, in countries 




Zealand show that only in firms where the majority of the directors serving on the 
audit committee are independent that are related with the possibility of aggressive 
earnings management (Sharma & Kuang, 2014). 
However, some studies could not establish that audit committee independence 
increases firm performance. For example, Chen et al. (2005) established little 
relationship between audit committee independence and performance. Similarly, 
Sunday (2008) found no relationship between performance and independence of the 
audit committee. Despite findings from some studies that independence of an audit 
committee does not lead to increasing firm value, most of the studies established a 
significant positive relationship between independence of company audit committee 
and value. 
In Nigeria, regulatory authorities emphasise the need for audit committees of public 
companies to be independent from management influence. According to SEC, and 
NAICOM codes, the best way to have an independent audit committee is to ensure 
that the non-executive directors more than those on executive cadre and independent 
directors among them shall head the audit committee. In summary, looking at audit 
committee independence as monitoring mechanisms of reducing agency cost, this 
study proposes: 
H4. Audit committee independence has a positive relationship with equity value 




3.3.5 The Relationship between Managerial Shareholding and Firm 
Performance 
Ownership of shares by executive directors and managers is expected to increase 
their monitoring ability. Researchers argued on the role played by shareholding of 
executive directors and managers towards ensuring sound administration of the firm. 
The findings of the studies on the relationship between executive directors and 
management share ownership and performance produced a mixed result, although 
most the findings reveal a positive relationship. For example, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) observe the overall evidence on the association concerning pay and 
performance as a problem issue. They contend that the greatest way to decrease 
agency cost is through increasing shares of director‘s and managers in the 
corporation in order to align management interest with that of shareholder.  
On their part, Jensen and Meckling (1976) opined that, as management shareholding 
increases, company managers bear a large proportion of the costs of elusion and 
other deed that will rescind the value of the company. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
argue that, managerial owners can be considered potential managers of equity 
agency problems. Therefore, an increase in their shareholdings gives them a stronger 
incentive to monitor performance of the firm. Managerial ownership is positively 
related with crisis-period performance of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)   
(Liu et al., 2012). 
Moreover, Short and Keasey (1999) reported a negative relationship at lower levels 




at higher levels of directors and managerial shareholdings. Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) constructed board composition and insider ownership relationship model and 
performance, permitting for the endogenous purpose of insider ownership and board 
composition and found a significant relationship management ownership and firm 
value consistent with (Morck et al., 1988). Stulz (1988) presents a model specifying 
that high share ownership by company management and the associated voting power 
warrant managers to be more likely embedded in their individual positions within the 
company. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) also advance the model whereby management 
is able to establish itself by making managers specific investments that improve the 
value of company owners.  
To conclude, Jensen and Meckling (1976) added that, where managers hold small 
stocks and owners are too spread to take action against non-value maximization of 
their stocks then agency problem upsurge. With minor or no shareholdings in the 
firm, management may use company assets to achieve personal gain.  
Notwithstanding, other studies could not establish any link between the proportion of 
shares own by directors and performance. For instance, Sanda et al. (2005) reports 
no significant relationship between director‘s ownership concentration and price to 
earnings ratio of the sample firms. In addition, Dadidson et al. (2002) reported a 
significant negative relationship between stock of executives (inside directors) and 




and management ownership is not positively and significantly related to the market 
value of firms. 
From the perspective of agency cost monitoring, share ownership by directors and 
management enhances their monitoring capacity. Ownership by management makes 
them to be vigilant in managing the company. Accordingly, in line with agency 
theory, it is reasonable to state that: 
H5. Managerial shareholding has positive relationship with equity value multiple of 
firms listed on the NSE.  
3.3.6 The Relationship between Chief Executive Officer Power and Firm 
Performance 
The Nigerian SEC Code of CG state that reducing too much power from chief 
executive officer that seems to be part of a mechanism to reduce the agency cost. 
Power of the CEO can be viewed in two perspectives. Firstly, separation of chairman 
and CEO from one person (Rechner & Dalton, 1990); Second, tenure of the CEO i.e. 
number of years serving in the company as CEO (Walters et al., 2007). The 
separation of chairman from CEO as a mechanism to checkmate the activities of 
CEOs who seem to be above their boards and in some cases influence board 
decisions. The CEO and chairman duality has been taken care of by the regulatory 
authorities in Nigeria. For example, CG codes issued by the SEC, CBN and 
NAICOM make it categorically clear that no CEO should be chairman of the board 




The CBN code of CG for banks recommends the tenure of a CEO to a maximum of 
4-years terms (8 years) and his or her reappointment for the second term must base 
on performance and value addition to the bank. Practically, it can be argued that 
whenever a CEO stay for a long period of time it is likely for him/her to accumulate 
too much power that may influence many company decisions. Long-serving CEOs 
can influence the appointment of executive directors that may be loyal to him. Long- 
serving CEOs can also use his/her position to penetrate some board member‘s to 
support his/her opinion during board meetings at the detriment of other company 
stakeholders. Research was also carried out in both developed and developing 
markets on the average term of the CEO as a solution for the inhibition of 
organization fraud (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). 
 Walters et al (2007) found that CEO tenure is positively related to shareholders 
value at low level tenure and negatively related with shareholders value where the 
tenure of the CEO rises to a significant level. Berger et at. (1997) reports that 
leverage resolutions are correlated to the extent of entrenchment by executives, and 
generally entrenched executives strive to evade debt. They establish that leverage is 
likely to be lesser when the CEO has longer tenure to serve in the company. 
Similarly, Bhagat and Black (2002) found a significant positive relationship between 
CEO power concentration and market to book value. Lastly, Morey et al. (2009) 
report a significant positive relationship between CEO power concentration and 




board of directors takes adequate measures for vigilance, the tenure of the CEO 
could value to shareholders (Walters, Kroll & Wright, 2007).  
However, the study of Bathala and Rao (1995) reveals a negative coefficient for 
CEO tenure at a 1% level. This means CEOs who control the firms for relatively 
long periods of time seem to be successful towards restricting outside directors 
representation on boards of their firms'. This agrees with the entrenchment 
proposition found in the literature that longer serving CEO gets excess power that 
makes it easier for him/her to control other members of the board of directors. 
Similarly, consistent with the perspective problem, overstatement of earnings is 
higher in the final year of CEOs (Ali & Zhang, 2014). The CEO tenure in Nigeria is 
4 years in the first instance, however, renewable after satisfactory performance. 
Therefore, based on the issues discussed above and in line with the agency theory, it 
is reasonable to propose that: 
H6. Chief executive power concentration has positive relationship with equity value 
multiple of firms listed on the NSE.  
3.3.7 The Relationship between Abnormal Directors Compensation and Firm 
Performance 
Director‘s compensation is often-suggested as an internal CG monitoring mechanism 
to ensure the optimum performance of directors. The pay-performance strategy 
generally helps to decrease the problem of CG in the firm (Phan, 2001). When a 




commit fraud in the companies is reduced. Prior studies found a link between 
director‘s compensation and their ability to carry out their monitoring function which 
in turn increases the performance of firms. For example, Mehran (1995) established 
proof supporting groups that believe in increased incentive compensation for 
directors, and also recommends that the method that motivates executives to increase 
the value of the firm to include stock base compensation plan. Perry (1999 finds 
evidence that incentive -based compensation for directors influences the level of 
monitoring by the board and through such compensation, firms can align the interest 
of directors and shareholders.  
In a similar study, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) also suggested that incentive pay 
for directors and management can enhance the monitoring efforts executed by the 
board of directors. Shivdasani (1993) provides additional evidence that ownership by 
unconnected outside directors remains negatively related to the possibility that a 
company will be subject to aggressive takeover attempt. Also, when choosing the 
form of compensation, firms need to be thoughtful to their individual firm 
characteristics, because some directors and managers may use the advantage to 
compensate themselves at the expense of other stakeholders. 
Other researches also reveal a stronger association between corporate performance 
and compensation of the executive (Hall & Liebman, 2000). Some researchers 
however, suggest trade-off between pay-performance to be optimum, though, could 




executives can sometimes structure compensation plans at the cost of shareholders 
(Campbell & Wasley, 1999). The pay for to directors is tied to long-term firm 
performance thereby increasing the value of shareholders (Cheng et al 2015). 
Nevertheless, some studies could not establish any relationship between director‘s 
compensation and increased performance (Core et al., 1999; Yeo, et al., 1999). There 
is no significant evidence for the motivation effect of executive directors share 
option compensation plans (ESOP) on stock price increase and operating 
performance of firms (Yeo, et al., 1999).  
In the context of this work, directors‘ compensation would be determined by average 
pay to directors above their peer group sector average as an additional benefit. It can 
be argued that, if abnormal compensation to directors increases firm performance, 
performance of directors can also increase their compensation. Executive directors 
compensation plan actually depend on complex performance including accounting 
measures (Bushman & Smith, 2001). In Nigeria, companies are encouraged to have a 
compensation committee that will structure compensation plan that will be fair to all 
the stakeholders. Based on the discussions above, it is expected that directors pay 
motivate them to perform better. Therefore, based on the issues discussed and in line 
with agency theory, the study makes the following proposition: 
H7.   Abnormal director‘s compensation has positive relationship with equity value 




3.3.8 The Relationship between CG Disclosure and Firm Performance  
The concept of CG is associated with the level of information asymmetry and 
contracting inadequacies that firms encounter (Klapper & Love, 2004). Financial 
accounting information reporting and disclosure are important avenues for 
management to communicate firm performance and CG practices to outside 
investors (Healy and Palepu, 2001). CG information disclosure in the company‘s 
annual report is also suggested as one of the internal monitoring mechanisms. 
Quality of financial experts‘ relative to future earnings growth is related to the value 
of CG (Byard et al., 2006). 
Firm capability to voluntarily disclose CG information is positively associated with 
the need to increase equity share capital, though, not with a need of raising debt 
investment by Australian firms (Collett & Hrasky, 2005). Also, Black (2001) found 
that, change in CG scores (CGS) including disclosure of CG information from the 
lowest to the highest significantly increases firm market value. Firm‘s voluntary CG 
disclosure has a significant positive relationship with the price to earnings (Eng & 
Mak, 2003).  
In a similar study, Bruno and Claessens (2010) report a significant positive 
relationship between better governance transparency and market to book value in 
countries with low investor protection. In addition, Mitton (2002) reports that, firms 
with higher quality disclosure, greater transparency and CG focus experience better 




Moreover, Morey et al. (2009) report a significant positive relationship between CG 
disclosure and higher market valuation measured by price to book value of firms. To 
support Morey et al, Holm and Schøler (2010) reveals that, disclosure has a 
significant positive relationship with earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation. 
While Gray et al. (1995) observed that company directors may disclose voluntarily 
information if that information will benefit their own personal interest. When 
directors own company shares and their interest coincides with the interest of 
shareholders, in that situation the director will pay more attention to the company 
share price, which reflects the prospects and performance of the company. 
Governance and social responsibility disclosure is significantly related to 
performance of companies (Lys et al., 2015). The disclosure effects are associated 
with the likelihood that the market expects future involvement and responds to the 
pronouncement of funds ownership performance (Croci & Petrella, 2013). 
However, the study of  Poshakwalea and Courtisb (2005) report significant negative 
relationship between disclosure and price to earnings of the sampled banks across the 
six selected European countries.  Also, results from Che Haat et al (2008) indicate 
that timeliness and disclosure are not significant contributing factors in the 
association between CG and market performance of the sampled firms. However, 
foreign ownership and debts monitoring have predicting power on the performance 
of the company. Against the background that CG information included in the 





In Nigerian, listed firms are by the SEC and CBN codes required to include the 
following corporate governance information in their annual reports. The CG 
information to be disclose includes, board size, board and audit committee 
independence, board gender diversity, managerial shareholding, chief executive 
power concentration and directors compensation. The objective is to provide details 
information on governance issues to stakeholder‘s .Therefore, based on the 
assumption of agency theory, the study suggests that: 
H8. Corporate governance information disclosure has a positive relationship with 
equity value multiple of firms listed on the NSE.  
3.4 Summary of the Chapter  
The chapter presented the theoretical model of the study to provide an insight of the 
proposed relationship that exists between the variables. The chapter also presented 
hypotheses of the study in line with the study objective. That is, to empirically 
examine whether the combinations of different CG mechanisms have significant 
influence in predicting equity value multiples of firms listed in the NSE. Hypotheses 
were developed through review of previous findings; however, emphasis was placed 
on the theoretical argument. In agreement with previous research, theories of CG are 
served as guides for the development of all the eight hypotheses that are tested to 
answer the research questions of the study. The subsequent chapter presents the 




the data, population and sample of the study. The chapter finally explains the 









RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discusses the hypotheses to achieve the study objective. The 
main objective of the study is to empirically examine how internal CG mechanisms 
affect the EVMs of firms listed in the NSE. To achieve the objective, this study used 
four proxies as measures of equity value multiple namely price to earnings, price to 
book value, price to cash flow and price to sales multiple through the use of principal 
components analysis PCA method. 
CG variables on the other hand are represented by board size, board independence, 
board gender diversity, audit committee independence, chief executive officer power 
concentration, abnormal directors‘ compensation and corporate governance 
disclosure and information. This chapter explains the research design, the population 
of the study, the data collection procedure, the source and methods of data collection. 
In addition, the chapter defines variables of the study (dependent and independents). 
Finally, the chapter presented a model specification for the regression analysis and 




4.2 Research Design   
Research design is those strategies and actions for gathering information and 
examining them with the objective of combining the significance of research through 
economy in procedure (Barney, 1986). Different research designs have been 
suggested depending on research objectives and they include: experimental research 
design, survey research design, exploratory research design, causal research design, 
case study research design, cross-sectional research design, historical research design 
and descriptive research design, longitudinal research design, and observational 
research design among others. However, this study chose to use descriptive research 
design to examine the impact of the independent variable (CG mechanisms) on the 
dependent variable (EVM). Documentary information from annual accounts and 
reports of the sampled listed companies in the NSE is utilized in answering the 
research questions. The use of secondary information from financial statements and 
other relevant publications justifies the selection of the research design. 
4.3 Type of Data for the Study 
According to Hsiao (2003), panel data is a set of data that trails a specified section of 
individuals or entities over a period of time. Similarly, panel data provides numerous 
observations on every individual or entity in the sample. Panel data are widely used 
to conduct research both in developing and developed countries of the world. Panel 




several key advantages over time-series data or conventional cross-sectional (Hsiao, 
1985).  
Panel data provided the researcher with large number of observations, increased the 
degree of freedom and decreased the collinearity between independent variables – 
therefore improved the effectiveness of econometric estimations (Hsiao, 2003). 
Additionally, panel data permit a researcher to investigate a number of vital research 
problems which cannot be solved using time-series data or cross-sectional data 
(Hsiao, 2003). Panel data possess the characteristics of both cross-sectional and time 
series, thus, making it provide more tentative prediction. The use of panel data 
regression techniques has become progressively popular as the accessibility of 
longitudinal sets of data has grown. Panel data comprise recurring time series 
observations (T) of a huge number (N) of cross-sectional components (firms, 
individuals, or households) (Ahn & Schmidt, 1998). A significant benefit of using 
panel data is that it‘s allowed the control of unobservable heterogeneity by the 
researcher, that is, organized differences through cross-sectional elements (Ahn & 
Schmidt, 1998). Based on the issues highlighted above, the data of this study are the 
combination of cross-sectional and time series.  
4.4 Sources and Method of Data Collection 
The study used secondary sources of data; the data are gathered from the published 




years (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013). The period is chosen for the following 
reasons. Firstly, this is the period of post global financial crises that have affected 
virtually most countries of the world, Nigeria inclusive. The period of global 
financial crisis leads to total failure of many corporate organizations. The period is 
characterized by a loss of huge amount of money from investors. These make some 
investors to lose confidence on how their investments are managed by company‘s 
management. Secondly, is the period when corporations started to pay more attention 
to CG practices in order to safeguard the interest of all stakeholders (shareholders, 
management, creditors, regulatory authorities, employees, associations and other 
interest groups).  
Thirdly, during the period, Nigerian regulatory authorities have carried out a lot of 
reforms in 2011 and 2012 to avoid a repetition of the past. Therefore it is important 
in order to assess the influence of these regulatory reforms on the value of 
shareholders. Firms are mandated to disclose certain information in their annual 
reports which CG practices are part of it. Information on the dependent variable 
(EVM) is extracted and calculated by the researcher on individual company bases for 
all the period of the study. CG information on the other hand, is extracted base on the 
published information. Other secondary information includes publication from SEC, 





It is important to note that, this study is restricted to Nigeria because of the following 
reasons. First, according to the African Securities and Exchange Association, Nigeria 
capital market is the most vibrant in the Africa Sub-Sahara region and the second 
most important market after South Africa. Therefore making Nigerian capital 
markets an important player in equity investment in Africa and world at large. 
Second, Ujunwa (2012) observed that, corporate governance in Nigeria is an 
important issue that requires frequent investigation particularly in relation to the 
value of shareholders.  
4.5 Population of the Study 
The population of this study comprises of all public companies listed on the NSE i.e. 
period of the study. The study includes listed companies from all sectors according 
to NSE classification. The NSE categorized listed firms based on the following 
sectors; (i) Agriculture; (ii) Conglomerates; (iii) Construction/Real Estate; (iv); 
Consumer Goods; (v) Financial Services; (vi) Healthcare; (vii) ICT; (viii) Industrial 
Goods; (ix) Natural Resources; (x) Oil and Gas; (xi) Services; and (xii) Utilities. The 
ability of a public company to meet the listing requirement of NSE indicates the 
company is a public company and its shares could be traded in the stock exchange 
market. The population is selected because of the objective of the study, that is to 






Thus, the selection of the population concentrates only on listed companies. 
Secondly, all the listed companies are required by the SEC to prepare annual 
financial reports including disclosure of CG information. The population of the study 
comprises of 203 listed firms as at 31st December 2013. It is important to note that 
contrary to the widespread view that different industries have different ―best‖ 
multiples. Liu et al (2001) investigated the performance of a comprehensive list of 
multiples and a variety of associated issues like variation in their performance across 
industries over the period. Evidence from the findings established that the overall 
rankings of equity valuation multiples are observed consistently for almost all 
industries over the period. 
4.6 Data Sampling Procedure 
The determination of an appropriate sample is a common task for various 
organizational researchers. Inadequate, inappropriate, or excessive sample continue 
to impact on the accuracy and quality of research (Bartlett, Kotrlik & Higgins, 2001). 
Therefore, the researcher is guided by the following procedures in determining the 
data of the study. Firstly, the study selects companies that are listed on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange prior to 2009. Secondly, only companies that are on NSE listing up 
2013 are considered. Thirdly, the choice of a company depends on the availability of 
information for both equity value multiple and corporate governance variables. It is 
important to note that, the sampled selection excludes firms that are sanctioned by 




The exclusion of the affected firms was also motivated by inability of non-selected 
firms to disclose data on the equity value multiples consistently in their annual 
reports. Thus, the selection of the sample excludes firms affected by regulatory 
reforms during the period of the study. 
4.7 Variable Definition and Measurement 
This sub-section defined equity value multiples (price to earnings, price to book 
value, price to cash flow and price to sales multiples) and how they are evaluated in 
the context of this research. Governance mechanisms (board size, board 
independence, board gender, audit committee independence, managerial 
shareholding, chief executive power concentration, abnormal director‘s 
compensation and CG disclosure and their measurements are discussed in the sub-
section below. It is important to emphasize that the selection of the above mention 
CG variables is based on the availability of data and issues observed in respect of the 
variables from the codes.  
4.7.1 Equity Value Multiple (Dependent Variable) 
As highlighted earlier, equity value multiples are the most important way to value 
shares of a company. Value multiples can be determined by two approaches. First, 
through the use of prior information, for example historical financial data of a 
company, these types of value multiples are referred to as trailing multiples 




and analysts, these types of value multiples are referred to as the forwarding-looking 
multiples (Barniv, 2009; Liu et al., 2002; Schreiner, 2007). This study used the 
trailing approach to determine value multiples of the study. This is because; the 
information is available in the firm‘s financial reports. In determining multiple of the 
regression model, two stages are involved, first, the researcher calculate individual 
value multiple of the firms within the sample and, second, application of the 
principal components analysis technique (PCA) to determine one EVM that is used 
in the regression model. Various EVMs are presented in table 4.1 below: 
Table 4.1 
Operationalization of equity value multiples construct  
EVM Variables Measurements 
Price to earnings (P/E) Price per share divided by earnings per share 
Price to book value (P/B) Price per share divided by book value per share 
Price to cash flow (P/C) 
 
Price per share divided by cash flow from 
operation per share 
Price to sales (P/S) 
 
Price per share divided by gross revenue/sales 
per share 







1. Price to Earnings Multiple 
One of the ways to reflect the worth of any company asset is to look at a multiple of 
earnings generated by that asset. While in buying shares, it is normal to consider the 
amount paid as a multiple of earnings per share that the company generates 
(Damodaran, 2006; Mosley & Singer, 2008). This price to earnings multiple is 
determined by stock price per share divided by earnings per share of the selected 
companies 
2. Price to Book Value Multiple 
Investors regularly consider the relationship between the price of a stock and the 
book value of the company‘s equity (net worth) as a means of measuring of how 
under-or overvalued a stock is. The price to book value multiple that emerges may 
vary across industries, dependent upon the growth potential of the company and the 
investments quality in each (Damodaran, 2006). In valuing businesses, some analysts 
estimate this multiple using the value of the company and the book value of total 
assets or capital (not just the equity) (Damodaran, 2006). In the context of this 
research price to book value multiple was determined by stock price per share 
divided by book value of equity per share.  
3. Price to Cash Flow Multiple 
Operating cash flow is one of the relative performance measures of earnings 




companies in U.S. and cash is regarded as a king in equity valuation (Liu et al., 
2007). Some studies used net cash flows from investing activities, cash flow from 
financing activities, total cash flow or net cash flow. However, this study used cash 
flow from operating activities, because it provides more accurate value as observed 
by Liu et al. (2007). Thus, price to cash flow was determined by stock price per 
share divided by cash flow from operations per share.   
4. Price to Sales 
Both book value and earnings are accounting measures of performance and are 
determined through accounting principles and rules. Another approach that has not 
much affected by accounting choices is using the proportion of business value to its 
generated revenues (Damodaran, 2006). For equity share investors, this proportion is 
the price to sales multiple where the market value or price of equity is divided by 
income generated by the company. Thus, price to earnings was determined by stock 
price per share divided by gross revenue per share.  
4.7.2 Equity Value Multiple for the Regression Model 
Factor models are used as dimensionality reduction methods in circumstances where 
a researcher has a large number of variables that are closely related and want to 
allow the most essential influences on the total variables at equal time. Factor models 
are also used to decompose the construction of a group of sequences to common 




idiosyncratic variation (Brooks, 2008). According to Brooks (2008), factor models 
are divided into two; first, macroeconomic model, and second, mathematical model. 
For, the macroeconomic model, the factors are observable, while, in the 
mathematical model the factors are unobservable and principal components analysis 
(PCA) is the common mathematical factor model. The PCA technique is useful 
where variables are closely related.  
The PCA is a factorial technique where new variables are created, as mixtures of the 
initial displays, variables named primary having no relationship between them and a 
maximum variance. In the PCA, the total variance of the variables is explained 
(Opris, Demeter, & Palade, 2014). PCA is a multivariate arithmetical technique that 
is used in order to reduce the variables number from a data set to a smaller number 
of ‗measurements‘. Mathematically, PCA generates uncorrelated components or 
indices, where every component is a linearly weighted mixture of the original 
variables (Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006).  
PCA transforms variables that are initially correlated to new uncorrelated variables 
with maximum representation of all the initial variables, and is useful in identifying 
and preserving data information structure (Kim, 1986). A statistical instrument 
designed to summarize inter-relationships between related variables is principal 
component analysis and one of its functions is to group variables to a small factor 






PCA technique has been used by many researchers to reduce the number of variables 
that are initially correlated to new variable. For example, Ittner and Larcker (2001) 
used PCA to reduce 12 factors of the corporate organizational strategy and company 
environment that are normally used to measure strategy and environmental 
uncertainty to 3 factors. Also, Larcker et al. (2007) used PCA to reduce 39 measures 
of corporate governance to 14 to see their impact on organizational performance and 
accounting outputs. In addition, Libby (1975) used PCA to reduce 14 accounting 
ratios to 5, while predicting failure in relation to the ratios. Finally, Miller and 
Bromiley (1990) used PCA to reduce 9 measures of corporate risk in management 
research to 3. 
Therefore, this study used the PCA method to reduce the 4 equity value multiples 
(price to earnings, price to book value, price to cash flow and price to sales) to 
generate one value multiple as the dependent variable. The PCA is deducted from 
Ashton, Cooke, Tippett and Wang (2003) aggregation theorem of market value and 
equity, thus; 
 
Where EVM is the equity value multiple, x (t) is the price to earnings multiple, b(t) 




multiple, x(t) and β (s) are the coefficients of valuations related with  every element 
of reduce valuation model, while is the error term in the regression equation. 
In addition to the PCA value as the explained variable, the study also estimated the 
influence various corporate governance variables on the individual dimensions of the 
equity value multiples (price to earnings, price to book value, price to cash flow and 
price to sales multiples).  
4.7.3 Application of PCA to Proxy Equity Value Multiple 
Liu et al.‘s (2002) study motivated the application of the Principal Component 
Analysis PCA to proxy Equity Value Multiples EVMs. Their study examined 
correlations for different sets of value drivers scaled by price and indicated that value 
drivers used to compute multiples were positively correlated. This suggests that they 
share considerable common information. Principal component analysis technique on 
the other hand, is applied where variables are established to have correlations with 
each other. In addition, Penman (1997) combined price-earnings and price-book 
value in valuation of equity, and the overall result indicated an improvement in 
calculating a combined P/E and P/B multiples compared to ones based on normal 
multiplier of each separately. This further suggests that equity value multiples share 





Similarly, Yoo (2006) examined whether the composite approach yields higher value 
accuracy than the individual multiple valuation approach and found that the 
composite approach using historical multiples reduces the valuation errors of each 
multiple valuation using a historical multiple. Correspondingly, the application of 
principal component analysis to a proxy group of variables can only be appropriate 
after the PCA satisfied the post- estimation test.  
The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was conducted as a 
post-estimation test to check whether correlations exist amongst the equity value 
multiples of the sampled firms under study. The overall KMO value was 0.79 
approximately indicating the sample quality falls in the ―meritorious‖ range of 
values as Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999) described. Therefore, based on the results 
of Liu et al. (2002), which suggests correlation amongst the equity valuation 
multiples because of their relationship with one numerator (stock price) and the PCA 
post-estimation test, the current study applied the PCA technique to proxy EVMs.  
4.7.4 Procedure of PCA Technique on Panel Data 
PCA is a factorial technique in which new variables are created, as combinations of 
the initial displays have no correlations amongst them with a full variance (Opris et 
al., 2014). Passamani et al (2015) documented that principal component analysis is a 
practical and common method in finance and macroeconomics with regard to 




of variables in a data set by extracting important linear combinations from the 
supposed variables that might correspond to describe a particular phenomenon. The 
principal component analysis methodology is applied where correlations exist 
between the variables and the researcher desires to choose a component that 
represents all other variables. The objective of PCA is to find a variable that has a 
linear combination of the initial variables and do away with redundant variables. 
 In this study, PCA methodology is important because the equity valuation multiples 
(price-to-earnings, price-to-book, price-to-cash flow and price-to-sales multiples) 
have relationships with stock prices. The first principal component PC1 is given by 
the linear mixture of the initial variables x and accounts for the maximum possible 
variance. The second principal component PC2 captures most of the information that 
is not captured in the first PC1 and also not correlated with the first PC. Principal 
component analysis is performed with software like the Statistical Analysis System 
(SAS), the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and STATA.  
The current study used STATA software to compute the PCA and generated a 
principal component with a linear representation of all the four equity valuation 
multiples. Thus, these steps were followed. First, the data were sorted and arranged 
in panel form in the Excel spreadsheet before importing the data set. Second, the 
equity value multiples were imported in panel form into the STATA software. Third, 
the data were analyzed by first going to statistic in the STATA window, then 




selecting Principal Component Analysis (PCA), then selecting variables of interest 
for the PCA computation and pressing enter. The STATA automatically generated 
Principal Component Correlation and Principal Component Eigenvectors. After the 
computation of PCA correlation and eigenvectors, the final stage is typing predict F1 
in the STATA data entry window and pressing enter after which STATA 
automatically generates the first principal component.   
4.7.5 Corporate governance (independent variable) 
As earlier discussed, CG in the context of this research refers to those internally 
structured mechanisms that guides how corporations are governed for shareholders 
maximum returns and protection of other stakeholders interests. The CG variables of 
the study are board size; board independence; board gender diversity; audit 
committee independence; managerial shareholding; chief executive officer (CEO) 
power concentration; abnormal directors compensation and level of CG disclosure. 








Table 4. 2  
Operationalization of CG constructs 
CG mechanisms Measurements 
 Board Size (BS)                              Total number of board members 
Board independence (BI)                                       Number of independent directors to total board size 
  
Board gender diversity (BGD)        
 
Total number of females on the firm‘s board 
Audit committee independence 
(ACI) 
Number of independent directors to total number of 
audit committee members 
Managerial shareholding (MSH)                
 
Total management  shares ownership to the total 
shares 
Chief executive officer power 
concentration (CEOP)     
  
The tenure of the CEO of a company above 4 years 
is one (1) 4 years below zero (0) (the more the years 
the more power accumulation)  
 
Abnormal directors compensation 
(ADC)   
 
The amount of pay to director above peer group 
sector average 
 
Corporate governance disclosure 
(CGD)  
 
The disclosure of CG information in the annual 
reports dummy of one (1) otherwise zero (0) 




Firm size (FIRMSIZE)  Measured by natural log of total asset 
 












The difference between 2013 and company year of 
listing in the NSE. 
 
Industry dummies based on financial and non-
financial firms 
 
Firm total debts to total assets  
 
 
Firm dummies  for risk management committees 
one (1) and zero (0) 





1. Board Size  
Following prior researches, (Vafeas, 2000; Beasley, 1996) board size is represented 
by the total number of company‘s directors on the board including executive and 
non-executive directors. Annual reports of Nigerian listed firms disclose information 
concerning the board structure.  
2. Board Independence   
The number of independent directors to total number of board members on the firm‘s 
board is used to operationalize the independence of the board (Clifford & Evans, 
1997). As a result of regulatory recommendation by the SEC, an independent outside 
director is a director that is assumed to have some level of independence compare to 
directors on the executive cadres. Independent directors are not subject to any 
influence from management or any other person. The SEC CBN and NAICOM 
codes defined independent director of the company board as a director that has no 
substantial share in the company and does not represent any shareholder. Annual 
reports and accounts of listed firms listed on the NSE have information on 
independent directors.  
3. Board Gender Diversity 
Previous studies on board gender look at the number of women serving on the firm‘s 
board (Farrell & Hersch, 2005). Other studies measure board gender for percentage 




dummy board gender diversity (Dezso, 2012). This study measures board gender as 
the total number of women serving on the company‘s board. Information on board 
member‘s gender is available in the annual reports of Nigerian listed firms. 
4. Audit Committee Independence  
Independence of audit committee is operationalized as the number of independent 
directors to total members serving on the audit committee. SEC 2011 recommends 
that at least one member of the audit committee must be independent director while 
the NAICOM 2009 recommends the chairman of the audit committee must be 
independent. On its part, the CBN recommends that at least two of the bank directors 
must be on an independent cadre (Abbott, Park, & Parker, 2000; Klein, 2002). 
Information and status of the audit committee members are available in the annual 
reports of the Nigerian listed firms.  
5. Managerial Shareholding  
From prior studies, managerial shareholding refers to the amount of shares own by 
the company management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Donker Santen, & Zahir, 
2009). Managerial shareholding can also be measured by the percentage of shares 
owned by executive directors and other management to total shares of the company 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Flath & Knoeber, 1985). This study used managerial 




shares in the company in line with the monitoring mechanism. Information on 
shareholding of firms is available in the annual reports of Nigerian listed firms.  
6. Chief Executive Officer Power Concentration (CEOP) 
Following prior research, CEO power concentration is denoted by a dummy variable. 
While prior researches measures CEO power concentration on whether the CEO of 
the firm occupies the position of the chairman (Gul & Leung, 2004). The current 
study uses a broader measure of CEO power concentration. A chief executive officer 
is considered powerful where his/her tenure continues to increase over the years. 
This means the CEO of a company assumes more power concentration based on the 
years he/she serves as the CEO. Thus, CEO power concentration is determined by 
tenure individual occupying the position of CEO above 4 years meaning the CEO is 
serving a second term.  
7. Abnormal Directors’ Compensation 
From prior studies, director‘s compensation is determined by aggregating the amount 
of pay to directors including, salaries and other incentives accruing to the directors. 
(Mehran, 1995; Ryan & Wiggins, 2004; Brick, Palmon & Wald, 2006) However, in 
this study, director‘s compensation is measured as abnormal director‘s compensation 
that is directors pay above peer group as used by Agrawal and Walkling (1992) for 
takeover companies in US. Abnormal directors‘ compensation is also referred to as 




director‘s compensation. Thus, abnormal director‘s compensation was determined by 
computation of the peer group sector average, then comparison between the average 
and individual firm compensation package for directors. 
8. Corporate Governance Disclosure Information 
From prior studies, CG disclosure is measured as dummy one (1) and zero (0) if the 
firm annual report has CG Information 1 otherwise 0 (Collett & Hrasky, 2005,). 
Other researchers developed disclosure index to take care of individual item 
disclosed and score the firms (Singhvi & Desai, 1997). This study used a dummy of 
one (1) and zero (0) to assess CG information disclosure information in the annual 
reports of companies as recommended by the regulatory authorities. The CG 
information disclosure in the context of this study refers to the disclosure of 
information on the board size, board and audit committee independence, gender 
diversity of the board, managerial share ownership, tenure of the chief executive 
officer and director‘s compensation. 
4.8 Control Variables   
      4.8.1 Firm Size 
The size of a firm determined how the firm operates. Large firms usually find it less 
difficult to secure external finances and do not like to rely mostly on borrowing from 
bank for their financing. They have lesser informational asymmetries, and larger 
firms are more established than smaller firms (Baek, Kang & Suh, 2004). Large 




suggest that large companies are less exposed to external shock (Baek et al., 2004). 
Large firms are perceived to have sufficient tangible assets compare to small firms 
that are used as collateral to access debt capital (Bassey et al., 2014). In the context 
of this work firm size is measured by the logarithm of total assets. Information on the 
firm‘s total assets reflects in the annual reports of Nigerian listed firms. 
4.8.2 Firm Age 
The age of age a firm is a significant indicator that control vulnerability of equity 
prices, many investors often consider age of the firm before making their investment 
decisions. Firm age can be determined through two perspectives. First, the year a 
company is incorporated to carry out its business (Loderer & Waelchli, 2009). 
Second, company firm age, can also be looked into on the perspective of listing 
period i.e. the year a company is listed to trade its shares on the approved stock 
exchange (Baker, Powell, & Weaver, 1999). It has been established in the literature 
that, age of a company increases its performance and control abnormal changes of its 
stock prices. Firm age has a significant relationship with growth of firms (Choi et al., 
2013). Information on the year of listing of firms is available in the firms listed on 
the NSE. This study measured firm age as difference between 2013 and company 




4.8.3 Firms Leverage 
A number of empirical works have used leverage as control variable (Chiu & Ho, 
2015; Lys, et al., 2015; Mitton, 2002). The empirical study of this nature needs to 
take consideration of leverage because of the way firms under the sample are 
financed. The control for leverage prevents the likelihood of spurious correlations 
between the variables of the study. Leverage was reported to have positively 
relationship with the financial performance of selected insurance companies listed at 
the Nairobi Stock Exchange (Wanyonyi & Tobias, 2013). Size of firms and Leverage 
generally explained more than 53% of the variation in reported goodwill impairment 
of selected firms in the 2002 to 2004 reporting periods (Godfrey & Koh, 2009). 
The relationship between leverage and firm value is positive especially where 
leverage is unreasonably high (Pech et al., 2015). The leverage coefficient (Total 
debt/total assets) was indistinguishable from the value of zero; this could be as a 
result of fact that the variable does not have significant change over the time series 
analysis (Linck et al., 2009). Therefore, this study also controls for leverage to 
increase the statistical power of the model and control for the likelihood of spurious 
correlation. 
4.9 Technique of Data Analysis  
The technique of data analysis of the study is multiple regressions and the mode of 




deficiencies of unreliability and biasness of Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS), 
fixed and random effects unreliable and bias. According to Delgado-garcía, 
Quevedo-puente and Fuente-sabaté (2010) the System Generalized Method of 
Moments has the following advantages; it controls the problems of possible 
endogenous of the independent variables. The GMM method also avoids non-
observable constant heterogeneity problem resulting from each company specific 
features that remain over the period of time. Furthermore, the GMM system 
estimation method allows more instruments to be included for improving efficiency 
compared to other GMM estimators. The system GMM mode of estimation was 
found to have insignificant finite biases of sampling and smaller variances 
substantial compared to other estimations (Baltagi, 2005). 
The common concern with research on CG and performance is the possible presence 
of endogenous. Specially, where positive connection is established from 
performance to good CG, the estimated coefficient on CG would be rising towards 
biased, hence rendering the prior results unreliable. The reason for the endogenous is 
that, good company performance might encourage the execution of the best CG 
framework because effecting CG structure is expensive; therefore, only profitable 
companies can afford.  
Previous studies used GMM method to evaluate the relationship between governance 
variables and performance. For example, Mura (2007) used the System Generalised 




and non-executive directors on the value of firms. There are other studies that used 
the GMM in conducting research of corporate governance and value relationship 
(Ammann, Oesch, & Schmid, 2011; Delgado-garcía, et al., 2010; Guest, 2009). The 
reason of using the GMM estimator for governance and performance relationship 
aforementioned in the above researches is that, the static models (OLS, fixed and 
random) could not take care of endogenous problem between the explained and the 
explanatory variables. 
The system GMM is used for estimation of causality effects between the dependent 
and the independent variables (Méon & Sekkat, 2013). Considering the CG and firm 
values system GMM provide solution on endogeneity problem that is established in 
the literature between explanatory and the explained variables. 
4.10 Models Specification 
In order to examine eight hypotheses formulated, variables from Ohlson (1995)  
equity valuation model that include corporate equity value, book value and earnings, 
this study selects 8 variables of corporate governance that are representing other non-
financial information in line with (Feltham & Ohlson, 1995; Ohlson, 1995 ; Ohlson, 
2001 equity valuation model. The model suggests the inclusion of other information 
in valuing equity. Thus, 




From equation 1 above equity value multiple is a function of board size, board 
independence, board gender diversity, audit committee independence, managerial 
shareholding, chief executive officer power concentration, abnormal directors‘ 
compensation and CG disclosure information. 
The following sub-section explained the procedure involving the model used to 
estimate the regression equations. Before estimation of econometric analysis, 
showing the picture of variable distribution is very important and is usually done 
through the provision statistical summary of the data. Descriptive statistics are 
carried out to show the rudimentary properties for the data and they include the 
mean, maximum, minimum, standard deviation and variances that show the 
distribution of the data. 
To conduct the empirical analysis of the study and in conformity with Doris, 
O‘Neill, & Sweetman (2010), the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) tool of 
estimation as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
are used in estimating the regression. The GMM as a method of estimation takes into 
consideration time in-variant company characteristics, covering specific effects that 
are unobserved and which may have correlation with the independent variables. The 
GMM estimator also takes care of the endogenous problem of the regressions; it 
avoids bias in dynamic panel and accommodates panels that are unbalanced in 
addition to multiple endogenous variables. Alongside the benefits related to the use 




makes standard estimators of pooled ordinary least square (OLS), fixed and random 
effects unreliable and bias. Thus,                   
 
itiitit XYY    110    Model (2) 
Where  
Y  Represent the dependent variable, I refer to the unit of observation; t refers to the 
time, β0 is constant; β is coefficient of the lagged dependent variable; β1 is 
coefficient of explanatory variables; X is a vector of explanatory variable; 
 unobserved individual specific effect; Ԑ is the remainder of the error term. Thus, 
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From the model 3 above EVM is equity value multiple, BS is board size, BI is board 
independence, BG is board gender diversity, ACI is audit committee independence, 
MSH is managerial shareholding, CEOP is chief executive officer power 
concentration, ADC is abnormal directors‘ compensation and CGD disclosure 
information. 
To generate efficient and consistent parameter, Sagan test was carried out to test for 




model. Similarly, Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test was conducted including 
time dummy variable test for relevance of time. In estimating the regression 
equations of the study, system GMM two-step estimator was used because is more 
effective and robust in all sorts of heteroskedasticity (Arellano & Bond, 1991). The 
control variables (CV) are treated as exactingly exogenous and the regression 
equation utilized instruments that are internally while additional external instruments 
are not included. To validate the results, following diagnostic tests are conducted. 
1.       Sagan test for: 
i. Overidentifying restrictions that have a null hypothesis (Ho) indicating that 
instruments are valid, for example not have correlation with the error 
term. Thus, Rejecting Ho means the instruments are inconsistent and 
biased. 
ii. Model specification, the null hypothesis (Ho) indicating that the model and 
over identifying situations are specified correctly. Failures to reject the 
null hypothesis Ho justifies the model and over identifying restrictions are 
correctly specified.  
2. Arellano and Bond check for the autocorrelation. The null hypothesis (Ho) 
states that there is no 1st -order serial correlation. This test should reject the 
null hypothesis (Ho) of no 1st order serial correlation, however should not 





3. The test is to show the importance of time in the estimate (time dummy 
variable).  
Previous studies on CG and equity valuation have also used the Ohlson equity 
valuation model (Barniv, 2009; Davis-Friday, Eng & Liu, 2006; Lee, Lin & 
Chang, 2011; Kuo & Tswei, 2011). The model is flexible because it allows for 
incorporation of other information‘s that are not financial in nature, but has 
significant influence on the overall performance of an organization. Therefore, 
hypotheses test from the regression model above provide empirical results on the 
relationship between non-financial information (CG mechanisms) measured by 
board size, board independence, board gender, audit committee independence, 
managerial shareholding, chief executive power concentration, abnormal 
directors‘ compensation, CG disclosure information and value of equities in 
Nigeria. 
4.11 Summary of the Chapter 
The chapter introduced the methodology of the study. It explains the research 
designs, the population of the study, the data collection procedure, the source and 
methods of data collection. In addition, the chapter defines variables of the study i.e. 
dependent represented by equity value multiple and the two stages to determine the 
equity value multiple. First, calculating equity value multiple for all the sample 
firms. Second, use the principal components analysis to arrive at the equity value 




independent variables (CG mechanisms) were clearly defined and explanations on 
the mode of their measurements are also offered. Finally, the chapter presented a 
model specification for the regression and technique of analysis employed in the 
analysis of data together with the method of estimation. The methodology is 
presented in order to achieve the study objective, that is, examining the impact of 








PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the methodology of the research used to achieve the 
study objective. The main objective of the research was to empirically examine how 
combinations of CG mechanisms influenced the EVMs of firms listed on the NSE. 
To achieve the objective, this study used four proxies as measures of equity values 
multiples, namely, price-to-earnings, price-to-book value, price-to-cash flow, and 
price-to-sales. The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used to generate 
uncorrelated values of the explained variable (equity value multiple). 
5.2 Sector Classification of the Sample 
The final sample of the study comprised 100 companies that had the data required 
for analysis over the 5-year period from 2009-2013 resulting in 500 observations.  
As shown in Table 5.1, the majority of the sampled companies were from the 
manufacturing, banking and the insurance sectors (60%), conglomerates (15%), 





Sector classification  






Manufacturing  150 30 
Banks  75 15 
Insurance 75 15 
Conglomerates 75 15 
Services  55  11 
Agriculture 50 10 
Oil and Gas  45 9 
Total number of observations             500  100 
5.3 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) Results 
PCA is a factorial technique in which new variables are created, as combinations of 
the initial displays, having no correlations amongst them with a maximum variance 
(Opris et al., 2014). Passamani et al (2015) documented that principal component 
analysis is a practical and common method in finance and macroeconomics with 
regard to standard econometric examinations of models that are used to condense 
variables number in a data set by extracting important linear combinations from the 
supposed variables that might correspond to describe a particular phenomenon.  
The principal component analysis methodology is applied where correlations exist 
between the variables and the researcher desires to choose a component that 
represents all other variables. The objective of PCA is to find a variable that has a 
linear combination of the initial variables and do away with redundant variables. In 




(price-to-earnings, price-to-book, price-to-cash flow and price-to-sales multiples) 
have relationships with stock prices. The first principal component PC1 is given by 
the linear mixture of the initial variables x and accounts for the maximum possible 
variance. Second principal component PC2 captures most of the information that is 
not captured in the first PC1 and also not correlated with the first PC. Principal 
component analysis is done with software like the Statistical Analysis System (SAS), 
the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and STATA. However, the 
current study used STATA software to compute the PCA and generated a foremost 
component with a linear representation of all the four equity valuation multiples. The 
results of the of principal component analysis for equity valuation multiples are 
presented in two separate tables, Table 5.2 presents the PCA correlation and Table 
5.3 presents the eigenvectors. 
Table 5.2  
Principal Component Analysis Correlations 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 2.490830 1.9081300 0.6227 0.6227 
Comp2 0.582700 0.0733121 0.1457 0.7684 
Comp3 0.509390 0.0923132 0.1273 0.8957 
Comp4 0.417077 0.0923130 0.1043 1.0000 
Observations     500     
Components          4     
Trace                     4     





The table above presents the correlation variances of the principal components for 
PE, PB, PC and PS multiples variable variances. The first principal component has 
eigenvalues of variances of 2.49 and a proportionate representation of 0.62 (2.49/4) 
of the variable variance. This meant that the first principal component explained 
62% of the variation of the equity valuation multiples. This suggests that, if the first 
principal component is applied to the all equity valuation multiples, the valuation 
multiples have 62% representation in the first principal component.  
The second component has an eigenvalue variance of 0.58 and an equivalent 
variation of 15% (0.58/4) of the entire variable variance. This also suggests that 15% 
of the variation in equity valuation multiples is explained by the second component.  
The principal components analysis values produced are uncorrelated to each other. 
This indicates that the first and the second components explained 77% (62+ 15) of 
the total variable variance. This accordingly suggests that, by utilising the first and 
the second principal components, 77% of the variables total variance for equity 
valuation multiples was explained.  
The third component has an eigenvalue variance of 0.51 and fraction of 0.13 
(0.51/4). This suggests that 13% of the variation in the variable was explained within 
the third principal component value. Following the researches of Nikolaev (2010) 
and Sheu and Lee (2012) that used first principal component that has 60% 




principal component as the main component to represent all four of the equity 
valuation multiples. 
Had the components been interrelated, they would have partly represented by the 
same numbers, so the data enclosed in the combination would not have been equal to 
the summary of the of the components data. All the four principal components 
jointly explained all variance that occur in the variables. Therefore, the unexplained 
variances computed in the second panel all equal zero, and Rho = 1.00 as presented 
in the first result. More than 60% of the variance was explained within the first 
principal component. This suggests the existence of a strong correlation between the 
EVMs and, if joined together, can be satisfactory explained within the first principal 
factor. The next table 5.3 below presents the principal component analysis 
eigenvectors  
Table 5.3 
Principal Component Analysis Eigenvectors 
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Unexplained 
PE 0.4795 0.7966 0.1107 0.3512 0 
PB 0.5246 0.0735 -0.3497 -0.7727 0 
PC 0.5025 -0.4641 -0.5056 0.5258 0 
PS 0.4923 -0.3804 0.7809 -0.0554 0 
Observations     500      
 
Table 5.3 above presents the eigenvectors. These principal components values have 




(0.492 + -0.382 + 0.782 + -0.062 = 1), accordingly, the principal components 
analysis displays the principal components normed to the associated eigenvalues 
instead of to 1. The eigenvalues add up to summarize the variances for the variables 
in the investigation to show the ―total difference‖ of all the variables. The variables 
are dependable for having a component variance, so the total variance in the study‘s 
context is four (price-to-earnings, price-to-book value, price-to-cash flow and price-
to-sales multiples). To further check our reliable assertion of the PCA result, the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was computed as shown 
in table 5.4 below. 
Table 5.4  
Keiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy  
Variable PB PC PS PE Overall 
KMO 0.8074 0.7830 0.7830 0.8091 0.7872 
 
Table 5.4 above shows that the principal component analysis was established based 
on the equity valuation multiples. The data as used in the research presented the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin sampling adequacy of equity valuation multiples. KMO 
sampling adequacy for the variables was PE 0.81, PB 0.78, PC 0.78 PS 0.81. The 
overall total KMO was 79 approximately for all the four equity valuation multiples 
suggesting a strong correlation between the multiples. A KMO of 50 and above is 
judged as adequate; therefore, the results reaffirmed the appropriateness of the PCA 




5.4 Summary of Descriptive Statistics    
Table 5.5 below presents a summary of descriptive statistics for the explained and 
the explanatory variables equity value multiple and corporate governance variables. 




Table 5.5  
Descriptive Statistics Summary 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
EVM  500 4.4110 1.172601 -4.311341 15.24245 
BS 500 9.568 2.958866 5 20 
BI 500 0.63524 0.170742 0.17 1 
BGD 500 0.906 1.019432 0 6 
ACI 500 0.6437 0.1538397 0.33 0.9 
MSH 500 0.56998 0.24302 0 0.78451 
CEOP 500 0.648 0.4780723 0 1 
ADC 500 100.0179 70.3335 3.462844 532.1043 
CGD 500 0.47 0.499599 0 1 
LSIZE 500 7.278 0.8806313 5.71 9.59 
RISK 500 0.524 0.5039165 0 1 
NSE-AGE 500 22.68 14.42407 4 68 
LEVERAGE 500 0.57424      0.271438       -2.53        1.23  
INDUSTRY 500 0.41 0.8943 0 1 
Notes: Variable definitions: EVM = equity value multiple computed from the principal component 
analysis; BS = board size (number); BI = board independence (number of independent directors 
divide by total board members); BGD = board gender diversity (number of women in the board); ACI 
= audit committee independence (independent directors divide by number of AC); MSH = managerial 
shareholding (managerial shareholding divide by total shares); CEOP = chief executive officer tenure 
4 years and above (dummy 1 & 0); ADC = abnormal directors compensation (pay to director above 
sector average); CGD = corporate governance disclosure (dummy 1 & 0); SIZE = natural log of total 
assets; RISK = risk management committee (dummy 1 & 0); NSE-AGE = difference between 2013 




5.4.1  Dependent Variable 
The mean value of the equity value multiple computed from the principal component 
analysis is 4.4110 Nigerian Naira suggesting that on the average sampled firms have 
a composite value of 4.4110 Nigerian Naira. The standard deviation of the composite 
value for equity value multiple is 1.172601 suggesting that the data are closely 
clustered around the mean signifying normality of the data. The minimum EVM 




have a negative equity value multiple while the maximum composite value of the 
equity value multiple is 15.24245 Nigerian Naira.  
5.4.2 Independent Variables 
Table 5.5 above presented the summary statistics of all the independent variables.  
The mean value for the board size is 9.568, suggesting that sample firms have an 
average board size of approximately 10. The standard deviation of board size is 
2.958866 signifying that the data are clustered around the mean. The minimum value 
of board size is 5 and the maximum is 20. The minimum board size of 5 further 
suggests that sample firms have fully complied with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission‘s revised code of corporate governance. The code states that all listed 
firms in Nigeria must have minimum board size of 5, and the size and complexity of 
the firm operation determine the maximum board size.  
The mean value for board independence is 0.63524 suggesting that on average the 
sampled firms have board independence of approximately 64%. The standard 
deviation of board independence is 0.170742, which is lower than the mean. 
Minimum board independence is 0.17 signifying that in some the of the sampled 
firms only 17% of their directors are independent, which is far less than the 40% 
minimum requirement of the SEC revised code of corporate governance. On the 
other hand, Trans Corporation Company (Transcorp) in the year 2013 has all of its 





Similarly, the mean value for board gender diversity is 0.906, suggesting that on 
average 0.9 females are serving on the board of directors of the sampled firms. The 
standard deviation is 1.019432 also signifying the closeness of the data set to mean. 
The minimum number of females serving on the board is 0 meaning some of the 
firms have no female on their board. On the other hand, some firms have 6 females 
serving on the firm‘s board of directors. In fact, in some instances, boards with 9 
members have 5 or 6 females on them. This indicates adherence to the SEC revised 
code of CG that requires firms to consider gender issues in the composition of their 
boards. 
The mean value for the audit committee independence is 0. 6437 also suggesting 
that, on average, 64% of the audit committee members of the sampled firms 
comprises independent directors. The standard deviation of audit committee 
independence is 0.1538397 suggesting that the data are clustered around the mean. 
The minimum value proportion of independent directors on the audit committee is 
33%, and the maximum value is 93%. 
In addition, the mean value for managerial share ownership is 0.56998, suggesting 
that 57% of the share ownership of the sampled firms is owned by the management. 
The standard deviation of managerial shareholding is 0.24302, suggesting that the 
data are closely clustered around the mean. The minimum value is 0 meaning that 




proportional managerial ownership is approximately 78%. The mean value for chief 
executive officer (CEO) power is 0.648, suggesting that about 65% of the sampled 
firm have their CEOs serving in a second term or more. This means that 45% of the 
CEOs are serving in their first tenure that is 4 years and below. The standard 
deviation of CEO power is 0.4780723 signifying that the deviation is closely 
clustered around the mean suggesting the normality of the data set. 
Furthermore, the mean value for abnormal director‘s compensation is 100.0179 in 
thousands of Nigerian Naira suggesting that an average abnormal compensation for 
directors of the sampled firm is about 100,000.00 Nigerian Naira. The mean value of 
abnormal director‘s compensation is 70.3335, suggesting that the data are closely 
clustered around the mean. The maximum value of abnormal compensation is 
532.1043, which is about 532,000.00 Nigerian Naira. The mean value for corporate 
governance disclosure is 0.47, meaning that firms disclose information on their 
board size, board and audit committee independence, board gender, compensation 
for directors and tenure of their chief executive officers. This also suggests that 53% 
of the sampled firms have not complied with revised code for disclosing governance 
information in annual reports. The standard deviation SD of CG information 





5.4.3 Control Variables 
The mean value for log of total assets is 7.278, and the standard deviation is 
0.8806313. The reason is because of the variation in size of the firms in the sample. 
The firms within the sample included financial and non-financial industries, which 
are quite diverse in terms of size. The minimum value is 5.71 while the maximum 
value is 9.59. Also, risk has a mean value of 0.524 suggesting that 52% of the 
sampled companies have a risk management committee to monitor firm risk 
exposure. CG codes, particularly those of the Central Bank of Nigeria CBN and that 
of the National Insurance Commission, have emphasized the importance of risk 
committee. Cross checks of the sampled firm show that banks and insurance 
companies have all complied with the risk management requirement. 
Similarly, firm age has a mean value of 22.68, suggesting that an average age of the 
sampled firms is approximately 23 years. The minimum firm age of the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange is 4 years suggesting that the firm age was listed in 2009, and the 
maximum firm age is 68 suggesting that the firm with the highest age in the sample 
was listed in 1968. The mean value for the industry is 0.41 suggesting that on the 
average 41% of the sampled firms are financial sector while the other 59% of the 
sampled firms represent other sector of the listed firms. The mean value of leverage 
is 0.57424, meaning that the average of total debts to total asset is 57% while the 
standard deviation is 0.271438. The standard deviation is closely clustered around 




is -2.53 and the maximum value for the leverage of 1.23. Table 5.6 presents the 





Correlation Matrix Results  
 
Note: *** indicates that coefficient estimates are * = significance at 10%, ** = significance at 5% and *** = significance at 1% levels respectively. EVM=equity value 
multiple computed from the PCA  
 EVM BS BI    BGD CEOP ACI CGD   ADC MSH RISK  AG  SIZ   LEV ID 
EVM 1.0000              
BS 0.6666*** 1.0000             
BI 0.5034*** -0.0152 1.0000            
BGD 0.1614*** 0.3859   -0.1323*  1.0000           
CEOP 0.0850  0.0226   -0.1335  0.1961     1.0000          
ACI 0.1842*** 0.3397**   -0.0983  0.1803  -0.1438  1.0000         
CGD 0.1941*** 0.3491**  -0.0895*  0.2514**     0.0396*  0.1465*    1.0000        
ADC 0.0673   0.0644*  -0.1608  0.1680*     0.1069*   0.1722   0.0787  1.0000       
MSH 0.0543*** 0.0166  -0.1150  0.0446     0.2525*  -0.1521    0.0869*  0.0420  1.0000      
RISK 0.1938  0.3322  -0.0471  0.2073    0.0767*   0.0557*   0.5561   0.1271*    0.0359*    1.0000     
AGE 0.0227*** 0.0221    0.0350*  -0.0439 -0.2430   0.2053  -0.0597  -0.0559  -0.4002  0.0930  1.0000    
SIZE 0.2956*** 0.6291**   -0.1702  0.3815  -0.0449   0.3456*   0.4959*   0.1619*   -0.0454    0.4630  0.0299    1.0000   
LEV. 0.2938  0.2322*  0.0471   0.1073    0.0867*  0.04578  0.4661*   0.0971    0.0359*    0.3517 0.0271 0.0812* 1.0000  
IND 0.2938  0.3722  -0.0471  0.1073**     0.0767  0.0757   0.4561   0.1371    0.0559    0.1321 0.1123 0.1541 0.2132 1.0000 
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Correlation matrix results as presented in Table 5.6 above show a positive 
correlation of 0.66 between the equity value multiple, which is the dependent 
variable, and board size, which is the independent variable. The correlation between 
the equity value multiple and board independence has a positive correlation of 0.50. 
The correlation coefficient of equity value multiple to board gender diversity was 
0.16 while audit committee independence had a correlation of 0.18 to equity value 
multiple. Chief executive power concentration and managerial shareholding had a 
positive correlation of 0.08 and 0.05 to the equity value multiple respectively. Also, 
abnormal director‘s compensation had a positive correlation of 0.07 to EVM, while 
corporate governance information disclosure had a correlation of 0.19 to the equity 
value multiple of Nigerian firms. 
The correlation coefficient of the independent variables board size, board 
independence, board gender diversity, audit committee independence, CEO power, 
abnormal director‘s compensation and CG information suggests the absence of 
multicolinearity among the explanatory variables. This is because of all the 
correlation coefficients are less than 70% indicating that no problem of 
multicollinearity is present in the model. However, even where multicollinearity 
exists, the use of GMM is likely to overcome the problem. A problem of 
multicollinearity between the independent variables results in incorrect signs or 
doubtful magnitudes in the estimations coefficients and bias in the standard errors. 




5.5 Regression Results (GMM) 
This section introduces the GMM regression results for the dependent variable, the 
independent variables and the control variables. One of the contributions of this 
current work is the use of the system GMM regression model for the corporate 
governance variables and firms value relationship. This is because the GMM method 
eliminates estimation bias introduced by endogenous, unobservable heterogeneity 
and simultaneity – thereby basically desegregating the causal relationship from 
spurious correlation results. If corporate governance variables and firm performance 
variables are exogenous, then the static model (pooled, fixed and random) 
estimations will produce efficient and unbiased estimates.  
However, in the presence of simultaneity, unobservable heterogeneity, and/or 
endogenous, alternative specifications are then considered necessary. Therefore, 
establishing the presence of endogeneity in the corporate governance variables and 
firm performance relationship before continuing with the GMM specifications is 
essential. When and if past inventions in the performance of companies have an 
influence on the present corporate governance structure, then the assumption of 
exogenous will be violated.  
In that situation, any estimate from the pooled OLS, random and fixed-effects 
models will result in estimation bias. Overcoming the problems of estimating the 
governance and performance relationship is the emphasis of this analysis (Delgado-




of the model includes the Arellano-Bond estimator for autocorrelation in the error 
term, Hansen J for over identification and the model specification and the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) 
The Arellano-Bond estimator indicates the non-existence of autocorrelation in the 
model errors terms for the system GMM specifications. The Arellano-Bond at the 
first order serial correlation was 0.090; however, corrected in the second order serial 
correlation, the value was 0.98. Notably, the Arellano-Bond estimator is usually 
conducted on the estimated error term differences and hence, autocorrelation in the 
error terms is scheduled for one period because they are mathematically related. 
Thus, Arellano-Bond AR (1) statistical test is significance for the different error 
terms is uninformative. The Hansen J statistic of 0.36 shows that the conditions of 
GMM were not scientifically violated suggesting that the moment condition is well 
specified for the system GMM specifications.  
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) should always be lower than 10, indicating that no 
one of the explanatory variables is significantly explained by other explanatory 
variable (Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998). In this case, the VIF for all the explanatory 
variables (board size, board independence, board gender diversity, audit committee 
independence, CEO power, managerial shareholding, abnormal directors 
compensation and CG information disclosure) were all below 3 suggesting the 





In the GMM regression model, the lagged differences of CG and control variables 
were used as instrumental variables with the CG variables treated as endogenous 
variables while the control variables are predetermined. That is, lag values of 1 and 2 
of the different CG variables; and lag values of 0 and 1 of the different control 
variables, constitute the vector instrument Z value. The Hansen J test for over 
identification, Arrelano-Bond test and variance inflation factor for all the variables 


















Table 5.7  
GMM Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient  z-statistic  Probability  VIF 
PCAV L1. 0.031 11.30***    0.00  
BS 0.088 61.07***  0.00 1.89 
BI 1.717 75.15***    0.00 1.11 
BGD 0.051 5.16*** 0.00 1.41 
ACI 0.024 8.18***    0.00 1.31 
MSH 5.320 6.07***    0.00 1.27 
CEOP 0.004 0.72 0.47 1.23 
ADC 0.000 -0.54 0.59 1.13 
CGD 0.018 4.52***    0.00 1.71 
RISK 0.032 4.23***   0.00 1.61 
NSE-AGE  -0.001 -3.12***   0.00 1.32 
SIZE 0.017 3.45***    0.00 2.42 
Intercept  -0.574 -14.58***    0.00  
Industry  & year effect  Yes     Yes  Yes  
Mean VIF    1.45 
AR1 0.090    
AR2 0.988    
Hansen J 0.363    
No. of observations 500    
Note: * = *** = significance at 1% level. PCAV L1. Lag value of the dependent variable  
(equity value multiple) computed from the PCA 
 
Table 5.7 above presented the values of the variables obtained from the GMM 




5.5.1 Hypothesis One (Board Size and the Equity Value Multiple) 
The regression result in Table 5.7 above shows a positive coefficient of 0.08 between 
board size and the equity value multiple of Nigerian listed firms. This means that for 
every increase in board size from an average of 5, the equity value multiple of 
Nigerian listed firms will increase by 0.08 Nigerian Naira (NGN). The probability of 
board size as an explanatory variable to equity value multiple is 0.00 indicating a 
positive and significant relationship between the explained and the explanatory 
variable (equity value multiple and company board size). The interpretation is that 
board size of Nigeria listed firms impacts positively the equity value multiple of the 
shareholders at the 1% level of significance.  
The result provides evidence for accepting the study hypothesis, which proposed that 
board size would have a significant and positive relationship with the equity value 
multiple of Nigerian listed firms. The implication of this result is that board size, as 
one of the internal corporate governance monitoring mechanisms, played an 
important role in increasing the value of shareholders. The findings agree with the 
prediction of agency theory that a board provides monitoring mechanisms for 
company management thereby increasing the value of shareholders and other 
stakeholders. The agency problem was more pronounced and complicated prior to 
the reforms in the corporate governance of listed in Nigeria according to the 




In the Nigerian business environment, agency theory has been a serious problem, 
most especially in public companies where shareholders are spread across the 
country and abroad. The joint report of Central Bank of Nigeria CBN and Nigerian 
Deposit Insurance Corporation NDIC 2009 indicted many CEO and some board 
members of public companies for using their positions to defraud their respective 
organizations. Shareholders in the affected corporations have suffered seriously due 
to the problem self-serving (managers) agents. Reform on the board size of listed 
companies could be said to have yielded a desire result particularly to the value of 
equity shareholders. The result further suggests that the board members of the 
sampled firms act as stewards of the owners who appointed them to act on their 
behalf in accordance with the stewardship theory. The stewardship theory refers to 
situations wherein managements are not motivated by their individual objectives but 
instead are stewards whose motivations are aligned with those of their principals 
(owners). 
This result conforms to Larmou and Vafeas (2010) who studied the role of board size 
in relationship to corporate monitoring and established a connection between size of 
the board and company value. The study also aligns with the results of Alimehmeti 
and Paletta (2014) and Mt Rahim et al. (2015) that documented a significant positive 
association between board size and firm value. However, the study contradicts the 
study of Andres and Vallelado (2008) who found that board size showed little 
evidence of predicting the impact of a firm‘s market valuation, except for small and 




(2015) that board size had no significant association with firm value measured by 
earnings per share.   
5.5.2 Hypothesis Two (Board Independence and the Equity Value Multiple) 
The regression results presented in Table 5.7 above show a positive coefficient of 
1.72 between board independence and the equity value multiple of Nigerian firms. 
This means that for every 1% increases in board independence the equity value 
multiple of Nigerian listed firms will increase by 1.72 Nigerian Naira (NGN). The 
probability of board independence as an explanatory variable to equity value 
multiple was 0.00 and positive indicating a positive and significant association 
between the explained and the explanatory variable (equity value multiple and board 
independent) The interpretation is that board independence of Nigeria listed firms 
effects positively the equity value multiple of the shareholders at the 1% level of 
significance. 
Evidence obtained from the regression results provides justification for accepting the 
hypothesis of the study that board independence has a significant and positive 
association with the equity value multiple of Nigerian firms. The implication of this 
finding is that board independence as one of the corporate governance monitoring 
mechanisms that plays a significant role in increasing shareholders value. The results 
of the study reaffirmed the assumption of agency theory that the independence of a 




shareholders. This is possible because an independent board will always take 
proactive measures that will safeguard the interests of the entire firm rather than just 
management interests.  
In the Nigerian business setting, agency theory has been a serious problem most 
especially in public companies where shareholders are spread across the country and 
abroad. In the previously issued code of 2003, non-executive directors were assumed 
to be independent. However, the joint report of Central Bank of Nigeria CBN and 
Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation NDIC 2009 demonstrated otherwise as 
many of the non-executive directors succumbed to the wishes of the management 
instead of the firm owners. Therefore, regulatory authorities made a clear distinction 
between non-executive directors and those that are truly independents.  
This result supported the findings of Byrd and Hickman (1992) and Knyazeva et al. 
(2013) that a firm‘s market stock price reaction is more positive when a firm‘s board 
comprises independent directors. Similarly, Brickley et al. (1997) found the average 
equity market response was positive when a board had a majority of independent 
outside directors and negative when it did not. Similarly, Aebi et al. (2011) found 
that board independence influenced bank performance during financial crises. 
However, this current study contradicts Imanzadeh (2014), who said that the 
proportion of independent directors on a company board had a negative relationship 




independence forecast a lower Tobin's Q other governance mechanisms predicted the 
market value of only nonmanufacturing companies. 
5.5.3 Hypothesis Three (Board Gender and the Equity Value Multiple)   
The regression results as presented in the table above had a positive coefficient of 
0.05 between board gender diversity and the equity value multiple of Nigerian firms. 
This suggests that for every increase in the number of females on a company‘s board 
the equity value multiple of Nigerian listed firms will have an increase of 0.05 
Nigerian Naira (NGN). The probability of board gender diversity as an explanatory 
variable to equity value multiple was 0.00 positive indicating a positive and 
significant relationship between the explained variable (equity value multiple) and 
the explanatory variable (board gender diversity). The interpretation of this result is 
that a gender diverse board of Nigerian listed firms impacts positively the equity 
value multiple of the stockholders at the 1% level of significance.  
The evidence from the results provide justification for accepting the hypothesis of 
the study that board gender diversity would have a significant positive relationship 
with the equity value multiple of Nigerian firms. The implication of this finding is 
that representation of females on boards of companies serves as a corporate 
governance monitoring mechanism that can play a significant role in increasing the 
value of shareholders. An increased impact of females on company value is likely in 
Nigeria considering the growing participation of females across all the industries 




The results of the study confirmed the agency theory prediction that a diverse board 
would correspondingly increase stockholder value. This result reaffirmed the Higgs 
Report of 2003 in the United Kingdom that suggested the inclusion on females on 
corporate boards would provide more gender-balanced decisions in company 
management. This is possible because, as Adams and Ferreira (2009) found, female 
directors on boards attend more meetings than their male counterparts and are more 
willing to join monitoring committees of the firm in which critical company 
decisions are taken. In Nigeria, regulatory authorities have recommended that 
corporate boards consider the gender issue in the composition of those boards in 
order to provide a level playing field for females with respect to their male 
counterparts.  
The results of this current study support the findings of Gul et al. (2011) who 
documented that gender diversity increases stock price through the machinery of 
public information disclosure in larger firms and by boosting confidential evidence 
gathering in smaller firms. Similarly, Adams and Ferreira (2009) established that 
female directors have a significant impact on board inputs and firm performance in 
selected firms in the United States. The finding also supports the results of Ku Ismail 
and Abdul Manaf (2016), that positive an abnormal return is related to the 
appointment of women on corporate board.  However, this present study contradicts 
the studies of Chapple and Humphrey (2013) who reported a negative association 




company. Also, Rose (2007) could not establish any significant linkage between firm 
performance as measured by firm value and the representation of females on boards. 
5.5.4 Hypothesis Four (Audit Committee Independence and the Equity Value 
Multiple) 
The regression results in Table 5.7 above show a positive coefficient of 0.024 
between audit committee independence and the equity value multiple of Nigerian 
listed firms. This implies that for every increase in audit committee independence the 
equity value multiple of Nigerian listed firms will have a corresponding increase of 
0.024 Nigerian Naira (NGN). The probability of audit committee independence as 
the independent variable to equity value multiple was 0.00. The result signified a 
positive and significant relationship between the variables (equity value multiple and 
audit committee independence) of a firm‘s board. The interpretation is that audit 
committee independence of Nigeria listed firms influences positively the equity 
value multiple of the shareholders at the 1% level of significance. 
The results obtained from the regression results provide convincing evidence for 
accepting the hypothesis of the study that audit committee independence would have 
a significant positive relationship with the equity value multiple of Nigerian firms. 
The implication of this result is that the independence of the audit committee is one 
of the governance monitoring mechanisms that play an important role in adding 




agency theory that the independence of a company audit committee would result in a 
corresponding increase in value for shareholders. 
In Nigeria, regulatory authorities such as the CBN, for example, have mandated that 
members of the audit committee must all be directors from the non-executive cadre 
while the majority must also be independent directors and have expertise in the 
financial profession. Thus, this governance provision has yielded results in the form 
of increasing value for shareholders.  
The audit committee mediates between management and external auditors for proper 
accountability of their respective companies. An independent audit committee will 
take proactive measures that will protect the best interests of the entire firm rather 
than the interests of only the management. The results of the study have strengthened 
the proposition of agency theory that an independent audit committee is an important 
monitoring mechanism that reduces the agency problem. In Nigeria, particularly 
before reforms of corporate governance, the independence of an audit committee was 
not accorded much importance. This could be part of the reasons that public 
companies faced distress and bankruptcy even after receiving a clean audit from their 
respective audit firms. An important example is the case of failed Oceanic bank 
Nigeria PLC, which collapsed immediately after the receipt of a clean audit report by 




The result of this current study supports the findings of Uwuigbe (2013) who 
reported a positive correlation coefficient between the audit committee composition 
and stock price of Nigerian firms. Also, Klein (2002) added that audit committees of 
company boards can add to internal monitoring through an increase in the level of 
integrity of the financial auditing process. This significant relationship may be 
because an independent audit committee takes proactive measures to ensure 
compliance with internal control processes and procedures of their respective 
organizations. The result also confirms Sharma and Kuang (2014) who found that a 
firm‘s audit committee independence reduces incidences of aggressive earnings 
management. 
However, the results of this current study contradict those of Malik (2012) who 
found that an audit committee of the company had no significant relationship with 
the stock price of listed companies in Korea. Similarly, Chen et al. (2005) 
established little relationship between audit committee independence and 
performance. In addition, Sunday (2008) found no relationship between performance 
and independence of the audit committee.   
5.5.5 Hypothesis Five (Managerial Share and the Equity Value Multiple) 
The regression result presented in the table above shows a positive coefficient of 
5.32 between managerial share ownership and EVM of Nigerian listed firms. This 
means that for every increase in share ownership of management, the equity value 




Naira (NGN). The probability of managerial share ownership as an explanatory 
variable to explain the variable (equity value multiple) was 0.00 and positive 
indicating a positive and significant association between the variables. The 
interpretation of this result is that managerial shareholding in the Nigerian listed 
firms influences positively the EVM of the shareholders at the 1% level of 
significance.  
The result obtained from the regression results provides substantial evidence for 
accepting the hypothesis of the study, which predicted a significant positive 
relationship between shareholding of management and the equity value multiple of 
Nigerian firms. The implication of this finding is that share ownership of 
management serves as a governance-monitoring mechanism that plays a significant 
role towards increasing the value of shareholders. Results of the research reiterated 
the assumption of agency theory that share ownership of management serves as a 
tool for controlling the excessiveness of self-serving managers. Thus, management 
may be more willing to take adequate actions for the overall best interests of the 
company if they also have a share stake in the company.  
In fact, an increasing debate has grown amongst different stakeholders of corporate 
governance about the importance of share ownership of management towards 
ensuring their utmost accountability to the company. The results of this current study 
have provided further justification for the shareholding of management as a way of 




corporate environment, managerial share ownership as a control mechanism for self-
serving managers was not accorded much importance in the previous codes of 
corporate governance. However, the revised code of corporate governance provided 
extensive guidelines on managerial shareholding to ensure the alignment of owners 
and managers interests. The Central Bank of Nigeria in 2011 reported that banks 
with substantial ownership by managers exhibited more stewardship with respect to 
their respective banks compared to banks that have less managerial shareholding.  
This result conformed to that of Masulis and Mobbs (2011) who found that firms 
with insider director‘s shareholding had better operational performance and market 
ratios. These companies make better purchasing decisions, have better cash holdings, 
and exhibited fewer overstatements of earnings. Similarly, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
argued that an increase in managerial shareholdings gives managers a stronger 
incentive to monitor performance of the firm thereby creating value to shareholders. 
The result also aligns with Liu el al. (2012) who found that managerial ownership 
was positively related with crisis-period performance of Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs). 
On the other hand, this study contradicts the findings of Mustapha and Che Ahmad 
(2011) who found that managerial share ownership in Malaysian corporations had a 
significant negative association with total costs of monitoring as projected by the 




(2005) reported no significant relationship between director‘s ownership 
concentration and the price-to-earnings ratio of the sampled firms in Nigeria.             
5.5.6 Hypothesis Six (CEO Power and the Equity Value Multiple) 
The regression result as presented in the table above shows a coefficient of 0.00 
between abnormal director‘s compensation and the equity value multiple of Nigerian 
firms. The probability of abnormal director‘s compensation as the explanatory 
variable to equity value multiple was 0.59 negative. This indicates an insignificant 
relationship between the explained and the explanatory variable (equity value 
multiple and abnormal director‘s compensation).  
5.5.7 Hypothesis Seven (Abnormal Directors Compensation and the Equity 
Value Multiple) 
The regression result as presented in the table above shows a coefficient of 0.00 
between abnormal director‘s compensation and the equity value multiple of Nigerian 
firms. The probability of abnormal directors compensation as the explanatory 
variable to equity value multiple is 0.59 negative. This indicates an insignificant 
relationship between the explained and the explanatory variable (equity value 
multiple and abnormal directors compensation).  
5.5.8 Hypothesis Eight (CG Disclosure and the Equity Value Multiple) 
The regression result as presented in the table above shows a positive coefficient of 




and equity value multiple of Nigerian listed firms. This suggests that for every 
Nigerian company that discloses CG information in its annual reports, the company‘s 
equity value multiple will have an increase of 0.02 Nigerian Naira (NGN). The 
probability of CG information disclosure as the explanatory variable of EVM is 0.00 
positive indicating a positive and significant relationship of companies that disclose 
CG information and the explained variable (equity value multiple). The 
interpretation of this result is that disclosure of CG information in the annual reports 
of Nigerian firm‘s impacts positively the EVM of the shareholders at the 1% 
significance level.  
The regression results also provide evidence for accepting the hypothesis of the 
study, which predicted a significant positive relationship between CG information 
disclosure and the equity value multiple of Nigerian firms. The implication of this 
outcome is that the presentation of information about a firm‘s CG serves as one 
governance monitoring mechanism that plays an important role in increasing the 
value of stockholders. This is because investors would be more willing to invest in 
companies that disclosed detailed information particularly on their governance 
information. Disclosing information on board size, independent of board and audit 
committees, managerial shareholding and remuneration for directors helps investors 
make investment decisions. 
The provisions of the respective codes (SEC, CBN and NAICOM) for good 




in the annual accounts. The results of the study confirmed the decision usefulness 
theory prediction that accounting information must be prepared from the perspective 
of residual equity holders. Staubus (1959) explained that the purpose of accounting 
and other information disclosure was to provide information that will assist in 
economic decision making by investing units (investors) and credit granting units 
(creditors), referred to as makers of investment decisions. The author also posited 
that such types of information must relate to the periods and amounts of 
shareholders‘ future cash receipts. 
The results conform with the findings of Croci and Petrella (2013) that disclosure 
effects are associated with the likelihood that the market expects future involvement 
and responds to the pronouncement of funds ownership performance. In addition, 
Mitton (2002) reported that firms with higher-quality disclosure, greater 
transparency and CG information experienced better share price performance during 
the East Asian financial crisis.  
However, this current study contradicted the findings of Bhasin (2012) who observed 
that less than 50% of firms were following the disclosure index, and no significant 
change existed among the disclosure scores of the four industries and subsequent 
firm performance. Similarly, Poshakwalea and Courtisb (2005) reported a significant 
negative relationship between disclosure and price-to-earnings of the sampled banks 




5.6 Additional Analysis on Corporate Governance variables and Individual 
Equity Valuation Multiples 
This section provides additional analysis on the role of corporate governance 
variables towards explaining equity value multiples of Nigerian firms (price-to-
earnings, price-to-book, price-to-cash flow and price-to-sales). The objective is to 
see the influence of individual governance variables in predicting the equity value 
multiples. Table 5.8 below presents the GMM results. 
Table 5.8 
GMM Panel Regression Results for Equity Value Multiples 
Variable Price-to-Earnings  Price-to-Book  Price-to-Cash  Price-to-Sales 
PCAV L1. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob 
BS -1.46*** 0.00  0.48*** 0.00  -0.81*** 0.00 -0.06 0.56 
BI -1.41* 0.07  -0.06*** 0.00  2.65 0.23 0.13 0.19 
BGD 0.81*** 0.00  0.05 0.32 1.43*** 0.00 -0.44*** 0.00 
ACI 1.71*** 0.00  -0.32*** 0.00  1.19*** 0.00 1.22*** 0.00 
MSH 3.45*** 0.00  -3.65 0.93 1.49 0.21 1.29*** 0.00 
CEOP -0.73*** 0.00  -0.54*** 0.01 0.77** 0.04 0.64 0.00 
ADC 0.09*** 0.00  -0.00*** 0.00 -0.02*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.01 
CGD 6.34*** 0.00  0-.01 0.97 2.89*** 0.00 0.44*** 0.00 
RISK -3.49*** 0.00 -0.41** 0.04 1.24** 0.02 -0.55*** 0.00 
NSE-AGE 0.01*** 0.00  0.02*** 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.03*** 0.00 
SIZE 5.15** 0.01  0.01 0.89 1.69*** 0.00 0.62*** 0.00 
Intercept  -23.79  -1.04  -12.31  -5.05  
Industry  & 
year effect  












Hansen j 0.32  0.37  0.32  0.1  
Observation  500  500  500  500  




5.6.1 Corporate Governance Variables and Price-to-Earnings Multiple 
Table 5.8 above presents a summary of the regression results for price-earnings. The 
results indicate that board size has a negative coefficient of 1.46 and a probability 
value of 0.00, suggesting a significant negative relationship between board size and 
price-to-earnings multiple. The result in the table above, also revealed a negative 
coefficient of 1.41 between board independence and price-to-earnings multiple of the 
sampled firms. The probability is statistically significant at the 1% level of 
significance contradicting the prediction of agency theory that board independence is 
positively related to value. On the other hand, board gender has a positive correlation 
with 0.81 on the price-to-earnings multiple.  
The probability of board gender is statistically significant at the 1% level suggesting 
that board gender is statistically and positively related to PE multiple. The results 
agree with the study of Gul et al (2011) and contradict that of Chapple and 
Humphrey (2013). Audit committee independence has a positive coefficient of 1.71 
and a probability value of 0.00 suggesting that audit committee independence is 
significant in explaining the price-to- earnings multiple consistent with Uwuighe 
(2013) and the proposition of agency theory. The coefficient of managerial 
shareholding is 3.45 positive and has a probability of 0.00 also suggesting that 
managerial shareholding is related significantly to PE multiple consistent with the 




The result is also consistent with the findings of Masulisa and Mabbs (2011). Chief 
executive officer power CEOP has a negative coefficient of 0.73 and probability 
value of 0.00 indicating that CEOP is statistically and negatively related to PE 
multiple. This suggests that CEOs are found to be stewards of their firms. Abnormal 
directors compensation has a positive coefficient of 0.09 and probability of 0.00 
suggesting that abnormal directors compensation is positively related to PE multiple. 
The coefficient for corporate governance disclosure is 6.34 positive with a 
probability of 0.00 suggesting a significant positive relationship between the 
explained and the explanatory variables at the 1% level of significance. The 
disclosure of CG result is consistent with Croci and Patrella (2013).   
5.6.2 Corporate Governance Variables and Price-to-Book Value Multiple  
The second dimension of the dependent variable is price-to-book value. GMM 
results in table 5.8 revealed that board size has a positive coefficient of 0.48 and a 
probability value of 0.00 suggesting that board size of the sample firms is 
statistically and positively related to PB multiple at 1% level of significance. Board 
size to book value is consistent with Alimehmet and Paletta (2014). The coefficient 
of board independence is 0.06 negative with a probability of 0.00 indicating board 
independence is significantly and negatively related to PB multiple. This finding is 





The coefficient of audit committee independence to PB multiple is -0.32 with a 
probability value of 0.00 suggesting that audit committee independence is 
statistically and negatively related to PB multiple. This finding is also contrary to the 
agency theory proposition that audit committee independence reduced the agency 
problem. Similarly, chief executive power CEOP has a negative coefficient of 0.54 
and a probability value of 0.00 suggesting that CEOP is negatively related to PB 
multiple at the 1% level of significance. This is consistent with the findings of 
Morey (2009) and contradicts Ali and Zhan (2014).  
On the other hand, abnormal director‘s compensation has a coefficient of -0.00 and a 
probability value of 0.00 indicating that abnormal director‘s compensation is 
negatively related to PB multiple of the sampled firms. However, board gender 
diversity, managerial shareholding and corporate governance disclosure are 
statistically insignificant in predicting the price-to-book value multiple. On the 
overall, only board size is consistent with the theory, board independence, audit 
committee independence and abnormal director‘s compensation are contrary to the 
prediction of agency theory.      
5.6.3 Corporate Governance Variables and Price-to-Cash Flow Multiple  
The third dimension of the dependent variable is the price-to-cash flow multiple. 
GMM regression in Table 5.8 above indicates that board size has a negative 




significant and negatively related to the price-to-cash flow multiple. The coefficient 
of board gender diversity is 1.43 positive with a probability of 0.00 indicating that 
board gender diversity is statistically related to price-to- earnings multiple at the 1% 
level of significance. This finding is consistent with the findings of Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) and contradicts the findings of Humphrey (2013).  
Similarly, audit committee independence has a positive coefficient of 1.19 and a 
probability value of 0.00 suggesting that audit committee independence played a 
significant role towards price-to-cash flow multiple of the sampled firms. The 
finding is consistent with Uwuighe (2013) and agency theory prediction that audit 
committee independence increased accountability thereby reducing manager-owner 
problems. The coefficient of chief executive power CEOP is 0.77 positive suggesting 
that CEOP is significant and positively associated with the price-to-cash flow 
multiple of Nigerian listed firms. This finding is also consistent with the study of 
Walters et al. (2007) but contradicts the findings of Core et al. (1999).  
On the other hand, abnormal director‘s compensation has a negative coefficient of 
0.02 and a probability value of 0.00 suggesting that abnormal director‘s 
compensation is significantly and negatively related to the price-to-cash flow 
multiple. This may be possible when managers only engage themselves in earnings 
manipulation just to maximize their remuneration. However, corporate governance 
disclosure has a positive coefficient of 2.89 and a probability value of 0.00 




relationship with the price-to-cash flow multiple of Nigerian listed firms at the 1% 
level of significance. On their part, board independence and managerial shareholding 
are statistically insignificant. In general, board gender, CEOP and disclosure of 
corporate governance information are significant and consistent with the theory 
while board size and abnormal director‘s compensation are statistically insignificant.  
5.6.4 Corporate Governance Variables and Price-to-Sales Multiple  
The fourth dimension of the equity value multiple is the price-to-sales multiple. The 
regression results as presented in the Table 5.8 show that board gender diversity has 
a negative coefficient of 0.44 and a probability value of 0.00 indicating that board 
gender diversity is statistically and negatively related to price-to-sales of the sampled 
firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. On the other hand, audit committee 
independence has a positive correlation of 1.22 and a probability value of 0.00 
suggesting that audit committee independence has a significant and a positive 
relationship with the price of sales of the sampled firms at the 1% level of 
significance. 
The result of the audit committee is consistent with the finding of Uwuighe (2013), 
however, contradict Sunday (2008). Also, managerial shareholding has a positive 
correlation of 1.29 and a probability value of 0.00 suggesting that managerial 
shareholding as a monitoring mechanism is related significantly to price sales at the 




ownership of management is an important monitoring device against self-serving 
agents. Chief executive officer power CEOP has a positive coefficient of 0.64 and a 
probability value of 0.01 also suggesting that CEOP is statistically associated with 
the price-to-sales multiple of the sampled firms.  
The CEOP result is consistent with Ali and Zhan (2014). Correspondingly, abnormal 
director‘s compensation has a positive coefficient 0.00 and a positive probability of 
0.00 also indicating that abnormal director‘s compensation is significantly related to 
the price-to-sales multiple of the Nigerian firms. Moreover, corporate governance 
disclosure has a positive coefficient of 0.44 and a probability of 0.00 suggesting that 
corporate governance disclosure is significantly related to the price-to-sales multiple 
of Nigerian listed firms at the 1% level of significance. The result of abnormal 
director‘ compensation is consistent with the finding of Croci and Petrella (2013) 
and Milton (2012). A cross checks of the GMM regression results suggests that the 
basic estimation tests of Arrelano-Bond 1 & 2 and Hansen J test were satisfied.  
In summary, the GMM results revealed that board size has a significant and negative 
relationship with price-to-earnings and price-to-cash flow multiples at the 1% 
significance levels, suggesting a significant and negative relationship between board 
size and the price-to-earnings multiple. On the other hand, board size was found to 
have a significant and positive relationship with the price-to-book value multiple 
implying that board size significantly influenced the price-to-book multiple of 




effect on any of the four equity value multiples contrary to the agency theory 
proposition that board independence reduces the agency problem thereby increasing 
the value of owners.  
The GMM result on board gender diversity was positively related to price-to-
earnings and price-to-cash flow, however, negatively related to the price-to-sales 
multiple. Audit committee independence was positively related to price-to-earnings, 
price-to-cash flow and price-to-sales multiples at the 1% level suggesting a 
significant and positive relationship between three out of the four equity value 
multiples. Managerial shareholding, for its part, influences only price-to-earnings 
and price-to-sales multiples at the 1% significance level while price-to-book and 
price-to-cash were not statistically significant. The CEO power, on the other hand, 
was related negatively to price-to-earnings, and price-to-book, but, positively related 
to price-to-cash and price-to-sales all at the 1% level of significance. 
In addition, abnormal director‘s compensation was positive and significantly related 
to price-to-earnings and price-to-sales and negatively related to price-to-book and 
price-to-cash flow multiples. Lastly, CG information disclosure was positive and 
statistically associated with price-to-earnings, price-to-cash flow and price-to-sales 
multiples at the 1% level of significance. This, therefore, suggests that the disclosure 
of corporate governance information has a significant and positive impact on price-
to-earnings, price-to-cash flow and price-to- sales multiples. However, the disclosure 




The additional analysis further justified the application of the PCA technique that 
produced one uncorrelated value that represents all the equity valuation multiples. 
That is why the PCA results produced better results compared to individual equity 
value multiples and regression results, and most of the variables are consistent with 
theory.   
5.7 Summary of the Chapter 
This subsection summarizes the presentation of the results. The results of the 
descriptive statistics were presented and the behavioural nature of the variables was 
explained. The chapter also presented the correlation matrix results for a clearer 
picture of the correlations that existed between the independent variables, control 
variables and the dependent variable (equity value multiple). The result of the GMM 
regression was also presented in the chapter; including the analysis of the results 
related to the study variables. The post-estimation test of the GMM regression was 
also introduced and the regression results satisfied all the post-estimation tests 
thereby providing the appropriateness of the estimation method. Finally, the chapter 
presented the GMM regression results of individual equity valuation multiples and 







CHAPTER SIX  
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
6.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter presented the results of the descriptive statistics, correlation 
matrix and GMM regression results. The chapter extensively discusses the GMM 
results. The relationship between board size, board independence, board gender 
diversity, audit committee independence, managerial shareholding, CEO power, 
abnormal directors compensation and disclosure of CG information in relationship to 
the equity value multiple are discussed. The current chapter summarized the results 
of the study and presents conclusions drawn from the results. The implications and 
limitations of the study findings are also discussed. The chapter lastly presented 
suggestions for future research.  
6.2 Summary of the Results 
This section summarizes the results of the GMM regression on the relationship 
between the dependent variable (equity value multiple) and the independent 
variables (corporate governance variables). Table 6.1 below presents summary of the 







 Summary of the Results 
Objective Hypothesis p-value Sign Results 
1 Board Size P 0.00*** + Supported 
2 Board Independence P 0.00*** + Supported 
3 Board Gender Diversity P 0.00*** + Supported 
4 Audit Committee Independence P 0.00*** + Supported 
5 Managerial Shareholding  P 0.00*** + Supported  
6 Chief Executive Officer Power P 0.47 + Not supported  
7 Abnormal Directors Compensation P 0.59 - Not supported  
8 CG Disclosure  P 0.00*** + Supported 
Note. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 6.1 above presented a summary of the thesis based on the objectives and 
hypotheses. The results show that board size, board independence, board gender 
diversity, audit committee independence, managerial shareholding and corporate 
governance information disclosure have a significant and positive relationship with 
the equity value multiples of Nigerian listed firms. On the other hand, chief 
executive officer power and abnormal director‘s compensation are statistically 
insignificant in explaining the equity value multiples of Nigerian listed firms. 
6.3 Conclusion 
This thesis examined whether various corporate governance variables play a 
significant role in determining the performance of a firm in relationship to equity 
value multiples of Nigerian firms. The recent failures of corporate organizations in 
both developed and developing economies, together with the ambiguous findings of 




need for more thorough empirical investigations. Besides, the ability to disaggregate 
causal relations and spurious correlations are of specific importance with regard to 
policy deliberation and implementation. The preceding analysis used the system 
GMM panel regression to distinguish between causal relations and spurious 
correlations within the CG variables and equity value multiple. 
This study served as the first of its kind by using a broad set of CG mechanisms to 
equity value multiples in the Nigerian context. The study established that board size, 
board independence, board gender diversity, audit committee independence, 
managerial shareholding and CG information disclosure were positively and 
significantly related to the equity value multiple of Nigerian listed firms. The reasons 
why six of the eight explanatory variables are significant could be explained as 
follows. Prior to the reforms of corporate governance by the regulatory authorities 
most boards of firms were dominated by former and serving military personnel 
making the affected firms have poor corporate governance. 
The Nigerian political environment is dominated by the military regime thus 
allowing the military personnel to dominate the corporate setting. However, after the 
reforms and coupled with the transition of the country to democracy most of the 
dominance of military on boards of public companies has been addressed. 
Technocrats, experienced individuals and professional with the integrity to protect a 
firm‘s and its stakeholders‘ interests are now mostly people appointed to corporate 




An additional possible reason is the application of appropriate sanctions for erring 
firms for corporate governance violations. For example, the Central Bank of Nigeria 
CBN and Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation NDIC joint audit report indicted 
three deposit money banks in 2011 (Afri Bank, Bank PHB and Spring Bank) and the 
boards of the affected banks were dissolved by the government and new boards 
constituted by the CBN. This action and other stiff measures have sent a clear 
message to the boards of the public firms to focus on the overall objective of their 
respective organizations. 
Therefore, the current study concludes that above-mentioned corporate governance 
variables (board size, board and audit committee independence, board gender 
diversity, managerial shareholding and CG information disclosure) explained the 
equity value multiples of Nigerian firms satisfactorily. According to statements 
issued by regulatory authorities, particularly the Central Bank of Nigeria and 
Securities and Exchange Commission in 2012, corporate governance reforms have 
reduced agency problem and have made management more effective stewards of 
their respective companies by acting more diligently compared to their acts prior to 
the CG reforms. The study also concluded that CEO power and abnormal director‘s 






6.4  Implications of the Study Findings 
This study empirically examined the effects of selected CG variables on the equity 
value multiples of firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The conclusions 
drawn from the study findings have the following implications. The study 
established significant correlations between the equity valuation multiples. 
Therefore, it implied that the EVMs are better explained with PCA methods due to 
the correlations that exist between them. The composition of the film board and its 
corresponding independence provides great value to shareholders, thus, suggesting 
the achievement of the objectives of regulatory bodies. The number of women 
serving on corporate boards influences shareholders‘ value in a positive manner, also 
implying that the regulatory recommendation for gender diversity board has been 
achieved.  
Similarly, the regulatory authorities have emphasized the importance of the board 
and audit committees‘ independence, and the results obtained from the study suggest 
a significant and positive relationship between the duo and the equity value multiple. 
This, therefore, implied that the objective of ensuring board and audit committees 
independence for effective monitoring was also achieved. On the other hand, 
managerial shareholding is regarded as a monitoring mechanism that aligns the 
interests of managers and shareholders. The results of this study reaffirmed the role 
of managerial shareholding in increasing the value of equity holders. The disclosure 
of governance information in annual reports was also found to be significant and 




firms shows that not all firms disclosed CG information in their annual reports. 
Therefore, various regulatory bodies such as the SEC, CBN and NAICOM can use 
the outcome of this research to improve the level of CG information disclosure 
among Nigerian firms.  
6.5 Limitations of the Study 
The following are the limitations identified in both corporate governance variables 
and the valuation multiples. 
1. The study examined eight structured corporate variables with respect to 
equity value multiples. Therefore, generalizations cannot be made with 
respect to the other CG variables, particularly to the unstructured corporate 
governance variables.  
2. The current study used a sample of only those companies listed on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange. Thus, the study cannot make a generalization on 
the companies that are not listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
3. This study used four equity valuation multiples to generate a single equity 
value multiple. Therefore, no conclusion on the entity valuation multiples 
because they are not captured in the study.   
6.6 Suggestions for Future Research  
This study makes the following recommendations for future research.  
1. This study focused only on the equity valuation multiples. Entity or enterprise   




therefore recommended on entity valuation multiples to examine their potential 
influence of CG variables on them.  
2. This study also recommends the replication of this research in a different 
environment to see whether what is obtained in Nigeria could also be obtainable 
in other environments, especially in emerging markets like Nigeria.     
6.7 Concluding Remarks 
The current thesis examined corporate governance variables measured by board size, 
board independence, audit committee independence, board gender diversity; 
managerial shareholding, chief executive officer power, abnormal director‘s 
compensation and disclosure of corporate governance information on the equity 
value multiples of Nigerian listed firms. The study used the Principal Component 
Analysis PCA technique to produce one principal component that represents all the 
four equity value multiples. The PCA post-estimation test established that a 
correlation exists between the equity value multiples and the first principal 
component computed from the PCA that produced 62% of the proportion of all the 
four EVMs. Similarly, the study established that board size, board independence, 
board gender diversity, audit committee independence, managerial shareholding and 
disclosure of corporate governance information have a significant relationship with 
equity value multiple of Nigerian listed firms. Therefore, the study concludes that, in 
the Nigerian business setting, the above-mentioned corporate governance variables 
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Principal Component Analysis Results 
pca pe1 pb1 ps1 pc1 
Principal components/correlation                  Number of obs    =       500 
                                                  Number of comp.  =         4 
                                                  Trace            =         4 
    Rotation: (unrotated = principal)             Rho              =    1.0000 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Component |   Eigenvalue   Difference         Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
           Comp1 |      2.49083      1.90813             0.6227       0.6227 
           Comp2 |      .582702     .0733121             0.1457       0.7684 
           Comp3 |       .50939     .0923132             0.1273       0.8957 
           Comp4 |      .417077            .             0.1043       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Principal components (eigenvectors)  
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |    Comp1     Comp2     Comp3     Comp4 | Unexplained  
    -------------+----------------------------------------+------------- 
           lnpe1 |   0.4795    0.7966    0.1107    0.3512 |           0  
           lnpb1 |   0.5246    0.0735   -0.3497   -0.7727 |           0  
           lnps1 |   0.5025   -0.4641   -0.5056    0.5258 |           0  
           lnpc1 |   0.4923   -0.3804    0.7809   -0.0554 |           0  














 estat kmo 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
 
    ----------------------- 
        Variable |     kmo  
    -------------+--------- 
           pe1 |  0.8091  
           pb1 |  0.8074  
           pc1 |  0.7830  
           ps1 |  0.7830  
    -------------+--------- 
         Overall |  0.7872  
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Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
summarize  bosize boid size nse_age1 industy1 ceopd1 female1 cgdi1 adircom1 risk1 msh 
aci_01 pca/evm tl_ta  
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      bosize |       500       9.568    2.958866          5         20 
        boid |       500      .63524     .170742        .17          1 
        size |       500       7.278    .8806313       5.71       9.59 
    nse_age1 |       500       22.68    14.42407          4         68 
    industy1 |       500         .41    .4587165          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      ceopd1 |       500        .648    .4780723          0          1 
     female1 |       500        .906    1.019432          0          6 
       cgdi1 |       500         .47     .499599          0          1 
    adircom1 |       500         100.018 70.335          3.463   532.1043 
       risk1 |       500        .524    .5039165          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
         msh |       500      .56998     .24302          0      .78451 
         aci |       500       .6437    .1538397        .33       .93 
     pca/evm |       500       4.4110    1.172601  -4.311341   15.24245 














GMM Results for PCA Value 
xtabond2 PCAV l.  PCAV  bosize boid female audits ceopd audits cgdi1 adircom riskv 
mash nse_age1 size industy Yrddum3 Yrddum4 Yrddu m5, gmm (industy riskv size audits 
ceop ceopd audits cgdi1 mash adircom, lag (1 2)) twostep Favoring space over speed. 
Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. Using a generalized 
inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimation  
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: cid                             Number of obs      =       500 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       100 
Number of instruments = 84                      Obs per group: min =         5 
Wald chi2(16) = 459170.93                                      avg =      4.00 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         5 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        PCAV |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        PCAV | 
         L1. |    .031002   .0027433    11.30   0.000     .0256252    .0363787 
             | 
      bosize |   .0876237   .0014348    61.07   0.000     .0848115    .0904358 
        boid |    1.71748   .0228534    75.15   0.000     1.672689    1.762272 
      female |   .0512283   .0099344     5.16   0.000     .0317573    .0706994 
      audits |   .0236042   .0028869     8.18   0.000      .017946    .0292624 
       ceopd |   .0036685   .0050969     0.72   0.472    -.0063212    .0136582 
       cgdi1 |   .0177783   .0039302     4.52   0.000     .0100752    .0254814 
     adircom |  -.0000115   .0000215    -0.54   0.592    -.0000536    .0000306 
       riskv |   .0319658   .0075568     4.23   0.000     .0171547    .0467769 
        mash |   5.320008   8.750009     6.07   0.000     3.600008    7.030008 
    nse_age1 |  -.0012824   .0004106    -3.12   0.002    -.0020872   -.0004777 
        size |   .0172589   .0050063     3.45   0.001     .0074467    .0270711 
     industy |  -.0405922   .0110076    -3.69   0.000    -.0621667   -.0190178 
     Yrddum3 |   -.010908   .0013462    -8.10   0.000    -.0135465   -.0082696 
     Yrddum4 |  -.0045279    .001735    -2.61   0.009    -.0079285   -.0011274 
     Yrddum5 |  -.0027761   .0017522    -1.58   0.113    -.0062103     .000658 






Instruments for first differences equation 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).(industy riskv size audits ceop ceopd audits cgdi1 mash adircom) 
Instruments for levels equation   Standard     _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.(industy riskv size audits ceop ceopd audits cgdi1 mash adircom) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.70  Pr > z =  0.090 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.01  Pr > z =  0.988 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(67)   =  80.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.130 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(67)   =  70.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.363 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(35)   =  28.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.767 























xtabond2   pe l. pe bosize  boid female audits ceop audits cgdi1  mash  adircom 
dirshar riskv nse_age1 size  industy  Yrddum3  Yrddum4 > Yrddum5, gmm (industy riskv 
size audits ceop ceopd dirshar  mash audits cgdi1 adircom, lag (1 2)) twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: cid                             Number of obs      =       500 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       100 
Number of instruments = 94                      Obs per group: min =         5 
Wald chi2(16) =  4.81e+07                                      avg =      4.00 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         5 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          pe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          pe | 
         L1. |   .0433621   .0192226     2.26   0.024     .0056864    .0810377 
             | 
      bosize |  -1.458351   .1131935   -12.88   0.000    -1.680206   -1.236495 
        boid |   1.405832   1.279471     1.10   0.070    -1.101885    3.913548 
      female |   .8116954   .1622796     5.00   0.000     .4936333    1.129758 
      audits |   1.712751   .1658546    10.33   0.000     1.387682     2.03782 
        ceop |  -.7322834     .01969   -37.19   0.000     -.770875   -.6936918 
       cgdi1 |   6.426462   .4737718    13.56   0.000     5.497887    7.355038 
        mash |   3.452306   6.934307     4.98   0.000     2.096506    4.812106 
     adircom |    .091572   .0018166     5.04   0.000     .0055967    .0127177 
       riskv |  -3.489542   .3174626   -10.99   0.000    -4.111757   -2.867327 
    nse_age1 |    .101238   .0217482     4.66   0.000     .0586123    .1438637 
        size |   5.154576   .4381251    11.77   0.000     4.295866    6.013285 
     industy |  -6.534906   .5840852   -11.19   0.000    -7.679692    -5.39012 
     Yrddum3 |   -4.13001   .1590264   -25.97   0.000    -4.441696   -3.818324 
     Yrddum4 |  -4.593725    .319141   -14.39   0.000    -5.219229    -3.96822 
     Yrddum5 |   -3.02907   .3574466    -8.47   0.000    -3.729653   -2.328488 








Instruments for first differences equation 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).(industy riskv size audits ceop ceopd dirshar mash audits cgdi1 
    adircom) Instruments for levels equation Standard _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.18  Pr > z =  0.029 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.14  Pr > z =  0.256 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(77)   =  45.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.998 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(77)   =  82.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.321 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(41)   =  43.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.374 























PRICE-TO-CASH FLOW MULTIPLE 
xtabond2  pc l. pc osize  boid female audits  ceopd audits cgdi1 adircom riskv  mash  
nse_age1 size  industy Yrddum3  Yrddum4 Yrddum5, gmm (industy riskv size audits ceop 
ceopd audits cgdi1  mash adircom, lag (1 3)) twostep Favoring space over speed. To 
switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, perm. 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: cid                             Number of obs      =       500 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       100 
Number of instruments = 100                     Obs per group: min =         5 
Wald chi2(16) =  1.21e+06                                      avg =      4.00 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         5 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          pc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          pc | 
         L1. |   .1464317   .0154548     9.47   0.000     .1161408    .1767225 
             | 
      bosize |  -.8090781   .0963141    -8.40   0.000    -.9978504   -.6203058 
        boid |   2.651457   2.221757     1.19   0.233    -1.703106    7.006021 
      female |   1.430104   .1509913     9.47   0.000     1.134167    1.726042 
      audits |    1.18516   .1089447    10.88   0.000     .9716319    1.398687 
       ceopd |   .7691386   .3789279     2.03   0.042     .0264535    1.511824 
       cgdi1 |   2.888586   .2843545    10.16   0.000     2.331261     3.44591 
     adircom |  -.0151596   .0011237   -13.49   0.000     -.017362   -.0129572 
       riskv |   1.241599   .5339382     2.33   0.020     .1950991    2.288098 
        mash |   1.480006   6.410007     2.31   0.021     2.250007    2.740006 
    nse_age1 |    .005285    .019835     5.81   0.015     .0764091    .1541608 
        size |   1.691083   .5571205     3.04   0.002      .599147    2.783019 
     industy |  -1.450599   .7307452    -1.99   0.047    -2.882834   -.0183651 
     Yrddum3 |  -2.633338   .2571898   -10.24   0.000    -3.137421   -2.129255 
     Yrddum4 |  -1.639234   .2602618    -6.30   0.000    -2.149338    -1.12913 
     Yrddum5 |  -3.393602   .2748841   -12.35   0.000    -3.932365   -2.854839 
       _cons |  -12.31015   4.275978    -2.88   0.004    -20.69091   -3.929387 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 




Instruments for levels equation   Standard     _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.(industy riskv size audits ceop ceopd audits cgdi1 mash adircom) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.90  Pr > z =  0.004 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.55  Pr > z =  0.581 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(83)   =  95.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.167 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(83)   =  88.65  Prob > chi2 =  0.315 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(51)   =  57.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.257 



























.xtabond2  ps l. ps  lbosize  lboid female laudits  ceopd cgdi1 adircom riskv  mash  
nse_age1 size  industy Yrddum3  Yrddum4 Yrddum5, gmm (I ndusty riskv size audits ceop 
ceopd cgdi1  mash adircom, lag (1 3)) twostep Favoring space over speed. To switch, 
type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, perm. 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: cid                             Number of obs      =       500 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       100 
Number of instruments = 100                     Obs per group: min =         5 
Wald chi2(16) = 562477.55                                      avg =      5.00 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         5 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          ps |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          ps | 
         L1. |   .3642835   .0111744    32.60   0.000     .3423821     .386185 
             | 
      bosize |  -.0623828   .1061912    -0.59   0.557    -.2705137    .1457481 
        boid |   .1251508   .0948461     1.32   0.187    -.0607441    .3110457 
      female |  -.4438451    .024185   -18.35   0.000    -.4912468   -.3964434 
      audits |   1.224203   .0908278    13.48   0.000     1.046184    1.402222 
       ceopd |   .6424703   .0500958    12.82   0.000     .5442843    .7406563 
       cgdi1 |   .4372114   .0664237     6.58   0.000     .3070235    .5673994 
     adircom |   .0007854   .0002768     2.84   0.005      .000243    .0013279 
       riskv |  -.5521871   .0583355    -9.47   0.000    -.6665227   -.4378516 
        mash |   1.292306   6.872308    18.75   0.000     1.152306    1.422306 
    nse_age1 |   .0304239   .0030478     9.98   0.000     .0244503    .0363974 
        size |   .6241043   .0622783    10.02   0.000      .502041    .7461676 
     industy |  -.3428345   .0786858    -4.36   0.000    -.4970558   -.1886132 
     Yrddum3 |  -.3285319   .0191892   -17.12   0.000    -.3661421   -.2909217 
     Yrddum4 |  -.0425719   .0235951    -1.80   0.071    -.0888175    .0036737 
     Yrddum5 |   .1426626   .0227402     6.27   0.000     .0980926    .1872325 
       _cons |  -5.015271   .4345275   -11.54   0.000    -5.866929   -4.163613 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Warning: Uncorrected two-step standard errors are unreliable. 
 




  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/3).(industy riskv size audits ceop ceopd cgdi1 mash adircom) 
Instruments for levels equation   Standard     _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.(industy riskv size audits ceop ceopd cgdi1 mash adircom) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.53  Pr > z =  0.026 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.34  Pr > z =  0.731 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(83)   = 127.95  Prob > chi2 =  0.101 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(83)   =  74.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.727 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(51)   =  47.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.121 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(32)   =  26.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.724 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(11)   =   9.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.570 




















PRICE-TO-BOOK VALUE MULTIPLE 
xtabond2 pb1 l. pb1  bosize  boid female audits  ceopd audits cgdi1 adircom riskv 
lnmash  nse_age1 size  industy Yrddum3  Yrddum4 Y rddum5, gmm (industy riskv size 
audits ceop ceopd audits cgdi1 mash adircom, lag (2 4)) twostep Favoring space over 
speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, perm. 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: cid                             Number of obs      =       500 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       100 
Number of instruments = 76                      Obs per group: min =         2 
Wald chi2(16) =   4250.76                                      avg =      3.93 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         pb1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         pb1 | 
         L1. |   .1797354   .0105767    16.99   0.000     .1590054    .2004654 
             | 
      bosize |   .4872032   .0233258     3.74   0.000     .0414854     .132921 
        boid |   -.061667   .2693297     3.83   0.000     .5037909    1.559544 
      female |   .0598979   .0336194     3.57   0.320     .0540051    .1857907 
      audits |  -.3274104   .0489028    -3.22   0.001    -.2532581   -.0615627 
       ceopd |   .0397531    .143862     0.28   0.782    -.2422112    .3217174 
       cgdi1 |   .0005336   .1210414     3.23   0.001     .1532968    .6277704 
     adircom |  -.0028489    .000525    -5.43   0.000    -.0038778     -.00182 
       riskv |  -.2023549    .116521    -1.74   0.042    -.4307319    .0260221 
        mash |  -3.653207   1.641327    -1.14   0.932    -5.083207    1.346507 
    nse_age1 |    .029773   .0052332     5.69   0.000     .0195161    .0400299 
        size |   .0117439   .0867305     0.14   0.892    -.1582447    .1817325 
     industy |  -.8081158   .2064753    -3.91   0.000      -1.2128   -.4034317 
     Yrddum3 |  -.3096286   .0315025    -9.83   0.000    -.3713723   -.2478849 
     Yrddum4 |  -.2547391   .0471673    -5.40   0.000    -.3471854   -.1622928 
     Yrddum5 |  -.2546954   .0592853    -4.30   0.000    -.3708924   -.1384984 
       _cons |  -1.014473    .593426    -1.71   0.087    -2.177566    .1486211 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 




Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard     _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(industy riskv size audits ceop ceopd audits cgdi1 mash adircom) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.23  Pr > z =  0.005 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.46  Pr > z =  0.311 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(59)   = 111.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.100 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(59)   =  52.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.705 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(35)   =  29.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.374 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(24)   =  23.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.488 
 
  
